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As donors of time and money analyze nonprofit organizations to determine where they can best 
invest their donations, comparative information is difficult to find. Without clear and compelling metrics 
to compare one potential nonprofit recipient to another, how can these donors make informed decisions 
about where their time and money will best be utilized?  Due to the difficulties of comparing the value of 
one mission to another in an objective way, the metrics used in this study consider nonprofit organizations 
and their readiness to use donations effectively from an organizational perspective rather than a mission-
focused one. The Community Engagement Index (CEI) assesses an organization’s commitment to 
integrating volunteer support throughout all its operational realms, while the Financial Vulnerability 
Index (FVI) considers the long-term financial stability of the organization.    
In this study, a purposive sample of nonprofit organizations in Texas was examined through the 
lens of the FVI in seven biennial time periods from 2000 to 2012, while CEI results were considered in 
2010. The intention was to determine whether the Great Recession of 2007-2009 caused meaningful 
changes in FVI scores for this sample. Due to inconsistent filings of Form 990 from which FVI data was 
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pulled, consistent FVI information was available for only 29 of the organizations in the sample. The 
organizations in this sample showed little statistically significant change in their FVI during the time of 
the recession, though it is difficult to know whether this lack of change is due to the small size of the 
sample or the strong economic performance of Texas throughout the economic crisis that hit other states 
more severely. Further testing with a larger sample, as well as CEI data from additional years, would 
strengthen a future study of this question. The unique nature of the information provided by each of these 
metrics is shown by the fact that they do not correlate with standard financial indicators.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Each scholar is drawn to her or his field by a different path. My interest in the nonprofit sector from 
the perspective of a strategic donor was cultivated by a summer internship. I wandered into the 
Stanford Theatre in Palo Alto during a college summer vacation, looking for some way to pay rent. 
The theater was purchased in 1987 by the David and Lucile Packard Foundation and run by the 
Stanford Theatre Foundation through the patronage of David Woodley Packard. After getting a job 
scooping popcorn, I asked my manager for extra work hours. I ended up serving as an intern at the 
Packard Humanities Institute and working with David W. Packard as the David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation was reinventing itself following the demise of David A. Packard, co-founder of Hewlett-
Packard. With the inclusion of David A. Packard’s bequest, the Foundation had grown 
tremendously, and the staff was focused on how best to influence the nonprofit sector with these 
new assets. One of the key components of the new vision was strategic giving: grants that would 
support greater efficacy and efficiency in essential nonprofit organizations. This initiative is currently 
reflected in the David and Lucile Packard Foundation’s capacity building grants, carried out through 
their Organizational Effectiveness program (The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, n.d.). These 
grants are intended to smooth operational challenges facing a nonprofit, allowing them to spend 
their time on the things they do well instead of worrying about back office issues such as 
bookkeeping, website updates, or training costs. 
This approach intrigued me. At 21, I had already been working in the nonprofit sector with disabled 
athletes for five years, and had struggled with inadequate resources. I spent more of my time fixing 
old, broken equipment than I did with my athletes. At the same time, I had seen established, well-
funded nonprofit organizations raise additional funding with ease while provided little feedback on 
their results. The David and Lucile Packard Foundation Organizational Effectiveness grants were a 
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way to solidify the organizational structure of nonprofit organizations. With this solid infrastructure, 
these organizations had more resources available to focus on their mission-focused work. This 
approach intrigued me. 
During my several years of work in the for-profit sector, I remained engaged in the nonprofit sector 
and attempted to support planning and infrastructure projects with my time and talents in much the 
same way that the David and Lucile Packard Foundation’s Organizational Effectiveness initiative 
was supporting such projects with treasure. During my nonprofit work, fund development 
professionals informed me that infrastructure dollars were difficult to raise. I grew more curious 
about the motivations for giving, and the types of information donors sought before or after a 
donation. Did donors have specific questions which would affect their willingness to give? If so, 
there might be certain data a nonprofit could share to support potential donors. If not, nonprofit 
organizations might be able to spend less time preparing reports and more time working on direct 
services. As I watched the economy fluctuate, I also became curious about how nonprofit 
organizations fare during economic crises. How did donors respond to financial crises? Did 
economic downturns cause shifts in funding patterns? Did donors give more during a downturn in 
acknowledgement of greater need, or did donations drop because potential donors had less to give? 
These questions drove the creation of the first part of this study, in which I will examine the 
financial vulnerability of nonprofit organizations in Central Texas between the years of 2000 and 
2012, to learn about the shifts in their funding structures and financial stability during the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009. 
Beyond financial performance, my curiosity has led me to explore nonprofits from an organizational 
strategy perspective, though my own consulting work and through the Masters in Business 
Administration curriculum at the McCombs School of Business. During my Masters work, I learned 
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about the strategic importance of effective volunteer engagement and management from Dr. Sarah 
Jane Rehnborg at the RGK Center. Thanks to her, I now include volunteers as donors to nonprofit 
organizations. Their gifts of time provide benefits to nonprofits, much like the gifts from financial 
donors. After focusing on the relationships between public charities and their financial supporters 
between 2000 and 2012, I will also consider ‘time donors,’ or volunteers, in this study. I plan to 
explore how financial sustainability varied in comparison to the strength of volunteer programs in 
the examined organizations.  
Motivating individuals to give their time and money to nonprofit organizations is challenging work. 
By examining financial sustainability and its inverse, financial vulnerability, we can gain a better 
understanding of which organizations are at risk during an economic downturn. Clearer knowledge 
of an organization’s risk of ceasing operations – and of what level of support might reduce this risk 
– could be a useful data point to share with potential funders. 
Scope of the Nonprofit Sector 
While this study will focus on the financial status of nonprofit organizations, defining the worth of a 
nonprofit’s work goes beyond its balance sheet. The financial strength of a nonprofit should be 
secondary in defining its success after a primary examination of its progress toward its mission. So 
how can this mission-centric information best be conveyed? Measuring the success of a nonprofit 
organization is not an easy task. Great effort has been expended in trying to establish a consistent 
way of measuring varied organizations in the sector in search of an ‘apples to apples’ comparison. 
The nonprofit sector includes 1.6 million 501(c)(3)-classified public charity organizations registered 
with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Urban Institute, 2013). Religious congregations and 
organizations with less than $5,000 in annual revenue are part of the sector, but are not part of this 
tally. The sector contributed over $800 billion to the economy in 2012 which represented 5.5% of 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the sector provided 9.2% of all wages and salaries paid in the 
United States. Volunteers donated time valued at almost $300 billion to the sector, and donations to 
the sector were also close to the $300 billion mark. Total assets held by the sector are estimated at 
$2.7 trillion, running on total annual budgets of roughly $1.5 trillion. Fully half of nonprofit budgets 
across the United States are financed by fees for goods and services paid by private sources, while 
fees collected from government agencies comprise just under a quarter of total nonprofit revenue. 
Private contributions account for 13.3% of the budgets of nonprofits across the nation on average, 
while government grants provide 8.3% of the total budget. If these numbers don’t sound 
representative of the sector as a whole, note that they are skewed by hospitals and higher education 
institutions. Comprising less than 3 percent of all nonprofits, they are responsible for 61% of the 
revenues and expenses for the sector as a whole (Urban Institute, 2013). For the purposes of this 
paper, I will use the terms ‘nonprofit’ and ‘nonprofit organization’ to refer to public charities in 
receipt of 501(c)(3) designation from the IRS. 
Other than donors (of time and of money), what groups might be interested in evaluating the 
financial stability of nonprofit organizations? Our communities carry larger tax burdens thanks to 
the tax exemptions granted to nonprofits. These tax exemptions and benefits affect income tax, 
property tax, minimum wage rates, bankruptcy, and postage costs (H. B. Hansmann, 1980). These 
cumulative benefits were estimated to be worth between $31 - $48 billion in 2008-09 alone 
(Sherlock, 2010). In a time when funding is tight, this is a meaningful amount of money. This 
revenue means that the remaining tax needs of our community must be met without the assistance 
of nonprofit organizations, increasing the effective tax rate for the remainder of the community and 
reducing the funding available for the government to provide services. While these dollars then enter 
the money supply and contribute to the tax basis in varied ways, there is still a reduction in available 
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tax dollars due to these exemptions. In return, the assumption is that nonprofit organizations are 
meeting community needs left unmet by the free market (H. Hansmann, 1987).  
What can we measure? 
One of the few pieces of data that can be tracked is the survival of an organization. Given the cost 
and friction in launching a new organization along with the lemma that nonprofit organizations exist 
to increase social good, I posit that the continuity of organizations, rather than re-launching new 
organizations to address ongoing community challenges, is positive on the whole. New 
organizations also face a newness bias (Kanter & Summers, 1994) as the community surrounding 
them adjusts to their presence. The new organization must build new relationships within the 
funding community and its organizational field, and find ways to reach out to its intended client 
base. None of this work is directly providing services to the intended population. 
Further, the metric of survival does not directly correlate with services being provided: in fact, there 
may be a negative correlation. An organization that is not concerned with survival may spend out its 
budget on providing excellent services for a short period of time, rather than focusing on 
fundraising and long-term management. The most efficient and effective nonprofits may be those 
that have failed due to spending all their resources on direct services.  
Another issue with survival as a metric of success is that it offers little guidance to the nonprofit’s 
management team on how best to make decisions in the short term (Kanter & Summers, 1994). 
Given that the support of a major benefactor can bias an organization’s survival and allow the 
organization to continue operating in the face of weak management or in pursuit of goals that do 
not support the mission, organizational longevity is not always an indication of organizational 
quality. Given the expectation that an organization’s reputation will grow with its age (Okten & 
Weisbrod, 2000), higher ages are expected to correlate with better reputations. Kanter and Summers 
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(1994) note that organizational competition is a critical component to receiving feedback. In other 
words, a very weak organization may exist for a long time if there are no competitive services being 
offered. Barriers to entry that create situations like this may include remote rural geography, high 
startup costs, or a dearth of qualified personnel.  
With all of the challenges listed above, Kanter and Summers conclude that “in the domain of 
nonprofit organizations, survival can indeed be an appropriate effectiveness standard” (p.226, 
Kanter & Summers, 1994). Kimberly agrees that “survival is one criterion that most researchers 
agree is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for success” (Kimberly, 1979). In order to 
survive, organizations must maintain enough resources to carry them through turbulent 
environments. These resources may be in several forms which could include cash reserves, product 
and service lines garnering sufficient net income to bolster the organization, generous grantors, 
committed volunteers willing and able to fulfill critical roles, extensive in-kind contributions from 
other organizations, or a blend of these and other forms of support.  Emery and Trist (2009) define 
turbulent environments as those fields in which organizations face high levels of relevant 
uncertainty. In turbulent markets, forces from the outside environment can render the consequences 
of an organization’s actions unpredictable. Legislative changes, new entrants into the market, and 
shifts in clientele and other inputs cause organizations to operate in a world in which nothing feels 
certain. Even survival is not assured. 
Financial Vulnerability 
In order to survive environmental turbulence, nonprofit organizations must ensure that they have 
sufficient financial resources to continue operation. Greenlee and Trussel (2005) modified Tuckman 
and Chang’s (2001) Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI) to create an absolute, rather than a relative, 
metric of financial vulnerability. By determining thresholds of financial strength above which an 
organization is unlikely to reduce programs in the future, as well as a threshold below which 
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organizations were in meaningful danger of reducing programs or closing their doors, the modified 
FVI contributed a tool allowing nonprofit organizations and their supporters to assess the relative 
viability of an organization’s financial position. I intend to utilize this metric to examine how a set of 
nonprofit organizations in the state of Texas fared through the recession of 2007-2009. Both the 
theoretical and historical background of the FVI will be discussed at greater length in the 
methodology chapter of this document. If this index can be shown to reveal important data about 
the sustainability of a nonprofit during a financial crisis, this simple metric may provide valuable 
information to potential supporters of a given organization – whether those supporters are 
considering donating time, goods, services, or cash to an organization. Since the FVI of an 
organization can be calculated easily, organizations can use it for internal longitudinal trend 
information, and can also share it with donors to portray their fiscal stability as they choose. 
Community Engagement and Voluntarism 
Nonprofit organizations devote varying amounts of attention to their interactions with their 
surrounding community. While every 501(c)(3) public charity is required to have a board, these 
boards can be ‘rubber stamp’ groups that agree with anything the CEO proposes (Carver, 2006; 
R.D. Herman & Van Til). By contrast, organizations that invest time and resources into building and 
maintaining ties to their surrounding community are creating non-financial resources. Ironically, the 
construction of a strong cadre of devoted volunteers may reduce the attractiveness of a 990 filing by 
reducing program expenses and thus increasing the apparent percentage of budget spent on 
administration and fundraising, these non-financial resources can yield potent organizational benefits 
(Charity Navigator, 2014a). Volunteers of many stripes can form a cadre of supportive voices when 
critical legislation is on the table, while volunteers with specific talents can offer strategic guidance 
and connections to an organization. However, most of the research on volunteering has focused on 
the value volunteers receive from their work ("Nonprofits by the Numbers", n.d.; Chinman & 
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Wandersman, 1999). The basic premise here is that for volunteering to occur, the individual 
volunteer must be receiving value greater than the cost they incur, or else they would not agree to 
volunteer. We may assume that nonprofit organizations would be unlikely to continue to utilize 
volunteers if they were not also receiving value exceeding the cost they incur. Given that nonprofit 
organizations are required to have governing boards which are usually filled by volunteers, the value 
they obtain may be the freedom to continue to exist. The value of volunteers to an organization is 
usually measured in financial terms (Hager & Brudney, 2004; The RGK Center, n.d.), based on the 
tasks they perform and with some consideration of the replacement cost: the amount the 
organization would need to spend to fulfill those tasks if all the volunteers were to quit (Clary et al., 
1998; Yanay & Yanay, 2008). Susan Ellis points out that, were these volunteers to quit en masse, 
nonprofits would not necessarily hire staff to fill all of these roles (Ellis, 1996), though it is not clear 
whether the reason not to fill these roles with paid staff is due to lack of need or lack of funding to 
support the additional staff. Hager and Brudney discovered that while most nonprofit organizations 
feel that volunteers save them money, the largest benefit of volunteers was in program delivery 
improvement. Further, they found that volunteers allowed organizations to provide additional 
services which would not have been possible without volunteer support (Hager & Brudney, 2004).  
Volunteers garner some of their benefit through social interaction. Putnam explains that as working 
hours grow longer, the number of children living in houses with no stay-at-home parent increases, 
and technology provides more leisure entertainment at home rather than outside the home, less time 
is available for social interaction. Organizations such as churches, unions, and women’s 
organizations have seen precipitous drops in membership, and a commensurate drop in civic 
engagement (Hager & Brudney, 2004). Wellman and Leighton present the idea of a liberated 
community as a group which is drawn together by bonds more central than those of geography 
(Brudney & Meijs, 2009). Putnam agrees that there are components of community that are 
   
9 
 
developed through online interaction, but argues that these communities are less likely to take 
collective action (Putnam, 2012).  
Volunteer work that is undertaken alongside other volunteers in the same physical space, however, 
provides benefits for the volunteer (Miller, 2002). The social connection gained by working with 
fellow volunteers who share a passion for a given cause is one of the benefits of volunteering for the 
volunteer (Hager & Brudney, 2004). Most of the research on the positive impact of volunteering has 
examined the relationship from the perspective of the volunteer, not of the organization. Does the 
formation of these bonds accrue any value to the nonprofit for which the volunteers are working? 
Will an organization with strong volunteer management and community connection practices 
respond differently from its peers during a financial crisis? 
The metric which was used to compare these volunteer management and community connection 
practices for this study was the Community Engagement Index, or CEI (Rehnborg & Poole, 2010). 
The CEI is a refinement of a tool created to answer the question, ‘what are the traits of 
organizations that manage volunteers well?’ The additional non-financial benefits of volunteers to 
organizations will be discussed in the methodology section of this document wherein the CEI and 
its history will be examined more thoroughly. One of the unique contributions that the CEI brings 
to the field is that it considers volunteer impact from a holistic, organization-wide perspective. The 
benefit which accrues to an organization as a whole of having a group of advocates for an 
organization out in the community is more difficult to measure than the internal impact of program 
volunteers.  
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 created such a crisis for many nonprofits. Did organizations with 
strong community ties fare differently during that recession? In other words, did organizations with 
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higher levels of community engagement show different patterns of financial risk between the years 
of 2008 and 2012 than those with weaker community bonds?  
This exploratory study began with an examination of the financial stability of 80 nonprofit 
organizations in the state of Texas as measured by Greenlee and Trussel’s modification of Tuckman 
and Chang’s Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI) (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991) in the years of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012.  
Next, FVI scores were examined in conjunction with Community Engagement Index (CEI) scores 
in the year of 2010 to determine whether organizations with stronger community linkages showed 
different patterns of financial performance from their peers.  
The consideration of a nonprofit organization from a perspective so strictly focused on financial 
performance may appear counterintuitive, given that nonprofits exist to strive towards their 
missions, not to increase their financial assets. I am examining organizations from this financial 
perspective due in part to the challenges of measuring financial performance, but also in hopes of 
reinforcing a metric which may help donors to understand how important their financial support is 
to the sustainability of a nonprofit organization. When a potential donor is examining two potential 
recipients of a major grant, calculating the FVI for these organizations may provide valuable 
feedback to the donor. The relevance and history of the FVI will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Though this study will consider financial vulnerability and community engagement simultaneously in 
its second section, this is not meant to imply that the benefits of a successfully managed volunteer 
program can be quantified by a solely financial measure. Previous studies have shown that 
organizations with strong volunteer management practices receive more benefit from their 
volunteers than those with weak management practices (Hager & Brudney, 2004). Preliminary 
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findings from a different, organization-wide assessment,  TCC Group’s Core Capacity Assessment 
Tool (CCAT), suggest that organizations engaging more than 50 volunteers outperform their peers 
in many ways, including financial strength (Rehnborg, 2014). The comparison of an organization’s 
performance on these two indices is meant to explore two secondary dimensions of nonprofit 
performance, without suggesting that performance in these dimensions defines the value of a given 
nonprofit organization. A careful focus on progress towards its mission should be the metric of 
success for any public charity. The challenges of measuring this progress are also addressed in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
When considering how best to invest in the nonprofit sector, donors of both time and money 
consider how to find good organizations doing good work in their communities. Both organizational 
mission and the likelihood that their time or dollars will be well-invested are important. The David 
and Lucile Packard Foundation supports this process through funding of infrastructure and 
organizational development efforts to strengthen organizations with strong missions and leaders that 
face internal structural challenges. For an organization to be well-prepared to utilize investments of 
time and money, it should have both a strong volunteer support structure and a stable financial 
foundation. While not every nonprofit serves its mission in a way that allows easy, smooth 
incorporation of volunteers, the organizations in this sample do engage volunteers and do accept 
financial donations. As a result, both of these elements are relevant in the sample organizations. In 
this study, these two components of the sample organizations were considered. 
After a review of the history of voluntary work in the nonprofit sector in the United States, this 
chapter will include a review of the theoretical underpinnings of the study. Various measures of 
organizational success and stability will be considered, culminating in the selection of Greenlee and 
Trussel’s (2000) modifications of Tuckman and Chang’s Financial Vulnerability Index (1991) as the 
metric of choice whereby to assess an organization’s long-term probability of survival. Next, the 
history of the Community Engagement Index will be reviewed, followed by a discussion of the three 
theories underlying the structure of that tool.  
How Did the Nonprofit Sector Come to Be? 
Having established the scope of the nonprofit sector in the U.S. economy, as well as its critical role 
in providing services in our society, I now add a review of the history of the sector. How did 
nonprofits evolve into their current role? 
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According to Salamon (2002), the first nonprofit in the nation was Harvard College, funded by a tax 
on corn. Hammack (2002) argues that a true nonprofit organization cannot be funded by a tax based 
on Salamon’s own definition of nonprofits as being organizations that are self-supporting (Salamon, 
1999), and therefore that the first nonprofits on American soil came into being after the American 
Revolution. Hammack suggests that before the Revolution, churches fulfilled many of the roles 
filled by nonprofit organizations in current American society. Churches managed education and 
social services including behavior reformation and indigent services, and Britain attempted to 
maintain some control over the now-independent colonies through the church, as well as through 
the Masons. Thus, the concept of community support organizations existed in the form of churches 
long before the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act formally recognized the different tax status of public 
charities in 1894 (Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, & Stanton, n.d.) when the first federal corporate 
income tax was established and charitable organizations were exempted from it. Prior to the 
Revolution, voluntarism was a part of the culture of the colonies, but voluntary associations 
exploded after the war. Brown (1973) estimates that more than 2500 voluntary associations were 
formed between 1760 and 1830 in Massachusetts alone. The realms addressed – trade associations, 
health services, intellectual and cultural groups, and some political groups – were similar to those 
included in today’s nonprofit sector.  
Brown (1973) highlights an intriguing point about these early voluntary associations: nearly every 
one began with some exclusionary component. Before 1790, the groups were exclusively male. 
Between 1790 and 1810, women began to form single- and dual-gender groups. Trade groups were 
limited to professionals in a given industry, literary and cultural groups controlled entrance into their 
membership through social and financial means by requiring fees.  
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What caused this explosion of associations? The implementation of the separation of church and 
state coincided with efforts from Protestant and Catholic churches to incorporate proselytization 
and service of the “unfortunate” into one’s Christian service (Hammack, 2002). With the 
Constitution implementing the separation of church and state as well as an explosion of commercial 
activity and population (R. D. Brown, 1973), voluntary associations allowed citizens to express their 
own priorities and values through a blend of associations, rather than having to choose between the 
strictures laid out by a given church or forgoing the support of a community of like-minded peers. 
In the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (The Dartmouth College Case, 1874) the Supreme 
Court ruled that the contracts of nonprofit organizations cannot be altered by the government, 
reinforcing their autonomy as an independent sector. This was a case in which the trustees of 
Dartmouth College, an institution which had been formed by a grant by King George III in 1769 
(prior to the Revolution) that had outlined the governance structure of the school and granted land 
to it. When the trustees deposed the president of the College in 1816, the New Hampshire 
legislature altered the charter to grant powers to the governor of New Hampshire including the 
ability to designate trustees and creating a state board with veto power over the trustees. These 
changes placed control of the College in the hands of the state, effectively moving it into the public 
sector. By overturning this transition and returning control of the College to the original board of 
trustees, the Supreme Court acknowledged that contracts, once entered into, should not be easily 
modified by the State, and that corporations had rights to maintain the property acquired under 
these contracts. While this case established rights for all corporations, the fact that the organization 
in question was a nonprofit organization further solidified the autonomy of nonprofit organizations 
in the face of governmental pressures.  
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To augment this independence from government control, nonprofits were granted exemption from 
federal income tax late in the nineteenth century. When the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 
instituted the first federal income tax, three core principles were defined. First, the organization had 
to be formed for the purpose of public charitable benefit. Second, the funds of the organization 
could not be diverted to the benefit of an individual connected to the organization. Third, gifts to 
these organizations would be exempt from the income tax. 
During the nineteenth century, records of donations are not extensive, but in 1922 private giving 
was estimated at 0.6% of gross national product, while the nonprofit sector comprised roughly 1% 
of the workforce (Hammack, 2002). While this may seem a pittance for total donations, note that 
currently the nonprofit sector makes up 9.2% of the U.S. workforce and annual donations are 
roughly 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). To reach 
the same ratios reached in 1922, donations to the sector would have to increase by roughly half a 
trillion dollars annually – almost three times the current rate. 
As nonprofits explored different funding streams, they continued to grow throughout the 19th 
century. Segregation was a common theme of these organizations, whether by race, religion, or 
gender. Associations provided some support for African Americans and women, but were wielded 
most effectively by white Protestant men to maintain commercial control (Hammack, 2002). 
Associations of craftsmen could reject membership applications for any reason, including race, class, 
or country of origin, excluding many groups from the networking and sales opportunities that such 
membership could convey. Immigrants from other religions were routinely denied the right to form 
associations. African Americans seeking to form corporations, be they for-profit or nonprofit, were 
rejected regularly. Given that white-run organizations charged higher rates to blacks than to whites, 
the inability to incorporate limited black enterprise in the South (Spencer, 1985). Catholics seeking 
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to form associations were denied on the assumption that any Catholic organization would be 
controlled by the Pope. Rejection of corporate status for African American organizations was 
common in the North and the South: Connecticut refused a charter for an African American school 
in the 19th century, while southern states routinely blocked organizations thought to promote literacy 
in African American populations (Hammack, 2002).  
The first sixty years of the 20th century saw the rapid growth of nonprofit medical centers and 
hospitals. Over these sixty years, the percentage of the labor force dedicated to nursing increased by 
more than a factor of twenty. Nonprofit educational institutions were also cropping up rapidly, 
supported by funding from the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (better known as the G.I. 
Bill), the National Science Foundation in 1950, and the National Defense Education Act in 1958. 
While the latter two actions have funneled important funding into the sector, the G.I. Bill altered 
higher education in such a fundamental way that it merits a closer look.  
The G.I. Bill was intended to revitalize the economy, not the veterans, as they returned from war. 
While the original intention of the bill was to smooth the glut of workers into the economy and to 
support those soldiers whose education had been interrupted, the bill became a larger measure to 
support veterans and to honor their sacrifices (Olson, 1973). The interest from veterans in 
education, as well as the high quality of their academic performance, exceeded all expectations. A 
program initiated to manage economic challenges and to cope with returning service members 
turned out to be a massive success for academic institutions and veterans alike. Its influence 
highlighted the ability of older students who might be married or have children to be successful 
students, and even to assist in teaching. Universities also discovered that larger classes could still be 
effective, a shift which led to vast increases in class and cohort sizes which has not been reversed 
(Olson 1973).  
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Individuals seeking to form nonprofit organizations fought deep wells of prejudice well into the 
1960s. While the discrimination earlier in the century focused on religion, discrimination based on 
race and gender were still rampant in the second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, 
incorporation of a nonprofit had to be authorized by a judge, who could capriciously reject a request 
based on not liking the name of the organization, or deciding that there was not a need for such an 
organization (Hammack, 2002).  
The rapid expansion of the sector has continued since the 1960s, but this expansion is not due to 
private giving, which has been at a consistent level at roughly 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
since 1960. Hammack (2001) attributes this to the doubling of average per capita incomes in the 
United States between 1945 and 1990, during which time spending on services quadrupled. 
Hammack suggests that because nonprofits provide more services than goods, it is reasonable that 
they would grow along with this economic trend. Federal funding increased yet more dramatically: 
from 1962 to 1997, federal funding of the areas commonly served by nonprofits increased from 
0.4% to 4.44% of the gross domestic product. While some of these dollars could have gone to 
public or private organizations, the increase by an order of magnitude in funding of areas such as the 
arts, research, education, health care, and social services created opportunities for nonprofit 
organizations to be supported financially. The process for incorporating a nonprofit organization 
became more equitable, allowing a more diverse set of founders to create a more diverse set of new 
nonprofit organizations, doubling the number of nonprofit organizations per capita over the 20 
years between 1970 and 1990 (Hammack, 2001). Government funders became interested in using 
vouchers rather than direct payment to provide subsidies for education, health care, and indigent 
care services. The Reagan administration attempted to veil the reduction of funding for direct 
operating support for social services by suggesting that vouchers would allow every recipient more 
control over the services received and would open up competition and drive an increase in quality in 
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the services provided. Along with this effort to create an open market for services that were 
previously funded by the government, the Reagan administration also promoted devolution: the 
decentralization of the outlay of public funds from the federal government down into individual 
states, counties, and towns.  
Marwell (2004) points out that in this privatized, devolution-driven, market approach to direct 
services, demand can often be greater than supply, and service providers spend their time competing 
with each other for funding rather than providing services. The determination of which organization 
receives the funding determines the shape of the services provided and can restrict the manner and 
geography in which services are available. Marwell posits that it is this shift that has driven the 
massive increase in the nonprofit sector since 1970, and that it has been a cumulative effort of 
countless legislative actions, not a single bill.  
As our current economy struggles to recover from the global recession of 2009, innovation in the 
nonprofit sector is driven by fears of insufficient resources, both human and financial. However, it is 
valuable to remember that nonprofit leaders have been worrying about the lack of volunteers since 
the early 1960s (Hammack, 2001). These fears are valid and important issues for nonprofit managers 
to consider, but it is also helpful to remember that the sector has been facing these challenges for 
over fifty years, and has become a larger and more critical component of the American economy 
over that time. Volunteer workforces have been critical to the nonprofit sector for more than two 
hundred years. As an integral portion of our national history, volunteering has grown and evolved 
along with the available and willing volunteer work force.  
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What do we want from the sector? 
With a clearer sense of the nonprofit sector and its unique traits and niches, what do we, as the 
public served by these public charities, want from the nonprofit sector? I posit that collectively, we 
want the sector to be efficient and effective while performing essential work. 
Essential 
To determine whether the mission a nonprofit plans to pursue is essential, we as a society rely on the 
IRS designation of being a 501(c)(3) public charity to determine whether an organization is 
performing essential work. Once an organization has obtained this designation, it is equivalent to all 
other 501(c)(3)-designated non-religious public charities. Tax laws apply similarly to all public 
charities, even when two charities have diametrically opposed missions (examples of such opposing 
viewpoints can be found in the areas of reproductive health and substance legality). After all, “ 
‘doing good’ is a matter of societal values about which there may be little or no consensus” (p. 222, 
Kanter & Summers, 1994). Rather than wading into the moral morass of these issues, the federal 
statutes regarding nonprofits do not distinguish between mission foci.  
Defining what work is worthy of being designated ‘essential’ is a challenging task. Still, the concept 
that every organization able to obtain and maintain this designation from the federal government’s 
tax-assessing arm is equally worthy is unsettling to many. While this study does not include 
information about how best to guarantee the essential nature of nonprofit work, the issue is an 
important one and merits awareness as we strive as a community to strengthen and improve the 
nonprofit sector as a whole. Despite the importance and value of the challenge of defining ‘essential’ 
work, either as an absolute or along a continuum, this question falls outside of the scope of the 
current study. For the purposes of this project, all public charities in receipt of a current 501(c)(3) 
designation from the IRS will be considered to be equally essential. 




Measures of efficacy are challenging due to the creativity in the nonprofit sector. A host of different 
organizations may arise within a relatively narrow mission focus, each with different goals and 
approaches, leading to different measures of effectiveness. As an example, consider a group of four 
organizations within the focal area of ‘safe after-school activities for high school students.’ 
Organization A offers tutoring for the ACT college readiness assessment. A team of tutors provide a 
brief lecture on a given ACT topic before dividing into small groups with students to practice that 
concept. The tutors have been trained in specific testing tricks and techniques for the ACT. They 
give the students a sample ACT at the beginning of the year and compare the students’ scores on the 
real ACT to their scores on these practice tests to measure their results. The program borrows space 
from local public schools and offers free services to the school’s students, reducing the 
organization’s total budget significantly. The tutors themselves are volunteers from a local college’s 
student teacher program, so the organization’s direct services are very inexpensive to provide. As a 
result, the organization’s administrative expense consumes more than half of their annual budget. 
Organization B offers homework assistance. Students can bring any type of homework and a group 
of tutors determine which tutor is the best match for that student’s challenges, and that tutor will 
cycle through the students who show up on a given day to give them as much guidance as they need 
during a given time window. Tutors are college-educated and have been given training in working 
with teens and are offered additional training and support as needed. The shift in student 
performance has been astonishing, but the cost per student is very high. 
Organization C is focused on getting students into college. This program provides no formal 
assistance with test preparation or current assignments, but guides students through the process of 
filling out the appropriate applications and other paperwork after helping them identify colleges that 
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might suit them well. This program offers no academic support, and provides no opportunities for 
students uninterested in a four-year degree. 
Organization D is a community center, providing a safe space for students to come after school to 
do homework, play sports, or socialize. A group of mentors are present and available and may help 
to organize activities, referee a basketball game, or set up an arts and crafts activity. The cost of the 
building is extremely high, and since the building is old it requires frequent repairs which impose 
large burdens on the organization’s fundraising staff. 
All of these organizations are providing service which may be extremely helpful for different 
students. Because they are offered through the nonprofit sector rather than the public sector, they 
can differentiate the clients they are willing to serve. The fact that they are nonprofit corporations 
does affect who they serve: they may turn away low-income clients in favor of those who can pay 
more. Unlike public sector organizations, they can discriminate among their potential clients based 
on traits such as the clients’ religion. After the passage of George W. Bush’s first presidential 
executive order creating the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, nonprofits 
discriminating not only between clients but also between potential paid staff members on the basis 
of religion became eligible for federal funding (Urban Institute, Vita, & Wilson, 2001). One can 
imagine the different ways in which these organizations could be assessed. Since the percentage of 
budget going to programs is a frequent metric for organizational assessment, Organization A could 
be ineligible for funding due to its conscientious efforts to keep program costs low – resulting in an 
apparently large overhead rate. Organization B could be disregarded due to its high cost per student, 
though it is the most adaptive, flexible, and responsive solution. Organization C will be helpful to a 
certain group of students, but depending on the demographics and priorities of the supporting 
community, this may not be a fit. Organization D faces ongoing site costs consuming large chunks 
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of its budget. Whether or not these expenses are considered program expenses, they are likely to 
continue to consume organizational resources at such a rate as to restrict the organization 
dramatically.  
Additional Challenges in Measuring Efficacy 
Beyond the variety of potential approaches to mission, nonprofits face a broad array of stakeholders 
with differing interests. Clients, and often their families in the case of children’s services and some 
medical services, a plethora of funders with varying priorities, internal staff, board members, and 
governmental bodies all have individual demands (Kanter & Summers, 1994). Further, the stated 
goals of these organizations may not be measurable for twenty years. In the example of the after-
school programs, they might all state that their mission was to prepare students for happy, successful 
lives. This presents the challenge of somehow documenting what a happy, successful life might look 
like, and how it might be measured. Even if a standard for a happy, successful life is constructed, the 
organization would need to find a way to measure it in the present. Further, the organization would 
need to control for other environmental factors that could influence a happy, successful life. It is not 
hard to see how evaluating nonprofit efficacy can appear impossible.  
Efficient 
In the for-profit world, the efficiency ratio is the percentage of revenue consumed by expenses, with 
lower ratios being more desirable (Busco, 2009). In the nonprofit world, efficiency is more difficult 
to express. In a services industry, the state of the inputs to an organization is highly relevant. For 
example, a hospital in an area with higher average income may have more families who have enough 
disposable income to allow them sufficient free time to exercise and to cook healthy food, and may 
live near safe parks where children can play. This hospital may have higher success rates with their 
patients due to the healthier patients coming through the door, as compared to a hospital in a lower-
income neighborhood. Moreover, a hospital in a higher income area may have more successful 
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fundraisers due to the higher income of the users of that hospital. Therefore, without measuring the 
‘inputs’ – the health of the incoming patients – for the hospital, measuring efficiency based on 
outcomes could penalize hospitals unjustly. An additional example can be found at competitive 
colleges: the students applying to these schools have already achieved so much that they are likely to 
be successful adults with or without the college experience. To appear successful and efficient, a 
university can accept only those students who have already paved their own paths to ‘success,’ 
however the university chooses to define success. 
Moreover, these swings in the state of the clientele of an organization may vary with the economy. 
For example, demand at food banks may increase when the economy is in poor shape, thus causing 
an increase in demand for services just as funding sources are drying up. At first blush, measuring 
the percentage of need met might appear to be a metric of efficiency, but the double whammy of 
increased demand combined with reduced funding could cause additional damage to the very 
organizations helping a community come through a crisis. Given that nonprofits are expected to 
hold social values over financial values (Kanter & Summers, 1994), an argument can be made that 
nonprofit organizations may need to damage their financial positions to benefit their clients during 
times of crisis.  
Given the challenges of measuring efficiency from a financial perspective, what other information 
can we gather about the work of nonprofits that will be valuable in assessing their efficiency? Many 
organizations rely on comparison to other members of their organizational field, in an approach 
based in institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This approach allows little flexibility for 
different models, such as the examples of after-school programs cited above. Moreover, it can have 
the effect of stifling innovation. Organizations are usually at their most innovative shortly after 
launch, and over time the same forces that drive innovation begin to drive institutionalization 
   
24 
 
(Kimberly, 1979). Comparison to peers is one of these forces. Thus, the very forces seeking to allow 
measurement of efficiency can push out innovation and trigger stagnation. By comparing an 
organization either to similar organizations or to itself in previous times can lead to abandonment of 
work past a given level. Such procedural approaches can cause staff to see a previous year’s 
achievement as a quota, and to reduce effort once this point has been reached (Kanter & Summers, 
1994). This was an issue raised by many teachers when the No Child Left Behind Act was 
implemented: the teachers were forced to spend a disproportionate amount of time ‘teaching to the 
test’ and working with low-performing students, leaving little challenge or even supervision for 
students who were not struggling with these standards (Darling‐Hammond, 2007). The result of the 
implementation of these standards was to reduce the opportunities for learning for the more gifted 
students, and to abandon those students deemed unable to pass the tests.  
Searches for a single theory of effectiveness for the nonprofit sector as a whole have been fruitless 
(Forbes, 1998). The diversity of missions encompassed by the sector, complicated by the variety of 
approaches taken to serve those missions, creates a setting in which performance comparisons 
between organizations are challenging. Since those supplying the funding rarely receive the output 
from the organization (Shapiro, 1973), supporters must rely on feedback from the administration. In 
the absence of a simple performance metric, different funders often use different metrics. As a 
result, diversity in funding streams may increase administrative workload as nonprofit staff members 
seek out information to meet divergent reporting requirements from a variety of funders. The work 
of gathering the information and formatting it for each of these various reports falls into the 
organization’s administrative or fundraising functions, and by consuming resources that could 
otherwise be directed towards mission-centric activities, reduces efficiency. 
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Often inefficiency stems from the very flexibility that allows nonprofit organizations to meet their 
missions. The opportunity for a staff member to take time away from a traditional role to assist a 
client may be the critical component in the client’s success. Daniel J. Cardinali, CEO of 
Communities in Schools (CIS), notes that the success of the CIS program is due to their ability to 
meet the needs of the students (Cardinali, 2014). Sometimes that means finding a quiet place for 
homework, and sometimes it might mean finding clothing that is clean enough not to be 
embarrassing for the student. Since each student has unique needs, there is no clear way to define 
the efficiency of this work. In one month, maybe all the challenges can be met with phone calls; in 
the next, extensive travel and in-person work may be required. The students with more extreme 
challenges may well be more expensive to serve, but the social good accrued by helping these 
students may lead to greater community benefit down the road. These may be the most ‘efficient’ 
dollars spent by an organization because they may be serving a student who would otherwise wind 
up as a larger community cost. Again we see that by prioritizing social values over financial values 
(Kanter & Summers, 1994), nonprofit organizations may appear to be grossly inefficient by strictly 
financial metrics. 
Organizational Sustainability as an Indicator of Efficiency for Investors 
A publicly traded corporation has an easy, visible metric by which to measure success from an 
investor’s perspective: the net value of the firm as quantified by the share price multiplied by the 
number of extant shares. Simplistic as this sounds, the visibility and easy comparability of these 
metrics allows investors to assess the sustainability of an organization, and to make assumptions 
about the quality of the work the company is performing. The roots of this study grow from the 
fertile questions raised by the David and Lucile Packard Foundation about how best to invest in the 
nonprofit sector, so examining the for-profit sector from an investor’s perspective is the appropriate 
comparative view. For-profit corporations may have additional goals beyond profit and may receive 
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benefits from accolades, but the most commonly-used metric to determine success for investors in 
the for-profit marketplace continues to be net value (Krantz, 2012).  
Given that non-profit organizations are prohibited by law from raising equity capital 
(CommunityEnterpriseLaw.org, n.d.), such comparisons become much more difficult to make. 
While few individual donors will spend time researching an organization before donating (Hope 
Consulting, 2010), organizational funders such as public and private foundations, corporations, and 
government grantors will usually have particular goals in mind when they support a nonprofit. As a 
result, different funders will request different information from nonprofit organizations, creating 
additional administrative burden for the nonprofits receiving funding from multiple sources with 
varying reporting demands. The funders are not making these demands to create artificial work for 
the nonprofits: rather, they are adhering to the teachings of management guru Peter Drucker who 
explained that if an organization is to meet its goals it must have “clear targets, the attainment of 
which can be measured, appraised, or at least judged” (p. 103, Drucker, 1980). These funders 
acknowledge that in order to meet their goals, they must have metrics aligned with the funder’s 
goals, not simply the recipient organization’s goals. The variety of funders and the myriad of goals 
they hold can create a reporting nightmare for nonprofit organizations able to obtain funding from 
diverse sources. As illustrated with the examples of after-school programs in the previous chapter, 
even organizations with apparently similar missions and foci may have divergent approaches 
requiring differentiated reporting approaches. Identifying funders with goals as similar as possible to 
an organization’s mission will help reduce this burden, but perfect overlap of organizational goals 
may be difficult to achieve.  
One way to mitigate this administrative burden is to focus fundraising efforts on a single fundraising 
stream or a certain type of donor. While many nonprofits are very successful in this approach, they 
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run greater risks of insolvency if an event strikes their preferred funder type more severely than 
others (Gronbjerg, 1993). Volunteers constitute one of these streams of support, though their 
contributions are not directly financial in nature. A diversified set of funding streams decreases 
financial risk, but may increase administrative work to meet the reporting requirements of a diverse 
set of funders (Gronbjerg, 1992). If diversification is positive, how can nonprofits diversify their 
funding streams while minimizing the increase in administrative effort to meet diverse reporting 
needs? 
To mitigate the burden that funders place on nonprofits through their reporting requirements, some 
efforts have been made to standardize the communication tools used by nonprofits to inform their 
funders and their communities of their progress. The public nature of an organization’s federal tax 
return on Form 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) each year has been a step towards 
transparency, and web-based services such as Guidestar (www.guidestar.com) have improved 
accesses to these resources. An additional communication vector which is becoming more common 
is a logic model (J. A. McLaughlin & Jordan, 1999; W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2001). By describing 
the process through which a nonprofit plans to convert its inputs into its intended outputs in the 
short and long term, a logic model can drive the generation of a standardized set of metrics based on 
the nonprofit organization’s goals and processes that may also meet the needs of many of its 
funders. Though these qualitative tools may help to explain the connection between program 
activities and the organization’s long-term vision, they still require time and thought from an 
interested reviewer to convey relevant information. The quest, therefore, is to identify a metric that 
can crisply convey the relevant fiscal status of a nonprofit, in hopes of encouraging donors to verify 
the solvency of the nonprofits into which they invest, thus reducing friction in the nonprofit system 
by channeling funds into organizations that will survive for long enough to invest those donations 
wisely in mission-focused work. Such a metric would not overemphasize growth beyond inflation, as 
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increased net financial value is not the primary measure of a nonprofit organization’s success: rather, 
that organization’s efforts towards its mission define its success. Further, the metric would give the 
broader community a sense of how financially resilient such an organization would be in the face of 
an economic shock. With this information, funders can either shore up organizations in which they 
believe in an effort to ensure their long-term viability, or can select sturdier institutions to support. 
Just as missions vary, so do funders; different supporters are drawn to organizations in different 
states of financial health. Thus, the desired metric would provide output along a continuum, to allow 
organizations to assess themselves longitudinally while allowing potential donors to compare the 
financial health of various organizations in an informed way. 
Individual Donors Do Little Research 
As of 2010, more than half of all charitable contributions came from the wealthiest 30% of 
individuals, with less than a fifth as much support coming from foundation grants (Hope 
Consulting, 2010). Only one-third of these donors would be willing to donate to a new cause, and 
the average amount of research done is under two hours, usually seeking simple quantitative data, 
usually derived from the organization’s most recent filing of Form 990. Thankfully, the data on 
revenue and expenses filed on Form 990 has been shown to be quite accurate when compared to 
audited financial statements (Froelich, Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000) . The most sought-after statistic is 
the percentage of overall organizational funds dedicated to programs (Hope Consulting, 2010). 
While financial support of programming is critical to an organization’s success, there are a host of 
factors which may distort this statistic.  
For example, in some mission areas it is much easier to recruit volunteers to perform program work 
than to perform administrative work. In mission realms such as food banking, the sorting and 
distribution of food is an unskilled task that can be handed off to volunteers with a broad array of 
physical health with little training. Groups may come in from offices, social clubs, or churches to 
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perform tasks such as opening cartons of food and inserting a set number of items into each of 
several containers for distribution. Habitat for Humanity has made extensive use of volunteers for 
years in its building projects. In child-oriented mission foci, recruiting volunteers from local 
retirement homes has been an effective way to increase the ratio of caretakers to students while 
keeping program costs low. An organization that dramatically improves recruitment to fill these jobs 
in a given year may see a large decrease in their program expenses, and may choose to invest those 
dollars to strengthen administrative portions of the organization. Such a shift, triggered by improved 
business practices, would cause a decline in the program spending of the organization. A donor 
looking only at this one statistic – the percentage of expense originating in program activity – would 
consider this program weaker due to the reduced employee cost from improved volunteer 
recruitment.  
Organizations such as Austin Partners in Education (www.austinpartners.org) bring committed 
groups of volunteers into local schools to deliver small-group instruction to students in struggling 
schools. Since the great majority of their ‘program staff’ is made up of volunteers, their program 
delivery expenses are relatively low. In each of these cases, volunteers are providing critical program 
services and support, but based on their balance sheets, this reduction in expenses on the program 
side will detract from their appeal in the eyes of donors. Ironically, the scrutiny of the percentage of 
expenses stemming from the ‘programs’ category as reported on an organization’s Form 990 filing 
can create disincentives to save money and safeguard resources in program delivery. Further, 
initiatives such as program management, program evaluation, and strategic planning would fall into 
the ‘administrative’ expense category. Such focused attention on a single ratio can cause nonprofits 
to avoid essential oversight and planning tasks for fear of alienating potential donors. That said, the 
focus of donors on this statistic prior to making a contribution has led to this ratio of program 
expense to total expense to be an important factor in predicting a nonprofit’s ability to garner 
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contributions (Kiser, 1999). One goal of this research will be to seek additional easily-conveyed 
metrics that could inform donors as to the stability of the organizations and their chances of 
survival.  
Charity Navigator’s Assessment Methodology 
Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.org) has attempted to broaden this perspective somewhat 
by creating a metric incorporating more components of an organization’s management, yet still 
maintaining the simplicity of a single indicator, allowing a casual researcher a similarly simple single 
metric by which to compare organizations. To reach such a crisp output as a single number, 
simplifications and generalizations are necessary. Still, there are challenges with the methodology in 
use, as there would be with any system expected to reduce the complexity of the entire nonprofit 
sector into a neat quantitative response. The subscale indicators listed below are those required to 
receive full credit on each of the subscales. Organizations that do not reach these standards are 
eligible for less stringent standards to receive scores under the full five-star rating. Still, the standards 
described herein outline the definition of a five-star nonprofit organization from the perspective of 
Charity Navigator.  
The largest drawback of Charity Navigator’s approach is that they only assess large nonprofit 
organizations. They only evaluate organizations with over $500,000 per year in public support, and 
more than $1,000,000 per year in revenue (Charity Navigator, 2014b). This metric excludes 82.4% of 
all nonprofits in the United States (Urban Institute, 2013). One can imagine how limited the 
usefulness of a reporting agencies such as Consumer Report or the Better Business Bureau would be 
if they only reviewed products from one out of five companies. 
With this limitation in mind, the review process of Charity Navigator is worth examining, as it is the 
best-known organization attempting to wrestle with this intractable problem of conveying 
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comparative information about nonprofits to potential donors. Bearing in mind that organizations 
with similar missions may take varying paths to that mission, Charity Navigator incorporates more 
information than the simple ‘program versus overhead’ ratio most commonly used by donors. Their 
metric includes the following seven categories: program expenses, administrative expenses, 
fundraising expenses, fundraising efficiency, primary revenue growth, program expense growth, and 
working capital ratio. The sum of the scores from these subscales is added together, and the 
nonprofit is given a ranking on its overall score, from zero to five stars. Each of these metrics has a 
valid reason for being included in the metric, as well as limitations to be considered. 
Charity Navigator will give a zero-star rating to any organization spending less than one-third of its 
revenue on programs. In the organizations they review, they have found that nine out of ten 
organizations incur at least 65% of their expenses on programs. Since the IRS will not recognize 
volunteer time on Form 990 as a donation, I suggest that there could be organizations using 
volunteers to perform so many of their tasks that the majority of their expense is in the 
administrative back office. Still, according to Charity Navigator, if such organizations were able to 
grow to this scope they would be given zero stars due to their “gross inefficiency” (Charity 
Navigator, 2014a).  
To receive a top score on administrative expenses, most organizations must keep their 
administrative spending under 15% of total expenses. Food banks and other food distribution 
services must keep their administrative cost under 3%. By contrast, museums may have 
administrative overhead of up to 17.5% and still receive full credit in this category. Charity 
Navigator indicates that these percentages are based on historical analysis of organizations in these 
mission areas (Charity Navigator, 2014a). 
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Fundraising efficiency is measured by comparing fundraising income to fundraising expense, and 
top scores are allocated to organizations able to raise a dollar by spending for less than a dime. For 
public broadcasting and media, this rate doubles due to the expense of the air time needed to raise 
money, while for community foundations and food distribution systems this rate drops to three 
cents. 
When measuring primary revenue growth, Charity Navigator breaks findings down into 34 mission-
based subcategories, such as International Peace, Libraries, and Wildlife Conservation. Each carries 
an expected annual growth rate, averaged over recent fiscal years, of between five and ten percent to 
reach the full score. This metric assumes that positive growth is an important component of 
nonprofit health, even for these very large institutions. One could easily imagine a wisely-managed 
library or museum with a consistent support base that has achieved balance with its surrounding 
community and has no need to grow beyond its extant revenue needs. The assumption that a 
nonprofit is not healthy simply because it is not growing at ten percent a year – a rate nearly three 
times the highest rate of growth the national economy has experienced in the last decade (The 
World Bank, 2014) – has no stated research grounding in the Charity Navigator methodology. It is 
reasonable to expect a nonprofit to increase its revenue at a rate which approximates the greater of 
two factors: the rate of inflation (Bowman, 2011) or the rate of increase of its expenses over time. 
Beyond this rate, additional growth may not align with the strategic vision of the nonprofit, or of the 
donor. 
In measuring program expense growth, Charity Navigator expects program expenses to lag revenue 
growth. As an example, to attain full points a humanitarian relief organization must maintain 
program expense growth at a level under three percent, while total revenue growth is expected to be 
over five percent. Even in an organization with 100% of revenue dedicated to program expenses, 
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this metric would expect an organization to raise $1.67 for each dollar spent on programs… at a 
minimum (Charity Navigator, 2014a). This expectation seems unreasonable, especially given that 
both of these metrics are averaged over a national recession.  
The working capital ratio of an organization is the ratio of its liquid assets to its expenses, and can be 
used to calculate the amount of time a nonprofit would be able to exist at its current spending rate 
on its current cash. In this category, Charity Navigator considers eleven categories separately after 
suggesting that nonprofits in general should keep one year’s worth of liquid assets available. For 
educational organizations this expectation rises to three years, and community foundations are 
expected to maintain 5 years’ worth of available assets to qualify for top ranking in this category 
from Charity Navigator. There is also a caveat mentioning that any organization with more than 
$250 million in working capital will receive full credit in this category. This stipulation, added 
casually into the description of this standard, suggests how inaccessible such goals are for almost 
half of the nonprofits in the nation which are operating on annual budgets under $100,000. Further, 
I would suggest that many donors want to feel that their dollars are needed, and that contributing to 
an organization while knowing that one’s dollars will not be filling a relatively urgent need would add 
a challenge to the work of an organization’s development staff. 
Charity Navigator is providing a valuable service for donors. Their comparative research allows 
casual donors to select between organizations within a given mission focus without seeking 990s for 
each organization and calculating financial metrics. Just like any snapshot, the metrics they capture 
convey certain information without giving a holistic view of organizational health. Still, given that 
the vast majority of nonprofits within the United States are unlikely to attain the scale needed to 
reach Charity Navigator’s thresholds for analysis, other metrics are needed to evaluate the health of 
smaller nonprofits. 




Though maximizing net assets is not the primary goal of a nonprofit organization, the fact remains 
that an organization must find ways to obtain enough resources to provide services if it is to make 
progress towards its mission. Bringing in funds may appear to be a distraction from the mission, but 
without it the mission will fail. While Charity Navigator’s strong preference for aggressive growth 
favors large organizations working hard to become larger, they are not the only metric emphasizing 
growth rate. Two additional financial measurement structures also share the view that growth is a 
critical component of nonprofit financial health, and award more favorable results to organizations 
growing more rapidly.  
Bowman felt that the extant models in 2011 were divided into those based on portfolio theory that 
assessed financial strength on a very long term basis with an assumption that services should be 
maintained or expanded over time, and those based on financial metrics that assessed financial 
strength at the moment of analysis. To bridge this divide, he created his capacity and sustainability 
model (Bowman, 2011) and explained that this tool could be adjusted by an organization to shift 
focus appropriately between short- and long-term analysis. However, his model biases both its 
short-term and long-term metrics on growth with higher scores attributed to higher growth rates. 
The capacity and sustainability metric is intended to consider the growth of an organization over 
time, emphasizing both current and future positions in a longitudinal assessment. Bowman points 
out that the choices of the levels at which to hold these metrics is left to the discretion of the 
organization’s management, which may be true when the metric is calculated for internal use as a 
reference against previous years’ performances. In contrast to Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) 
Financial Vulnerability Index, he argues that this tool is intended to reflect financial performance 
over both the short and the long term.  
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Bowman’s strong bias towards growth may be appropriate for internal analysis for some 
organizations. Given that the scope of analysis for this study is the Recession of 2007-2009, the 
long-term element of his model is not relevant. The focus for this study is on resilience in the face of 
an economic shock. The foundational assumption in the long-term component of Bowman’s model 
states that programs, as reflected by program spending, should remain steady or increase in the long 
term. For broad-based sector analysis, this model overemphasized the importance of financial 
growth. 
Zietlow’s Financial Health Index (Zietlow, 2012) utilizes measures of financial solvency, liquidity, 
and financial flexibility. The measure is based upon fifteen separate measures rolled up into four 
distinct components of the score, and requires information beyond that supplied on Form 990, 
unlike Charity Navigator and Bowman’s capacity and sustainability model. While this may be a 
valuable resource for internal use, it is too complex and relies too heavily on internal information to 
be useful in a broader context. For the purposes of this study, the preferred metric needed to have 
three traits: to be calculable from publicly available data, to be relatively unbiased towards growth, 
and to be applicable to organizations of varying sizes. The logic behind these traits is explained 
below. 
First, metrics calculable from publicly available data reduce debate about the accuracy of the 
numbers being used to calculate the metric (Froelich, et al., 2000). Prior to releasing financial 
information in a 990, the organization’s senior executive must sign the document affirming the data 
to be accurate. Executives know that these documents will be published and available for all to see, 
and that funding decisions will be based on these documents. As a result, externally released 
information is relatively reliable (Froelich, et al., 2000). Thus, a metric based on these externally 
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available numbers will not only entail less effort to obtain, but will also base the metric on the most 
verified information available.  
Second, nonprofit organizations strive to reach their missions, not to grow financially for the sake of 
financial growth (Sessoms, n.d.). Nonprofit organizations do not necessarily need to be increasing 
their financial assets each year in order to be striving efficiently and effectively to meet their 
missions. Therefore, the desired metric need not include a requirement for net asset growth. This 
pressure towards growth is an artefact of the metrics the nonprofit sector has borrowed from the 
for-profit sector (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Due to recognition that not every nonprofit 
organization is seeking to grow as part of its long-term vision, the metric should focus on financial 
flexibility and viability, rather than on financial growth for the sake of growth. Third, the data set 
under consideration includes organizations spanning a wide range of sizes. To examine these 
organizations fairly, the metric would not penalize an organization for its size. In return, this test will 
examine the predictive value of the metric as a bellwether of an organization’s ability to survive a 
recession. The applicability of the metric to organizations of varying sizes is important given that the 
organizations in the sample to be studied vary dramatically in size from under $200,000 in annual 
budget to over $10 million.  
Financial Vulnerability 
The metric which seemed best suited to this use and has been researched in the nonprofit sector is 
Trussel and Greenlee’s (2000) modification of Tuckman and Chang’s Financial Vulnerability Index 
(1991). 
Tuckman and Chang created the Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI) to identify those nonprofits 
that would be at risk during a financial downturn. Their article describes the importance of the 
nonprofit sector as a segment of the economy and as a provider of services, the challenges of 
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measuring the output of the sector. They explain that their goal is not to assess overall health, but 
rather to determine which nonprofits would need to curtail their programs abruptly in the face of an 
economic shock (Gronbjerg, 2001). Due to the exploratory nature of their work, the authors do not 
create an absolute scale such as that used by Charity Navigator, but rather a relative scale in which 
an organization ranking in the lowest quintile of the sample in a given criterion is considered to be 
‘at risk’ in that realm, while organizations in the lowest quintile in all four criteria are classified as 
‘severely at risk.’ To avoid this issue of relativity, Greenlee and Trussel (2000) created an absolute 
metric with cutoff values for financial health, questionable financial viability, and financial risk. 
Further information about the evolution of the FVI and the data it provides will be provided in the 
Methodology section of this document.  
Community Engagement: Theoretical Grounding 
Regardless of the challenge of quantifying the exact financial value of volunteers, (Handy et al., 2000; 
Handy & Srinivasan, 2004), this study operates from the assumption that volunteers provide value to 
the organizations they serve. My proxy variable representing these ties is the organization’s score on 
the Community Engagement Index (CEI), developed by Rehnborg and Poole (2010). The content 
of the CEI grew out of an examination of organizations that engaged volunteers effectively. As a 
result of this analysis, a holistic view of organizational activities spanning the boundary between the 
organization and its surrounding community emerged. Thus, while volunteer theory forms the 
starting point for the theoretical framework of community engagement, organizational capacity 
theory and community-building theory play essential roles in augmenting the scope of consideration 
of the study. 
Volunteer Theory 
Any discussion of volunteer theory should begin by defining how volunteering differs from other 
activities. Much like the description of nonprofit versus for-profit organizations, definitions may 
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become foggy near the boundaries. Differentiating between helping and volunteering can be 
challenging when a volunteer activity grows out of a helping activity. Many nonprofit organizations 
grow out of a small committed group of friends deciding to work together on an issue due to some 
personal link to that challenge. At what point does such a project transition from helping to 
volunteering? If the volunteer is receiving something of value in return, such as social contact or 
new skills, does this still qualify as volunteering? Herzog and Morgan (1992) suggest that one reason 
for the undervaluing of both helping and volunteering has been driven by decades of societal 
undervaluing of the work of women. As a result, little effort has been expended to assess the value 
of volunteer work to our society as a whole. They discovered that while productive time between the 
genders was equal, women spent more time in unpaid labor than did men. For this study, Herzog 
and Morgan looked at three categories of activity: paid work, unpaid work at home, and help 
provided to others. Volunteer work was included in this third category, as well as tasks such as 
mowing the lawn of an infirm neighbor or bringing items to a sick friend. Their analysis found that 
the work of women in sum was as productive and as valuable as that of men, though the 
compensation was lower due to the nature of the work they perform, such as child care, home 
maintenance, and helping activities (Herzog & Morgan, 1992). Thus, volunteering is not inherently 
less valuable to the community as a whole than paid work, but the value accrued from the work is 
given to the community rather than to the volunteer. Something drives people to give, a force 
named altruism by the philosopher Auguste Comte to describe what he saw as our highest goal in 
life (Mill, 1875).  
The findings of Herzog and Morgan, when taken with Comte’s words, suggest that altruism is 
driving members of our society, more women than men, to choose to give one of their most 
valuable resources – their time – to another individual or group out of a drive away from egoism and 
thus personal comfort.  
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Musick and Wilson state that “volunteer labor will always be necessary to help government agencies 
achieve their goals” (p.4, Musick & Wilson, 2007), and describes the differing logic from varying 
points on the political spectrum supporting the importance of voluntary efforts. It was the breadth 
of support for a better understanding of volunteering, and of the organizational characteristics 
which support volunteers effectively, that drove the Corporation for National and Community 
Service to commission the creation of the original tool from which the CEI is descended. Further, 
the reduction of civic engagement and the decline of social associational activity have weakened our 
democratic process by loosening the social bonds which hold communities together in common 
interest. As these bonds fray under the pressure of increased work hours and increased use of 
technology for connection and expression, volunteering provides an opportunity for individuals to 
connect with groups and thus to increase their social capital (Musick & Wilson, 2007). 
In their earlier work, these two researchers had come upon a definition of volunteering that 
addressed the issue of defining the scope of volunteerism. They posit that “volunteer work, unlike 
the labor market and the informal sector, is uncommodified; unlike household labor, it is freely 
undertaken” (p. 694, Wilson & Musick, 1997). They explain that informal helping, such as of an 
infirm neighbor, is a component of volunteering, but is a different activity and will be treated in their 
work as a separate category from formal volunteering. Moreover, they clarify that volunteers may 
receive benefits from their work, and that they may be altruistically motivated, but that this does not 
impinge upon the voluntary nature of their efforts (Wilson & Musick, 1997). The fact that volunteer 
work is not coerced is one of its central tenets; in fact, the lack of coercion to participate is a 
differentiator throughout the nonprofit sector. In defining the differences between the public and 
nonprofit sectors, the inability of a nonprofit to coerce participation from volunteers or from clients 
sets it apart from the public sector, wherein participation may be required (Frumkin, 2009). The fact 
that the public sector will occasionally allow nonprofit volunteer service to sate an obligation which 
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would otherwise be fulfilled by imprisonment is interpreted by critics as a blurring of this boundary 
separating the sectors. 
Effective volunteer management must be predicated on a deep comprehension of the motivations 
driving volunteers. Wilson and Musick (1997) outline four defining traits of volunteer work. First, it 
is productive: there is value produced for some individual, group, or entity. Second, it involves 
multiple people to some degree, either through multiple individuals working on an issue or multiple 
people benefitting from the volunteer work done. Third, it involves the ethics of the volunteer who 
is driven by a moral force, regardless of the benefit the volunteer may accrue from increased positive 
visibility, new skills, or invitations to join social clubs. Fourth, the authors suggest that helping and 
volunteering are related, and that volunteers may see them as substitute activities (Wilson & Musick, 
1997). In other words, the CEO who chooses to pick up litter in a park over the weekend may be 
less likely to agree to serve on the board of a nonprofit because she has fulfilled her helping role for 
the time being. This aligns with a common criticism of social media awareness campaigns at the 
moment: the argument is that by allowing people a way to legitimate their self-image as a caring and 
involved citizen by typing an update on Facebook or tweeting about a certain issue will fulfill that 
person’s desire to help. As a result, people are making statements on social media rather than writing 
letters to politicians, attending rallies, or donating money to a cause (Oremus, 2014). By allowing 
people to feel that they have fulfilled their moral duty and satisfied their need to see themselves as 
engaged and concerned, such campaigns lead to awareness but little action. If a person can post a 
video of being chilly for a few minutes after having ice water dumped on his head rather than 
donating $100, the person’s friends may enjoy the video more than they would care if the friend 
made the donation but the organization would probably benefit more from the $100 than from the 
video. Wilson and Musick discovered another example of this substitution in their data: they 
discovered that time spent in prayer was negatively associated with helping behaviors in women. 
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One hypothesis is that religious women are expressing their devotion to their faith through prayer 
rather than through charitable action. 
Since volunteers are not paid at market value for their work, Wilson and Musick identify a set of 
motivating factors that drive volunteers: the desire to be productive, to connect with others in a 
positive way, to express one’s moral self, and to balance this opportunity with other forms of 
helping. An organization hoping to create and maintain an effective relationship with volunteers 
would be wise to keep these motivators in mind. If volunteers are giving their time to feel that they 
are performing important work, they may not be satisfied with the classic task example of stuffing 
envelopes. Determining the type of social experience the volunteer seeks will be relevant: whether 
this individual is seeking social interaction through volunteer work, or whether the individual is 
more focused on the audience being served. Understanding that the volunteer is seeking a way to 
express or demonstrate a moral code may drive volunteers to seek recognition. Thus volunteer 
managers and other staff members may need to openly and publicly thank volunteers so that they 
feel their work, and through it their ethics, have been noticed. By contrast, volunteers who are 
seeking to learn new skills, or look for new social contacts, may not be as focused on public 
recognition of their work. Finally, effective volunteer managers will need to recognize that other 
helping behaviors may attain higher priority than their organization at times. Acknowledging this 
from the beginning may make it easier for volunteers to return after hiatuses. The issues addressed 
by the CEI (Rehnborg & Poole, 2010) are shaped by these defining traits of volunteer work. 
Writing about volunteer work has focused in three main areas: quantifying the impact of volunteers, 
improving volunteer management, and the work of specific groups of volunteers such as the board 
of directors or an event planning committee. Little research has been done on the impact of the 
relationships a nonprofit organization forms with its surrounding community through volunteer 
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involvement, partnerships with other corporations in its organizational field, and the leadership 
culture of the organization. By perceiving nonprofit organizations as open systems (Scott & Davis, 
2007) the authors of the CEI open a new perspective on voluntary engagement, and raise interesting 
questions about these community ties. Effective volunteer management yields greater benefit to the 
organization internally (Hager & Brudney, 2004), but what about time spent in collaborative activity? 
Does participation in projects such as continua of care and collective action groups support a 
nonprofit organization? Does serving as a resource for the media garner additional benefit for a 
nonprofit? Is the leadership culture of an organization significant in the extent to which a 
community will come together to support that organization in a time of crisis? These and similar 
questions are better addressed through the frame of community-building theory and organizational 
theory.  
Community-Building Theory 
Community-building theory occupies a position on the border between for-profit and public sector 
work. Most frequently, community-building is discussed in the same context as community action 
and community organizing, when attempting to gather a broad base of support for revitalization of a 
community or a component thereof, such as its school system or public safety network. In this 
context, however, community-building is serving in a manner more similar to the for-profit idea of 
brand awareness and engagement. An assessment of a brand’s community-building efforts would be 
based on answering the following question: how well are we connecting with and maintaining links 
to the people on whose good graces we depend? In the for-profit world, an organization able to 
keep customers happy will have an advantage over competitors without this skill. In the nonprofit 
world, if an organization has not found a single funding source willing to meet all its needs 
indefinitely, the interaction component is more challenging due to the diversity of the groups 
needing to be satisfied with the work of the organization.  
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In the Handbook of Action Research, Senge and Scharmer (2006) state that community action is 
founded in the theory of learning communities. These challenges are under scrutiny in the online 
learning industry, as educational institutions attempt to replicate the bonding experiences students 
share in face-to-face environments in online groups. Brown (2001) found community-building to be 
a three-step process. First, a space had to be available for individuals to connect in which 
communication was valued and protected. This space had to be available for continued interaction 
over time, which built camaraderie. Next, the community created its own set of behavior guidelines 
and followed them: language towards other members was positive, requests for help were answered 
promptly, and individuals shared relevant experience when it was helpful to others. Finally, these 
conditions allowed a community to form in which participants felt accepted, valued, confident, and 
connected (R. E. Brown, 2001). Creating opportunities for participants to discover common 
experiences and identifiers is an essential component of community-building (R. E. Brown, 2001; 
Senge & Scharmer, 2006). 
These conditions do not arise naturally. Nonprofit organizations hoping to build communities of 
support must intentionally craft, maintain, and guard these communities. Like any resource, 
communities that are only engaged during a time of crisis will be unlikely to pull together to help; for 
a nonprofit to build and maintain support from a community, that nonprofit must commit to 
ongoing communications and forums for interaction among that community.  
While a casual observer may wonder why a nonprofit would not be taking the time to invest in 
community connections, it is important to remember the multitude of publics a nonprofit 
organization must sate on a regular basis. In addition to keeping clients sufficiently content to 
continue using the nonprofit’s service, multiple types of donors with differing priorities must be 
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kept informed in the manner they prefer, staff members’ needs must be met, and perennially limited 
funding must be allocated carefully in the face of competing needs.  
In this delicate dance, organizations allocate varying amounts of their time, resources, and energy to 
developing and maintaining strong links with the community outside their doors. Some 
organizations choose to maintain an introverted focus, attempting to serve clients as efficiently as 
possible without extending their attentions to other organizations in their mission focus, their local 
region, or both. This approach was more common prior to the prevalence of Internet access, when 
research on similar organizations took special effort, especially to learn about those outside of their 
immediate region.  
Extroverted organizations expend their resources in building connections to other individuals, 
groups, and resources, sometimes without a clear sense of what the return on those expenditures 
will be. Staff members are given time away from their work to participate in partnerships, 
conferences, and other collaborative efforts. Justifying these expenditures can be challenging. 
Conference attendance is often classified as a training expense, though the casual conversations and 
networking between attendees often provide benefit beyond the information delivered in formal 
presentations (Johansen & LeRoux, 2013). Even though the private sector invested at least $46 
billion in training in 2004 (Mikelson & Smith Nightingale, 2004), most funders prefer to contribute 
their dollars to direct services rather than overhead expenses and have unrealistic expectations of 
how low overhead levels can be kept (Gregory & Howard, 2009; Wing, Hager, Rooney, & Pollak, 
2004).  
Some of these explorations and activities would be considered research and development in the for-
profit world, a segment which consumes a little less than 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
of the United States (The World Bank, 2012), though for the most innovative 1000 companies in the 
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nation that number rises to roughly five percent of corporate budgets (Strategy&, 2014). For-profit 
corporations recognize that continued investment in refining their offerings and determining the 
future needs of their clients is critical. Community engagement activities feed this need for 
information: as an active member of an ‘organizational field’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
organizations interact more frequently, establish patterns of dominance and collaboration, increase 
data flow to all organizations, and the organizations acknowledge that they are part of a common 
field. The organizational field is defined by the interaction, commonality of data, and peer 
acknowledgement of the field. In a rural area, the organizational field may encompass all nonprofits 
in all mission foci; in a large city, the organizational field may be far more limited. DiMaggio and 
Powell do not discuss the approximate number of organizations in an organizational field, which 
leads to the suggestion that an organization may be a member of several organizational fields. As an 
example, a local YMCA branch may participate in a field of local YMCA peers, a field of fitness 
peers, a field of national YMCA peers in similar cities with similar demographics, a field of local 
children’s services peers, a field of local low-income services, a field of faith-based organizations, a 
field of senior citizen service providers, and several others. Such an organization could benefit from 
innovations in service delivery or program tuning from each of these groups. 
An additional component of community-building for nonprofit organizations falls into the 
‘marketing and communication’ budget of many for-profit organizations. Because the buyer in the 
for-profit market (Porter, 2007) pays for the good or service received, there is a short feedback loop 
in customer satisfaction. As social media and online reviews of companies grow more common, 
corporations are receiving more immediate feedback today than in previous decades. In the 
nonprofit sector, however, payers and clients are separated (Oster, 1995), and there is little to no 
feedback between funders of a nonprofit and the clients who benefit from that nonprofit’s work in 
most cases, as payers and recipients have been split into two separate groups. As a result, the quality 
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of the nonprofit’s services is mostly unknown to the funder. This absence of a way for the payer to 
determine the quality of the good provided is one of the three creators of the market gaps 
nonprofits exist to fill (H. B. Hansmann, 1980). In this context, a funder has no way to assess the 
relative quality of the services offered by the candidates for funding. Without a way for funders to 
compare details of the services being provided (such as incremental quality of services, or alignment 
of organizational values to the funder’s personal views), a funder should be drawn to the least 
expensive service, assuming that this service will be the most efficient. In the absence of further 
information about the quality of service, funders would be expected to fund the least expensive 
program that meets their mission focus or philosophical area of interest. This logic leads nonprofits 
to do everything they can to keep their costs low in order to survive – even if this diminishes their 
efficacy. Exercises such as evaluation would be additional costs that would not improve their odds 
of survival, and as a result should be cut from the budget. Community-building activities are often 
victims of these cuts. To counteract this, some funders request evaluation materials or provide their 
own evaluation framework, as does the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (2015). 
In a for-profit firm, the profit margin acts as a litmus test for corporate success in the eyes of 
investors. In the nonprofit world, a clear metric for success to inspire donors and grantors is more 
challenging to assemble. Concrete measures such as fundraising success and effective fiscal 
management must be balanced with more nebulous concepts such as community engagement and 
client impact. For nonprofits with missions seeking long-term change, creating assessments which 
balance not only short-term and long-term impact as well as concrete and abstract goals can seem 
overwhelming. 
In the context of community engagement, the goal around which the community is being built is the 
mission of the nonprofit organization in question. Much like community organization in a 
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geographic context, community-building around a certain organization and the cause it represents 
has many components. Many of the same skills required to energize a community around a given 
political issue are needed to connect a community to a nonprofit’s mission. 
Organizational Capacity Theory 
Organizational capacity theory is an attempt to measure the capabilities of an institution to make 
progress towards its goals. With the push towards devolution and the transition of safety net services 
from government providers to nonprofit providers, nonprofit organizations have taken on 
additional responsibilities and reporting requirements (Alexander, 1999). In many cases, they may be 
expected to serve larger or more diverse audiences than they originally incorporated to serve. Unlike 
government service providers, nonprofits can be formed to serve very narrow groups. Nonprofits 
incorporate to serve a given mission which may or may not align with the greatest needs of the 
community surrounding it. O’Connell (1996) gives the example of an ambulance service. While such 
a service could form as a nonprofit organization, it would be the responsibility of the government to 
ensure that all residents had access to some ambulance service. The voluntary organization may 
choose to accept fees for services from the government, but the obligation to ensure broad service 
provision is a government responsibility, not a voluntary one. 
Reporting obligations also vary between the public and voluntary sectors. The concept of tighter 
collaboration between these two sectors can appear frightening to the surrounding populace for two 
reasons: differing reporting standards and reduced responsiveness to community feedback 
(Fredericksen & London, 2000). The concept of government funders outsourcing human service 
provision to the nonprofit sector has led to the suggestion that this link is building a hollow state, 
shutting out community voices and needs in favor of collusion between the public and nonprofit 
sectors (Fredericksen & London, 2000). If nonprofit organizations are depending on the public for 
fees and contributions to keep their doors open, they have a vested interest in keeping their 
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communities happy with their work. If, however, their funding comes from governmental sources, 
they have a vested interest in serving public sector interests and priorities.  
Structure of Study 
This exploratory study began with an examination of the financial performance of the Texas 
nonprofit organizations that had completed the CEI in 2010. Financial metrics were examined 
before and during the Great Recession, from 2000 to 2012. The proxy variable for financial 
performance was the organization’s score on Greenlee and Trussel’s (2000) Financial Vulnerability 
Index (FVI) in alternate years, while the proxy variable for community engagement was the 
organization’s score on Rehnborg and Poole’s (2010) Community Engagement Index (CEI).  
The details of the manner in which these tools were used to analyze financial sustainability and to 
explore its potential relationship with community engagement will be addressed in the next chapter 
of this document. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The intention behind this study was to consider whether additional information about nonprofit 
organizations could aid individual donors of time and of money in selecting recipients of their gifts. 
Do metrics describing the financial sustainability and volunteer engagement strength of nonprofit 
organizations contribute valuable information that is not captured by standard financial analysis? Do 
organizations that manage their finances well tend to engage volunteers well?  
This exploratory study examined the relationship between financial resilience and community 
engagement in the context of a widespread economic shock. I examined the relationship between 
the strength of a nonprofit organization’s community connections and its financial performance 
during a financial shock. My proxy variable representing community engagement was the 
organization’s score on the Community Engagement Index (CEI), developed by Rehnborg and 
Poole (2010). I performed secondary analysis on the pool of completed CEI responses received in 
2010. My proxy for financial resilience was the organization’s score on Greenlee and Trussel’s (2000) 
modified version of Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI). To 
understand the financial performance of these organizations prior to the Great Recession, I 
calculated their FVI for alternate years beginning in 2000, and concluding in 2012, yielding up to 
seven FVI values for each organization. I used this information to consider the following research 
questions: 
Research Question 1:  How did the Great Recession of 2007-2009 affect a purposive sample of 
nonprofit organizations in the state of Texas?  
Hypothesis A: Older organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the 
reputational bias of age. 
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Hypothesis B: Larger organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the larger 
sizes of their budgets. 
Hypothesis C: Controlling for findings from age and budget size, human services organizations 
showed lower FVI values than their peers in other NTEE categories, both during and after the 
Great Recession, mirroring national trends. 
Research Question 2: Did CEI scores in 2010 show any relationship with FVI scores in 2008, 
2010, or 2012? 
 
Sample for Study: CEI Completers from Fall 2010 
The pool of organizations examined in this study was defined by the group of organizations that 
completed the CEI in the fall of 2010. The respondent group consists of three subsamples: one 
from affiliates of the OneStar Foundation in Texas, one from affiliates of the Literacy Coalition of 
Central Texas, and one from veterans’ services organizations in northern Texas. The OneStar 
Foundation selected 176 organizations to receive the survey, from which 115 usable responses were 
collected. The Literacy Coalition of Central Texas affiliates completed 29 usable surveys, while 35 
veteran-serving organizations submitted usable surveys. Surveys were made available online and 
were completed online. In most cases, only one completed survey was received from each 
organization. In the cases where more than one survey was received, mean responses were used for 
each question after averaging individual responses. The final data set includes organizational 
responses to the CEI from 125 nonprofit organizations, based upon 179 individual responses. While 
the group does not share a single mission focus, these organizations were all operating within the 
state of Texas during the same time frame. The indices selected are intended to be mission-agnostic. 
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FVI Data Source: Form 990 Filings 
One of the benefits of the FVI is that it is based on information from an organization’s filing of 
Form 990 with the Internal Revenue Service. Given that research has shown such data to be quite 
accurate (Froelich, et al., 2000), this proxy variable was based on relatively reliable information. The 
information needed to calculate an organization’s FVI is publicly available for those organizations 
that file Form 990 with the IRS.  
Beginning with the list of 125 organizations that completed the CEI in 2010, I sought filings of 
Form 990 for the years of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. As I searched for the 
Employer ID Numbers (EINs) for these 125 organizations, ten had ceased to file 990s. This does 
not necessarily mean that their programs are no longer active: they may have combined operations 
with another public charity, or they may have re-incorporated under a different section of the tax 
code. An additional seven organizations had invoked the IRS exemption for religious organizations. 
Seventeen organizations filed either the 990-EZ or the 990-PF, alternatives to the full 990 that do 
not provide sufficient information to calculate an FVI. To maintain a consistent geographic focus 
within the state of Texas, I excluded branches of national organizations that did not file independent 
990s. Four organizations rolled their information into a 990 filed in a state other than Texas, and 
thus were excluded because their responses would not reflect conditions specific to this geographic 
region. Further, their financial data would be diluted by the information from other branches across 
the nation, and they would therefore not be relevant when addressing the second research question 
which includes consideration of the CEI, which was completed only by Texas branches. Since these 
other branches might differ meaningfully in leadership culture, marketing and communication, and 
volunteer training and their input had not been considered in the responses given in 2010, these 
organizations were excluded. Moreover, these organizations would be reporting financial 
information from a geographic region outside of the scope of this study, thus diluting the financial 
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results relevant to this study. I also excluded organizations that were individual departments or 
projects of large organizations such as universities based on similar logic. Six organizations that 
completed the CEI were responding on behalf of individual projects within individual schools of 
large universities, and their contribution to the financial vulnerability of the entire university was 
clearly minute. One organization was a project run by the government of a foreign nation and 
therefore did not file a 990, and was excluded for this reason. These exclusions are summarized in 
Table 1 below. 
Figure 1: Reasons for Exclusion from Sample 
Reason for Exclusion Number of Organizations Excluded 
Filed a 990-EZ or -PF 17 
Defunct or no EIN 10 
Religious mission, no 990 filed 7 
Small project inside large institution 6 
Branch of a national organization 4 




After these exclusions, 80 organizations remained in the sample. Of these 80 organizations, most had not 
filed a full 990 every year. In fact, only 29 organizations had filed consistently in each of the years being 
assessed. Twenty-two of the organizations were not incorporated until 2001 at the earliest, and a total of 
32 organizations show intermittent filing records. Thirteen of the organizations that received their public 
charity designation from the IRS after 2000 filed full 990s consistently after their first 990 filing. This 
could indicate that in certain years, these organizations had gross receipts totaling less than $200,000 and 
a balance of total assets at the close of the filing period of less than $500,000, the organization has the 
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option of completing the 990-EZ instead of the full 990 (Internal Revenue Service, 2014c). Given that 35 
of the respondent organizations had total assets of less than $500,000 in 2013, it is plausible that in some 
years, an organization elected not to incur the extra work of completing the longer Form 990 when it was 
not required. In some cases, however, the consistently large size of an organization’s financial position 
suggests that the missing 990s may be due to issues in the reporting or digitization process. 
Figure 2: 990 Filing Patterns 
Filing Pattern Number of Organizations 
Consistent filers in all seven time periods: 29 
Organizations incorporated in 2001 or after: 22 
Consistent filers from 2008 – 2012 (CEI timeframe): 50 
Consistent filers after first filing of full 990: 13 
Inconsistent filers: 32 
Total Organizations Represented: 80 
 
Among these smaller organizations that could have fallen beneath the full 990 cutoff requirements is 
the Round Rock Area Service Center, which filed a 990 with under $64,000 in assets in 2000 and 
$147,000 in assets in 2002. In both these years, the organization’s revenue ($1.3 million in 2000, and 
$208,000 in 2002) required the filing of a full 990. The steep decline in revenue suggests that the lack 
of a 990 for 2004 for this organization may be due to a diminution in assets and revenue obviating 
the need of a full 990. The Dallas Leadership Foundation also may have fallen below the cutoff for 
the requirement of a full 990, with revenue of $276,762 and assets of $218,000 in 2002. In 2006, the 
organization had $1.23 million in revenue and $934,000 in assets. Given that the organization has 
such variance in its revenue and had barely exceeded the revenue requirement for the full 990 in 
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2002, it is not outlandish to imagine that the organization could have fallen beneath the threshold in 
2004. 
By contrast, consider Lifetime Recovery, an organization with a full 990 on file for 2000 and 2004 
but none for 2002. In 2000, the organization had assets of $542,000 and revenue of $1.46 million. In 
2004, the organization had assets of $489,000 and revenue of $1.40 million. It would be surprising, 
though not impossible, for the organization to have suffered such a loss of revenue as to cause it to 
fall below the $200,000 mark in 2002. In this case it seems more likely that the 990 is missing from 
the data set due to an issue in the digitization process, or possibly due to a late filing or other 
administrative issue along the chain of custody of the information. I looked at the values in 2000 and 
2004 for the other components of the FVI such as the ratio of administrative expenses to total 
expenses to evaluate whether I could interpolate a value to fill this hole in the data set. 
Unfortunately, these values diverged to such a degree that I did not feel that interpolation would be 
valid. Management expenses in 2000 were $80,938 out of a total expense budget of $1.15 million. In 
2004, management expenses consumed $241,000 out of a total expense budget of $1.31 million. I 
could not identify a value for an interpolated management expense with sufficient grounding to fill 
this gap. While other organizations had similarly large budgets with missing 990s, the data for the 
various components of the FVI varied sufficiently to make generation of a fully interpolated FVI a 
guessing game rather than an academically grounded mathematical exercise. 
To address these data consistency issues, I obtained 990 data from the two major sources available: 
GuideStar’s Premium Search (GuideStar, 2015) and the Urban Institute’s National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2015). GuideStar’s website provides 
access to the three most recent filings of Form 990. Where possible, I used these resources to fill 
gaps in the digitized data received from these two sources. Since these data were collected in 2015 
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and the 990 is usually filed on an annual basis, this resource was helpful in filling some of the gaps in 
the 2012 information, but had little to contribute to the information from 2000 to 2010. The bulk of 
the data upon which this study is based was drawn from a customized data download from 
GuideStar, delivered on 30 January 2015. 
At first glance, one might be surprised to see the 990-PF form listed. After all, the PF is intended for 
private foundations, not for public charities. However, organizations which have yet to meet the 
‘public support test’ will incorporate as private foundations to begin. Once the organization either 
garners at least 33 percent of its support from the general public or from income from its mission-
related activities, the organization may petition the IRS to ask that its status be changed from private 
foundation to public charity (Internal Revenue Service, 2014b). The public support test is calculated 
on a five-year rolling average, so an organization may waver above and below passing the public 
support test from year to year.  
The Great Recession 
In 2007, a financial bubble in the housing market in the United States collapsed, triggering a 
financial shock which has been labeled the Great Recession (Elsby, Hobign, & Sahin, 2010; Palley, 
2011). As housing prices dropped precipitously, homeowners found themselves owing more on their 
homes than the homes were worth. In the first years of the millennium, banks were requiring low 
down payments on houses and providing low-interest mortgages for the first few years that would 
later require much larger payments to maintain. This lack of regulation and oversight combined with 
the collapse of the housing bubble to trigger a run on investment instruments (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission, 2011). The impact of this collapse was felt around the world. Despite the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, the official arbiter of the United States’ economic status, 
declaring that the Great Recession concluded in June 2009 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
n.d.), income inequality has continued to grow through 2012. In fact, the richest 10 percent of the 
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population of the United States have reaped 116 percent of the income growth garnered between 
2009 and 2012, since the bottom 90 percent of earners have seen their income decline on average 
(Tcherneva, 2014). The Great Recession affected nonprofit organizations: high net worth 
households decreased their giving by roughly 35 percent, while the largest individual donors shrunk 
between 2000 and 2009 (Grusky, Western, & Wimer, 2011). Nonprofit organizations felt the pinch: 
more than half saw drops in contributions, with one third of grantmakers reducing their giving. 
These drops in giving occurred simultaneously with an increase in need: 59% reported increases in 
demand for their services(McLean & Brouwer, 2009). 
This economic crisis provided a context within which to examine financial vulnerability and 
resilience in the nonprofit sector. The study began with analysis of financial stability in individual 
nonprofit organizations in 2000, calculating FVI scores biennially from 2000 through 2012. The first 
four of these FVI scores were expected to provide a sense of how the nonprofits fared during an 
economic recovery cycle, following a brief economic down cycle in 2001 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, n.d.). The FVI scores in 2008 were expected to indicate how hard the Great 
Recession hit the various organizations, while the 2010 and 2012 FVI scores documented the 
organizations’ financial performance after the crisis. 
Instrumentation: CEI 
The CEI has been through several iterations and refinements (Poole & Rehnborg, 2012). Originally 
created at the behest of the Corporation for National and Community Service, the goal of the 
original tool was to identify the characteristics of organizations engaging volunteers well. Focus 
groups were convened to answer questions about the essential traits of well-run programs and 
projects engaging volunteers. The 239 statements resulting from these focus groups were assessed 
through concept-mapping software which grouped them into eleven topic areas. The items within 
each topic were condensed and refined to create the Volunteer Program Assessment Tool, or 
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VPAT. After pilot testing and feedback, the VPAT was shown to have strong internal consistency. 
In the second wave of testing, the internal consistency reliability analysis yielded Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of 0.90 or higher for 7 of the ten scales, and alpha coefficients above 0.80 for the 
remaining three scales. Criterion-related validity was verified through comparison with the 
Organizational Assessment Process from the Colorado Trust (1996). The coefficients of correlation 
between related constructs were found to be in the upper moderate to large range (Martináas & 
Reguly, 2013) when forty-one participants took the OAP as well as the VPAT.  
Next, the instrument was updated, edited down to 191 items, and distributed to 1,187 volunteer-
utilizing organizations as the Tool for Improving Programs (TIPS). With the data from this round of 
utilization, the tool was refined down to the 132-item Volunteer and Community Engagement 
Capacity (VCEC) instrument, and was administered to groups in two states through affiliations with 
foundations and coalitions. The data gathered in this round of administration from 449 respondents 
representing 401 nonprofits was used to refine the instrument yet further, to its current form as the 
Community Engagement Index, or CEI (Poole & Rehnborg, 2012).  
The 52 items of the CEI are grouped into five dimensions gauging an organization’s capacity for 
community engagement. While the CEI is currently under copyright protection, further information 
about the index and the questions contained therein may be obtained by contacting the RGK Center 
at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. The tool overall carries an 
alpha of 0.96 (Cronbach, 1951), suggesting very strong consistency within the tool: in fact, this level 
exceeds the threshold for clinical testing (Bland & Altman, 1997; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). This 
high alpha level suggests that the concepts addressed within the CEI are closely connected. Given 
the rigor with which the CEI was created, it is not surprising to see that the alpha coefficient is so 
high. This gives researchers comfort that the concepts and principles share a common latent factor. 
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While such a high alpha may suggest to some researchers that further questions could be eliminated, 
the CEI serves a second purpose: it acts as a list of suggestions for areas of improvement within an 
organization. Staff members who take the CEI have found its individual questions to provide fodder 
for thoughts of organizational improvement, and have requested printed copies of the tool to keep 
for later inspection. Therefore, the researchers have decided to maintain this high level of internal 
consistency rather than look for further questions to eliminate, as the areas addressed by the current 
questions are important areas of organizational capacity (Rehnborg, 2014). 
Next, the criterion-related and construct validity of the CEI were examined. The Colorado Trust’s 
Organizational Assessment Process, or OAP (Colorado Trust, 2002) was used to test concurrent 
criterion-related validity in conjunction with TIPS, the instrument from which the CEI was derived. 
In areas of overlap between TIPS and OAP, Pearson coefficients were moderate to strong at a 
statistically significant level (p ≤ 0.05) between overlapping subscales. Further comparisons to similar 
instruments would be helpful. However, instruments assessing nonprofit organizations on such a 
variety of topics are rare. One instrument from the private sector that strives to provide similar 
information is the Core Capacity Assessment Tool (CCAT). While this is one of the most commonly 
used organizational assessments in the nonprofit sector, its lack of an academic grounding or 
available statistical analysis renders it unsuitable for academic purposes. To address this issue, the 
authors of the CCAT have partnered with the authors of the CEI to create the Service Enterprise 
Diagnostic (SED) tool.  
Goodness-of-fit testing has also confirmed the construct validity of the CEI (Poole & Rehnborg, 
2012). With a Tucker-Lewis Index of fit (TLI)(Tucker & Lewis, 1973) of 0.97, a relative fit index 
(RFI) (Bollen, 1989) of 0.96, and a comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 2011) of 0.99, the CEI 
passed these three goodness-of-fit tests, each of which carries a cutoff value of ≥0.95.  
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Subscales of the CEI 
Given that the CEI was created as an instrument to describe organizations that engage volunteers 
effectively, it is not surprising to begin a discussion of the theoretical framework behind the tool 
with volunteer theory. However, as Rehnborg and Poole continued their work, they discovered that 
the keys to effective volunteer engagement transcended the experience of the volunteers themselves. 
In addition to considering the appropriate management of many types of volunteers utilized by a 
given organization (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009) in such an assessment, the researchers 
realized that effective connection to volunteers went beyond the doors of a nonprofit. As a result, 
volunteer theory was a starting point for the theoretical framework underpinning the tool, though 
organizational capacity theory and community-building theory were soon integrated. Components of 
each theory are woven throughout the varying subscales of the tool.  
The five subscales of the CEI are Leadership Culture, Community Collaboration, Marketing and 
Communication, Infrastructure, and Volunteer Management. Two themes are apparent upon 
examining the tool. First, each subscale contains frequent references to volunteers, due to the tool’s 
foundation as a resource to assess volunteer engagement. Second, there is a strong focus on 
relationships between volunteers and paid staff. Effective community engagement is built from the 
inside of an organization out into the community, and must also permeate an organization from the 
board, through the leadership team, and out to every person working for the organization whether 
they are salaried or not (Ellis, 1996).  
The five subscales within the CEI, the number of items in each subscale, and their respective alpha 
ratings are as follows: Leadership Culture (12 items, alpha = 0.91), Community Collaboration (12 
items, alpha = 0.90), Marketing and Communication (8 items, alpha = 0.85), Infrastructure (8 items, 
alpha = 0.77), and Volunteer Management (12 items, alpha = 0.88). The test-retest reliability of the 
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tool was also tested through an assessment of results between two sub-samples from different states, 
and no statistically significant difference was found (Poole & Rehnborg, 2012).  
Figure 3: CEl Instrument Model 
 
 
These five subscales serve as indicators, contributing to the latent factor of community engagement 
capacity. The values indicated along the arrows show the regression weights, or factor loadings, of 
each of these factors. The values at the top right of each subscale show the squared correlation 
coefficients (R²) associated with each variable. According to Cohen (1988) these coefficients all 
represent large effect sizes as they have values over 0.80 with the exception of community 
collaboration’s loading rate of 0.79, which is very close to the 0.80 cutoff for a large effect size. The 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) value of 0.07 meets Steiger’s (2007) criterion for 
acceptable model fit.  
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Financial Vulnerability and the FVI 
In creating the Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI), Tuckman and Chang (1991) sought to create an 
indicator of a nonprofit organization’s ability to survive financial shocks without reducing the scope 
or quality of the programs it offers. They defined a reduction in services as a reduction in the dollars 
dedicated to programs following a financial shock. The variable used to define program expenditures 
was the dollar value from this cell in the organization’s filing of Form 990 with the IRS. As they 
were creating an exploratory metric, they did not create absolute metrics to determine the presence 
or absence of financial resilience, but rather utilized the FVI as a relative instrument, comparing 
organizations within their sample to other subsets of the sample. They subdivided their sample in 
several ways to explore the relevance of the information supplied by the FVI. 
Tuckman and Chang divided their sample by mission focus to compare apples to apples, and 
repeated each stage of analysis within each mission focus. Their diversified metric included four 
criteria, assessing four areas of the organization’s financial status: equity balances, revenue 
concentration, administrative costs, and operating margins. The authors did not consider 
organizations with less than $25,000 in annual gross receipts, though given that they were analyzing 
data from 1983 tax returns, this is not as small a value as it sounds today. In 2014 dollars, this would 
be an annual budget of about $58,500 (MeasuringWorth.com, 2014).  
Tuckman and Chang found that the results between mission foci varied meaningfully. Their six 
mission categories were Religious, Educational, Health care, Charity, Support, and Other (Tuckman 
& Chang, 1991). Of the entire sample, sixty percent of the severely at-risk organizations were 
support organizations, which include United Way organizations, community chest organizations, 
educational and athletic foundations, as well as hospital foundations. Health care organizations 
accounted for another one-fifth of the severely at-risk organizations, while the last one-fifth were 
religious organizations. Only nine percent of the sample of 4,730 organizations fell into the Charity 
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category, which includes most of the missions usually considered under 501(c)(3) heading. Examples 
from this category include rehabilitation services, food banking and distribution, international aid, 
free legal assistance, poverty alleviation services, and family planning. 
In both the examinations of the entire sample and the mission-specific examinations, about one-
tenth of one percent of the organizations were found to be severely at-risk, while roughly forty 
percent of the sample was at-risk in at least one category but not all four (Gronbjerg, 2001). 
However, given that the standard for vulnerability was based on a relative scale as compared to 
other organizations, it is possible that all these organizations were healthy or were vulnerable; these 
were simply the most vulnerable members of the sample. 
To avoid this issue of relativity, Greenlee and Trussel (2000) modified Tuckman and Chang’s 
approach slightly. Drawing in metrics from the for-profit sector used to determine the credit-
worthiness of firms, they determined that they would consider a nonprofit financially vulnerable if 
its program expenses decreased annually over a three-year period. (It is worth noting that for some 
organizations, this may be due to improved program delivery approaches, better volunteer 
recruitment or retention, or another source of increased efficiency.) Further, the definition of a 
financial shock was difficult to operationalize in a meaningful context, as reasonable people may 
have different opinions on what would constitute a financial shock. Thus, Greenlee and Trussel 
chose to look at organizational program spending over a three-year period as a predictive indicator 
of financial vulnerability. This decision was based on the work of Gilbert, Menon, and Schwartz 
(1990) who examined for-profit firms that were financially distressed and used a three-year history 
of financial performance to differentiate distressed companies that recovered from their financial 
woes from those that later went bankrupt.  
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Greenlee and Trussel (2000) did not segment their sample based on mission. They were able to 
create a model which was 77% accurate in predicting financial vulnerability in their holdout sample. 
In their study, the least predictive factor of the four components specified by Tuckman and Chang 
was the equity balance, also known as the operating expense ratio of revenue to expenses. While this 
predictive rate is useful, they suggest using a three-state test rather than their binary assessment to 
increase accuracy (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). Later, Trussel returned to this metric and found that 
organizations with a drop of at least twenty percent in program expenditures over the course of 
three years also tended to have more debt, more concentration of revenue streams, lower surplus 
margins, and smaller total assets than those organizations that were not financially vulnerable 
(Trussel, 2002). These findings, all of which were statistically significant, validate the relevance of the 
factors of the FVI.  
Limitations 
The union of community action theory with organizational capacity theory has not been extensively 
discussed in the academic literature. Without a solid literature background tying the concept of 
organizational community engagement to organizational performance, there is little academic 
grounding for the hypothesis that a connection exists. The concept of an organization as the unit of 
analysis in a discussion of community action, rather than a neighborhood or a larger population, 
inverts the usual approach. Normally community action theory is used to examine efforts by an 
organization to support a population, rather than efforts by a population to support an organization. 
The injection of volunteer theory lends a valuable perspective to balance this new approach to the 
examination of community engagement through the CEI.  
This study relied on CEI data from only one year: 2010. Conveniently, this year turned out to be at 
the conclusion of a financial recession. The remainder of the study was constructed around this 
serendipitous timing. Ideally, CEI data would also be available from these organizations in 2008 and 
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2012, to allow analysis to control for shifts in the organizations’ approach to community 
engagement over the time period.  
Data Analysis 
Analysis began with the collection of data from filings of Form 990 for the 80 organizations under 
examination. Form 990 data was collected from 2008, 2010, and 2012. The factors considered as 
components of the FVI are as follows: 
Equity ratio: This term is calculated by dividing the total equity of the organization by the total 
revenues of the organization. Higher equity balances are more favorable because they suggest that 
the organization has financial flexibility in the face of unexpected events. Greenlee and Trussel 
suggest that while equity may not always be held in easily saleable assets, the presence of these assets 
improves an organization’s ability to obtain loans, and may allow the organization to liquidate 
additional assets over time (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). An organization relying on assets such as 
restricted funds may find itself paralyzed by a need for cash in the face of an economic crisis. 
Revenue concentration ratio: This term is calculated by squaring the percentage of total revenue provided 
by each revenue stream, then summing these values. Thus, an organization with a single revenue 
stream would have a revenue concentration of 1, while an organization with five equal revenue 
streams would have a revenue concentration of (0.2)2 + (0.2)2 + (0.2)2 +(0.2)2 + (0.2) 2 =0.2. Lower 
revenue concentration ratios are more favorable, as they suggest that an organization has multiple 
funding sources so that if one is impinged upon, additional sources may be able to make up some 
portion of the gap. This ratio is an adaptation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market 
concentration (Rhoades, 1993). While the FVI considers five funding streams: funds from 
contributions and grants, program revenue, membership dues, unrelated business income and 
investment income (Tuckman & Chang, 1991), this calculation will need to be adjusted slightly to 
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reflect the fact that in 2006, Form 990 was changed and membership dues were included in the same 
revenue stream as contributions, grants, and gifts. As a result, this term of the FVI calculation 
should have had five streams in 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006, but only four streams in the 2008, 2010, 
and 2012 calculations. However, in examining the 990 filings for these organizations, none of the 29 
organizations with a 990 on file in each of the years under examination reported any membership 
dues in any of those years. One organization from the 50 organizations to be included in the sample 
for the second research question reported membership dues of less than $37,000 in one year, 
representing less than one percent of that organization’s $6.4 million budget in that year. As a result, 
the omission of the membership dues information from Form 990, though it represents a deviation 
from the original structure of the FVI as published (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991) does not create a meaningful shift for this sample in the years examined. 
Administrative Costs:  This term is calculated by dividing administrative expenses by total revenues. 
Higher administrative costs are positive, as they are expected to indicate flexibility within the 
organization’s budget to allow for cuts in administrative functions prior to cutting program budgets 
(Tuckman & Chang, 1991). I would suggest that organizations with sufficient funding to invest in 
administrative expenses may also have had the time and resources to plan for crises, including those 
of a financial nature. This perspective is in direct opposition to the metrics used by Charity 
Navigator (2014a). Organizations receive a raw score based upon the percentage of their budget 
allocated to programs. Higher administrative costs reduce the percentage of budget available for 
programs. This term may reflect an increase in sustainability at the expense of efficiency. Razor-thin 
margins may increase the funding available for programs, but they may also increase financial 
vulnerability in the face of an economic shock.  
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Operating margin: This term is calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue, then 
dividing by total revenue. Higher operating margins are more favorable. This ratio suggests that an 
organization is living within its means and is covering its expenses each year with newly raised 
revenue. Because these terms are calculated from information provided by Form 990, the figures 
used will include the portion of a multi-year grant that was allocated to the financial year in question. 
Using these four factors, Greenlee and Trussel (2000) based their cross-sectional model on financial 
metrics commonly used in assessments of for-profit organizations. They divided their sample and 
created a predictive model based on the first segment, reserving the second segment for verification 
testing. In their model, organizations with an FVI under 0.07 were considered to have “a strong 
indication of no financial vulnerability,” while organizations with a finding of 0.10 or more were 
considered to have “a strong indication of financial vulnerability” (p. 207, Greenlee & Trussel, 
2000). An example of this calculation is included below in Figure 4. 
  




Figure 4: From Predicting the Financial Vulnerability of Charitable Organizations, p.207 
 
 
Greenlee and Trussel specify cutoffs for the absence of financial vulnerability (under 0.07) and the 
presence of financial vulnerability (over 0.10). Using a single cutoff value of 10 percent, Greenlee 
and Trussel were able to attain a successful prediction rate of 77 percent: in other words, they 
successfully predicted which organizations were financially vulnerable in 77 out of each 100 cases in 
their holdout sample. To improve their chances of success, they created a more graduated approach 
to financial vulnerability, utilizing a tertiary categorical system including an intermediate realm 
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between strong indications of financial vulnerability and financial resilience. Given the researchers’ 
acknowledgement of the shaded meanings of FVI values, this study examined the variable both 
continuously and in coded form based on these cutoffs. Statistical testing and graphing were 
performed on the index values both in raw and coded form.  
Data Analysis Process 
Step One: Univariate Analysis of FVI Data 
The first step in the analysis was to consider the FVI data independently. FVI scores were calculated 
at seven points, based on Form 990 data drawn from the years of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, and 2012. This longitudinal data allowed for analysis of trends prior to the Recession, as well 
as an opportunity to contrast this performance with financial stability during the Recession itself. 
The IRS purge of inactive 501(c)(3) public charities in 2011 does not seem to have affected this 
sample in a meaningful way. In the sample of consistent filers, no organizations with annual budgets 
of less than $50,000 in 2008 were identified. Had they been, they would have been excluded, based 
on the approaches used by other researchers (Urban Institute, 2014) including Tuckman and Chang 
who originally created the FVI (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Organizations with budgets that dipped 
beneath the $50,000 threshold in 2010 or 2012 were included in this analysis, just as they were 
included in the Urban Institute’s research. (Organizations with annual budgets under $50,000 may 
have opted to file form 990-EZ, which would have excluded them from the data set automatically.) 
Removing these organizations from the analysis would have biased the results away from the 
organizations most likely to be financially vulnerable. Given that the Urban Institute found that 
1.7% of all organizations with more than $10 million in annual revenue prior to the Recession fell 
beneath $50,000 in revenue during the Recession, the inclusion of these organizations could have 
provided informative data in all budget ranges (Urban Institute, 2014). 
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Step Two: Search for Trends in Financial Data 
The goal of this analysis step was to identify define the impact of the Great Recession on this 
sample of organizations, and to determine whether different subgroups of organizations responded 
differently to the recession. The Urban Institute’s findings on subsector closure rates and revenue 
reduction rates based on overall revenue were expected to be useful as an informative baseline for 
comparison between subsamples (Urban Institute, 2014).  
Several researchers have suggested that organizational age, as reported on Form 990, serves as a 
proxy for an organization’s reputation (Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998; Robert D. Herman & Renz, 
1997, 1998). In this study this assertion that older organizations are stronger and thus will be able to 
survive financial shocks more smoothly was tested. 
Research Question 1:  How did the recession of 2007-2009 affect a purposive sample of 
nonprofit organizations in the state of Texas? 
Hypothesis A: Older organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the 
reputational bias of age. 
Additionally, the assertion that organizations with larger overall budgets reported on Form 990 have 
greater protection against shocks due to the scope of their budgets was tested. This theory (Cameron 
& Whetten, 1981; Forbes, 1998; Robert D. Herman, 1992; Robert D. Herman & Renz, 2008; 
Tannenbaum, 1961; Tassie, 1998) was tested with the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis B: Larger organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the 
larger sizes of their budgets. 
Finally, organizational decreases in revenue were compared to the Urban Institute’s findings about 
organizational performance during the Recession (Urban Institute, 2014). In their study, the Urban 
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Institute performed a logistic regression of two independent variables: NTEE category and 
organizational size as measured by overall budget, against the dependent variable of active 
organizational status. NTEE, or National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities, categories divide the 
sector into ten broad categories: arts and culture, education, environment and animals, health, 
human services, international affairs, public and societal benefit, and ‘other’ (Urban Institute, n.d.). 
They found that of these categories, the rate of organizational closure was highest among the ‘other’ 
category. Of the focused categories, the rate of organizational closure was highest in the health and 
human services categories, both before (2004-2008) and during (2008-2012) the Great Recession 
(Urban Institute, 2014). 
Hypothesis C: Controlling for age and budget size, human services organizations showed 
lower FVI values than their peers in other NTEE categories, both during and after the Great 
Recession, mirroring national trends. 
 
Step Three: Univariate Analysis of CEI Data 
Next, the CEI findings were considered. The remaining organizations had eight data points: CEI 
data for 2010, as well as FVI data were available for 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
Descriptive statistics were run on the CEI data to look for outliers, which were considered 
individually. Next, CEI scores were considered as a group. While the distributions were found to be 
non-normal, this issue was attributed to the small size of the sample. No outliers were removed due 
to the reduction of the already small sample that this would have caused.  
Step Four: Comparison of CEI and FVI Findings 
Next, scores from the two indices were considered jointly to address Research Question 2. 
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Research Question 2: Did CEI scores in 2010 show any relationship with FVI scores in 2008, 
2010, or 2012? 
Scores from the FVI in 2008, 2010 and 2012 were correlated against CEI scores in 2010. 
Additionally, each subscale of each index was tested for correlation against the subscales of the other 
index. Because this study is exploratory, no predictions or hypotheses were made about any 
predictive or causal relationships. The goal for this study was to identify correlations that can serve 
as starting points for future analyses of community engagement and its relationship, if any, to 
financial performance.  The following chapter will describe the findings from this study, as well as 
the challenges that arose in attempting to answer these research questions. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
In the creation and validation of the FVI, the primary research teams utilized far larger data sets than 
the set I analyzed. Tuckman and Chang used over 4,700 organizations from across the nation, while 
Greenlee and Trussel included roughly twelve thousand organizations including every nonprofit 
with over $10 million in assets, then whittled their sample down to just under six thousand 
organizations (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). I was curious to see how FVI 
scores would be distributed in a set of organizations in a region of a single state during a global 
financial crisis: the Great Recession of 2007-2009. 
Present and Absent 990 Filings 
From the original sample of 125 organizations that completed the CEI in 2010, 45 were removed 
due to the lack of full and appropriate 990s. For the details of these exclusions, see table 1 in the 
Methodology section of this document. Information about these 80 organizations from their filings 
of Form 990 in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 was initially sought through the 
DataWeb offered by the National Center of Charity Statistics. Access to the DataWeb was funded 
through the generous support of the RGK Center at the University of Texas at Austin. While the 
Business Master Files from the DataWeb had much of the information needed to complete the FVI, 
the amount of an organization’s expenses that were allocated to administration – an essential datum 
to complete the ADMIN term of the FVI – was not included in the Business Master Files. While the 
Statement of Income report from the DataWeb did include this piece of information, only three of 
the 80 organizations were included in the set of organizations for which Statement of Income data 
was available. Therefore, I purchased a custom data pull from GuideStar for each of these 80 
organizations for each of the seven time periods to be considered. The final data set of full Form 
990 returns included 408 records from this sample of 80 organizations across the seven time periods 
assessed. Even the ‘complete’ filings were missing some data. As an example, one hundred of these 
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filings do not list a value for the number of dollars allocated to administrative expense. Of these, 169 
returned FVI scores of under 0.7, qualifying for Greenlee and Trussel’s Not Financially Vulnerable, 
or NFV, classification (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). The intermediate category which ranges from an 
FVI of 0.7 to 1.0 included 120 filings, and was not named by Greenlee and Trussel. For convenience 
I will use the term No Indication, abbreviated NI, to refer to this middle range. The Financially 
Vulnerable, or FV (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000), classification which includes all FVI scores greater 
than 1.0, applied to 126 filings. Of these 126, 20 filings returned an FVI greater than 0.2. This data 
set showed a long right tail, extending up to an FVI of 0.97. However, the continuous variable of the 
FVI has only been tested in its categorical form. The previous work that forms the foundation for 
this study was predicated on the FVI as a categorical variable. At the same time, there is additional 
information to be gleaned from the raw FVI scores in some instances. As a result, both the coded 
and raw FVI scores will be used in this analysis, with clear definition of which metric is being used. 
Figure 5: Number of 990 Filings Per Year, Categorized By FVI 
Year NFV NI FV Total 
2000 23 (47%) 16 (32%) 10 (20%) 49 
2002 20 (38%) 20 (38%) 13 (25%) 53 
2004 16 (39%) 15 (37%) 10 (24%) 41 
2006 35 (51%) 16 (24%) 17 (25%) 68 
2008 21 (36%) 14 (24%) 24 (41%) 59 
2010 24 (38%) 20 (31%) 20 (31%) 64 
2012 31 (42%) 21 (28%) 22 (30%) 74 
Total 170 122 116 408 
 
Despite variance between years, each year has a reasonable number of organizations in each 
category. However, the increase in the percentage of financially vulnerable organizations in 2008 
from 25% to 41%, accompanied by a drop from 51% to 36% of organizations that do not appear 
financially vulnerable, suggests that this sample felt the impact of a financial shock between 2006 
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and 2008. While this data set does not provide sufficient information to determine which 
organizations closed during this period because it does not include information about mergers, the 
FVI scores of these organizations show that the sample as a whole was more financially vulnerable 
in 2008 than in the previous years examined. 
Figure 6: Coded FVI of Total Sample, 2000-2012 
 
Of the years examined, 2008 is the only year in which more organizations are financially vulnerable 
than are not. It is heartening to see the sample rebound in 2010 and 2012 to levels which are more 
similar to their pre-recession levels of financial stability. Further, it does not appear that the IRS 
revocation of tax-exempt status of inactive organizations in 2011 reduced the number of filings in 
this sample, as the recorded number of filings in 2012 is the highest in the sample. 
Unfortunately, the intermittent 990 filings found in the sample signify that the samples listed in 
Figure 6 above differ by year. Since only 29 organizations are consistent, the total sample cannot be 
considered longitudinally. Figure 6 is only an indication that the organizations in the sample fell into 
all three of the categories defined by previous research on the FVI (Chang & Tuckman, 1991; 
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Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). This is a helpful finding, as it allows for analysis between categories, and 
analysis of organizations that moved between categories over the time span under examination.  
2000-2012 Sample of 29 Consistent Organizations 
Next we turn to an analysis of the organizations with a 990 on file for each even-numbered year 
over the time span from 2000 to 2012. A full list of these organizations can be found in Appendix 
A. First, I began by considering univariate statistics. While there were issues with outliers, the 
outliers from one time period would regress towards the mean in other time periods. Removing all 
of the organizations that were outliers in one of the seven time periods would have reduced the 
sample to less than 20 organizations. With such a small sample, it is difficult to obtain normal 
distributions on these statistics. As a result, I opted to include all 29 organizations and to leave these 
statistics in the forms used by previous scholars to study financial stability. Due to this decision, 
there are issues with skewness and kurtosis in the distributions of the FVI scores in these years. As 
the figures in this chapter will show, certain organizations showed dramatic deviations from the 
mean in various years of the time period under examination, and these shifts were visible in the 
distributions of FVI scores in the seven samples under consideration. 
How did traditional financial metrics such as assets, liabilities, revenue, and expenses vary over the 
time period under examination for these 29 organizations? I include this graph both before (Figure 
7) and after inflation adjustment (Figure 8) to show how critical this adjustment is in order to glean a 
sense of the true trends. 
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Figure 7: Financial Indicators without Inflation Adjustment, 29 Consistent Filers 
 
 
(Note: Because Form 990 includes totals for these four indicators for the previous year, charts of 
these indicators include annual data from fourteen filings ranging from 1999 to 2012. These values 
were drawn from the same seven filings of Form 990 referenced above.) 
(Note: For the remainder of this document, this group of 29 organizations will be referred to as ‘29 
Consistent Filers’ in figure titles to indicate their consistency in filing Form 990 in the years under 
examination.) 
From Figure 7 it is difficult to see any downturn in the 2007-2009 timeframe. There is a diminution 
of space between the revenue and expenses lines: they are difficult to distinguish from each other 
during this time, suggesting that the organization’s margin on their operations was compressed 
during this time.  
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Figure 8: Financial Indicators, 29 Consistent Filers, Adjusted for Inflation, 2000-2012 
 
(Note: these and all other inflation-adjusted values in this paper are based on inflation rates from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).) 
Before the inflation adjustment, these organizations appear to be growing comfortably. Figure 8 
above shows a more tumultuous picture. Interestingly, the 2007-2009 Recession does not seem to 
materialize in this second graph (Figure 8). The Great Recession will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this chapter, and in the final chapter. In this inflation-adjusted graph, the level of mean 
organizational assets decline very slightly from 2007-2009, confirming that despite increases in 
revenue and expenses, these organizations were seeing no net income from these increased 
operations. Since the space between the revenue and expenses would represent net income that 
could be used to build the organization, this dip in assets may suggest that these organizations faced 
some declines in assets, though this fluctuation was minor in comparison to the drop between 2004 
and 2005. 
Over the years under examination, these consistent filers also show larger revenue than the full 
sample.  
  




Figure 9: Inflation-Adjusted Revenue Comparison Between 29 Consistent Filers Vs. 
Inconsistent Filers 
 
Depending on the year, the mean revenue of the consistent filers is between 2.5 and 8 times greater 
than that of inconsistent filers. In Figure 9, the 29 organizations with consistent annual filings of 
Form 990 are compared to the 51 organizations with inconsistent filings. To be clear, this group of 
51 organizations with ‘inconsistent’ filings also includes the 22 organizations that had not received 
their public charity designation until 2001 or later. In other words, not all of these absent filings were 
unexplained. The inconsistency of the full sample is clearly a factor here, as organizations of varying 
sizes drop in and out. Still, the fact that the consistent filers show asset levels that vary between half-
again as large and twice as large as the total sample is worthy of note. For the remainder of the 
analysis of this time sample from 2000-2012, findings will be based on these 29 consistent filers to 
ensure consistent samples. 
These 29 organizations range dramatically in size. Below is a figure showing their annual revenue in 
the year 2000. 
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Figure 10: Income in 2000 for 29 Consistent Filers 
 
The exponential shape of the curve of these revenues displayed in Figure 10 is clearly a cause for 
concern. The largest organization in the sample, Goodwill of Central Texas has an income twice as 
large as Lifeworks, the second largest organization in the sample. This chart documents the fact that 
this distribution is not a normal curve, and that skewness and kurtosis are issues for this distribution. 
Given the small size of this sample and the fact that the exponential curve of the data is not limited 
to a single case (Lifeworks’ income is 30% greater than that of The Children’s Shelter, the third-
largest organization in the sample, which is in turn 25% larger than that of Caritas, the fourth-largest 
organization), excluding outliers would not be a productive approach to addressing this issue.  
To reduce the overweighting of the budgets of very large organizations in this sample, I then 
graphed each organization’s relative revenue as compared to the baseline of the organization’s 
revenue in 2000. By dividing each organization’s revenue by its own revenue from the year 2000, I 
was able to control for organizational size and obtain a more balanced picture of financial 
performance in this sample. As a result, every organization’s value for the year 2000 would have 
been one, by definition, so the graph begins with data from the year 2002. 
   
80 
 
Figure 11: Relative Revenue Adjusted for Inflation, 29 Consistent Filers, 2002-2012 
 
The organizations spiking up at the end of Figure 11 are relatively small – San Antonio Youth, 
incorporated in 1986, grows steadily from under $400,000 in annual revenue in 2000 to annual 
revenue of over $5 million during the period in question. The Human Rights Initiative of North 
Texas, a public charity since 2000, has the most uneven performance of the sample, showing very 
high revenue rates in four-year cycles with low revenue in alternate periods. Like San Antonio 
Youth, a drop-out prevention program, the Human Rights Initiative of North Texas shows total 
revenue growth of more than twelve hundred percent between 2000 and 2012. Figure 12 shows the 
remaining 27 organizations by inflation-adjusted relative revenue after these two organizations have 
been deleted. 
Figure 12: Relative Revenue of 27 Consistent Filers after Deletion of Two Outliers, 2002-2012 
 
   
81 
 
After removing these two obvious outliers from the graph, the next two unusual graph lines 
correlate with Big Brothers Big Sisters, a midsized organization with impressive steady revenue 
growth over the time in question until 2008, at which point their revenue multiplier falls off. Still, 
over this twelve-year period the organization grew its annual revenue by a factor of four after 
adjusting for inflation, an impressive result without a recession. Avenida Guadalupe Association, a 
neighborhood revitalization project in downtown San Antonio incorporated in 1986, showed a great 
increase in revenue between 2008 and 2010. A casual web search does not reveal any major changes 
in the organization during this time. Family Service Association, a provider of family support 
services since 1950 in San Antonio, also saw a dramatic increase in relative revenue in 2010. After 
removing these outlier organizations from the chart, the remaining organizations present this picture 
of shifts in relative revenue. The final outlier with a relative revenue multiplier of over three is 
Business and Community Lenders of Texas, an economic development organization that assists with 
housing challenges, showing a large spike between 2010 and 2012 in relative revenue. Removal of 
these outliers leaves the resulting graph of relative revenue trends. 
Figure 13: Relative Revenue, Inflation Adjusted, 23 of 29 Consistent Filers, 2002-2012 
 




Figure 13 shows no clear trend in relative revenue among these 23 organizations. To increase the 
clarity of this picture, I then considered changes in revenue between 2007 and 2008, then 2008 to 
2009, then 2009 to 2010, then 2010 to 2011.  
Figure 14: Organizational Annual Revenue Changes for 29 Consistent Filers, 2007-2011 
 
As Figure 14 shows, fourteen organizations, or roughly half the sample, showed a decline in revenue 
from 2007 to 2008. Fifteen organizations saw a decline from 2008 to 2009. Between 2009 and 2010, 
twenty organizations saw growth in revenue, then from 2010 to 2011 thirteen organizations saw 
revenue growth. While this graph does not address the sizes of any of these changes in revenue, it 
suggests that more organizations grew from 2009 to 2010 than during the other years depicted. 
Given that by this categorization, an increase of a single dollar qualifies an organization for the 
‘revenue increased’ category, this chart does not describe the scope of these organizational changes. 
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annual budget to a sixty percent increase, while the declines in revenue ranged between three and 
eighty percent reductions.  
After considering relative revenue of the group as a whole, both with and without outliers, I then 
examined the group with the revenue segmentation through the lens of the relative revenue metric 
to determine whether organizations of different budget sizes came through the 2007-2009 timeframe 
differently. To do so, I divided the sample into three groups based on their annual revenue in the 
year 2000. The mean revenue of each group in each year in the sample can be seen in the graph 
below. 
Figure 15: Annual Revenue, 29 Consistent Filers Divided by Revenue Scope, Adjusted For 
Inflation, 2000-2012 
 
As Figure 15 shows, larger organizations grew far more than their smaller counterparts during the 
2008 to 2010 time period. The smallest organizations remained relatively consistent until 2010, at 
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between 2010 and 2012. Large organizations experienced an increase in revenue between 2008 and 
2010, and a smaller increase in revenue between 2010 and 2012.  
Given the differences in scope of these organizations, I was curious about whether the relative 
revenue of these organizations over the time period in question would show different patterns for 
organizations of different sizes.  
 
Figure 16: Relative Revenue of 29 Consistent Filers Divided By Revenue Scope Adjusted For 
Inflation, 2002-2012 
 
The smallest category of organizations showed an abrupt increase in relative revenue after 2010. 
Three of the outliers discussed above – Avenida Guadalupe Association, Human Rights Initiative of 
North Texas, and San Antonio Youth – fall into this category. Without these three outliers, the 
trajectory of the smallest organizations is still upward, though the increase from 2010 to 2012 is not 
as large.  
  




Figure 17: Relative Revenue of 26 Consistent Filers Post-Outlier Removal Adjusted For 
Inflation, 2002-2012 
 
This graph shows that the smallest organizations struggled most between 2008 and 2010 in terms of 
relative revenue growth, though their growth through the early part of the millennium as a cohort 
was far stronger on a percentage growth basis than that of their larger counterparts. 
The fact that these organizations show no meaningful drop in revenue during the 2008 period raised 
more questions. Further examination showed that 21 of the 29 organizations in this sample 
demonstrated growth in inflation-adjusted revenue between 2006 and 2008. Of the 29, seven 
demonstrated growth in revenue in each of the time periods assessed. For this analysis, an increase 
of a single dollar in revenue was still considered revenue growth, and similarly a reduction of a single 
dollar in revenue would be considered a decline in revenue. 
  




Figure 18: Inflation-Adjusted Revenue Increases, 2006-2012, 29 Consistent Filers 
 Small Medium Large Total 
2006-08 7 (70%) 4 (44%) 5 (50%) 16 (55%) 
2008-10 6 (60%) 6 (66%) 9 (90%) 21 (72%) 
2010-12 7 (70%) 6 (66%) 6 (60%) 19 (66%) 
Increased in all, 
2006-2012 
3 (30%) 1 (11%) 3 (30%)  
 
Figure 18 suggests that most of these organizations were successful in replacing any revenue that 
was lost during the downturn. Given that tax planning is a component of decision-making for 
philanthropic giving and more than a quarter of all donations to human services organizations are 
made in December (S. McLaughlin, 2014), the expectation would be that any issues from the 
recession would have affected donations to the sector by the time the 2008 990 was filed. The fact 
that more than half (55%) of these organizations saw their inflation-adjusted revenue increase from 
2006 to 2008 suggests that these organizations as a group were able to weather this storm. Of the 
three groups, the small organizations saw the largest percentage of organizations with revenue 
growth (70%), while 60% of the medium-sized organizations saw an increase in revenue from 2006 
to 2008. Large organizations were most likely to see revenue growth from 2008 to 2010 with 90% 
reporting revenue increases, while 60% of medium-sized organizations saw revenue increases and 
66% of small organizations experienced revenue growth. From 2010 to 2012, all three groups saw 
about the same chances of revenue growth, with small, medium, and large organizations 
documenting revenue increases in 70%, 66%, and 60% of their 990 filings, respectively. Large and 
small organizations were more likely to see consistent growth from 2006 through 2012 with 30% of 
each sample showing growth in each period, while medium-sized organizations were the least likely 
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to show consistent revenue growth in each time period, with only one organization in this category 
showing such results.  
With a sense of the information that traditional financial metrics can bring to the analysis of 
performance over the time period under examination, the question can now be asked: is the FVI 
bringing new information that is not captured by a simple revenue growth chart? 
To answer this question, I first looked at the FVI values within this sample during the time frame 
under examination. A bar graph of FVI scores revealed the following: 
Figure 19: FVI of 29 Consistent Filers 2000-2012 
 
The leftmost columns in each grouping are the organizations that are considered ‘not financially 
vulnerable’ (NFV), while the rightmost columns represent organizations which are considered 
‘financially vulnerable’ (FV). The number of organizations with an indication of not being financial 
vulnerability decreases from 2000 to 2006, then recovers somewhat after 2008. By contrast, the 
number of organizations considered financially vulnerable climbs from 2000 to its peak in 2008, 
then decreases somewhat thereafter. During the recovery in 2010, the number of organizations in 
the center ‘no indication’ (NI) group reaches its largest value. 
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In contrast to the chaos of shifts in relative revenue depicted in Figure 13, and to the simplistic 
picture of revenue increases presented in the bar graph of Figure 14, Figure 19 shows a shift in 
organizations away from financial stability into a period of vulnerability, then the beginning of a 
return to stability. This suggests that the FVI is providing a different perspective on financial 
stability that the simpler metrics of relative revenue and total revenue cannot convey. 
After considering the coded FVI scores, the reader may wonder about patterns in the raw FVI 
scores for this sample over the full time period. 
Figure 20: Raw FVI Scores of 29 Consistent Filers, 2000-2012 
 
 
A few outliers prevent any trends in the data from becoming visible. Avenida Guadalupe 
Association had an unusual revenue situation in 2000 that caused the revenue stream diversification 
term of the FVI to be greater than the expected peak value of 1. The organization’s income from a 
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revenue streams. Thanks to the way negative values are addressed in Herfindahl-Hirshman indices, 
this revenue diversification value became larger than expected.  
The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) is meant to give its reviewer a sense of the degree to which 
an individual or an organization is reliant on a certain funding stream. A well-diversified set of 
funding streams will lead to a low HHI (close to zero), while an organization relying on a single 
funding stream will have an HHI of one. The FVI includes a measure of funding stream 
diversification based upon the HHI as one of its terms. However, negative values in a portfolio of 
funding streams are considered to be equal to zero, as it is not reasonable to consider a loss as a 
positive funding stream for a person or an organization (Shaffer & Robles, 2014). As a result, 
Avenida Guadalupe Association received an FVI score far into the ‘financially vulnerable’ category 
in 2000, the extreme outlier on the left side of Figure 20 above.  
The Human Rights Institute of North Texas reveals its uneven revenue in this graph as well. In 
2010, this organization had expenses that were well more than twice its revenue (235%). This threw 
the margin term of the FVI calculation well outside the range of most of the FVIs calculated, 
creating the spike in 2010 seen in the graph above (Figure 20).  
Interestingly, while an FVI over 0.1 is considered to be an indication of financial vulnerability, both 
of the organizations with extreme outliers in the graph above returned to much more typical FVI 
values in the following year (though one of the two organizations was still within the financially 
vulnerable range of the FVI). 
When this chart is considered without these two outliers, no clear pattern emerges. 
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Figure 21: Raw FVI Scores, 27 of 29 Consistent Filers, 2000-2012 
  
In 2006, San Antonio Youth stands out for a spike in FVI. Recall that FVIs over 0.1 are considered 
to be an indication of financial vulnerability, so the upward spikes on Figure 21 are movements away 
from financial stability. This is the same organization with an almost-exponential increase in relative 
revenue from $400,000 in 2000 to more than $5 million in 2012 that appeared as an outlier in Figure 
11 of relative revenue, presented earlier in this chapter. With the impressive and consistent revenue 
increases shown above, it is surprising to see this organization show up as a negative outlier. 
Returning to the raw data shows that this organization has no reported administrative expenses in 
2006. This may have been an oversight in completing the 990, as the organization does report 
administrative expense in the other years on record during the time span under consideration. Given 
that the calculation of the FVI gives positive scoring to organizations carrying higher administrative 
costs as a percentage of total expense based on an assumption that this burden can easily be cut 
without damaging programs (Tuckman & Chang, 1991), San Antonio Youth receives an FVI score 
that is an outlier in the ‘financially vulnerable’ range of the scale for 2006. This serves as a cautionary 
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caused an organization that appeared very financially strong by traditional metrics to show up as a 
negative outlier in another measure of financial stability. After removing San Antonio Youth from 
this graph, the scale on the vertical axis has been expanded to show more granularity over the span 
from 0.07 to 0.1, the cutoffs of interest that delineate no indication of financial vulnerability (under 
0.7) from an indication of financial vulnerability (over 0.1).  
Figure 22: FVI, 26 of 29 Consistent Filers, 2000-2012, Expanded to Show FVI Cutoffs 
 
 
As Figure 22 shows, there is a lot of movement into and out of these categories over the entire time 
period, with little meaningful change during the 2007-2009 timeframe. It is important to recall that 
the FVI was intended by Greenlee and Trussel to be considered as a coded value based on an 
organization’s position which can be below the .07 cutoff in the ‘no indication of financial 
vulnerability’ range or its position above the .1 cutoff, in the range which indicates financial 
vulnerability. This graph appears tumultuous because raw values were used, and the scale of the 
graph has been reduced to focus attention on the area between these indicator values. The graph has 
been included to show that these raw values do vary, both within and between these categories. I 
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presented this graph in order to show the activity of these metrics which is lost in the categorized 
view of a bar graph.  
At first glance, it appears that fewer organizations may be in the ‘no indication’ area during 2008, 
though no later statistical testing confirmed this hypothesis. These graphical representations suggest 
that there is information presented by the FVI that is different from that represented by the graphs 
of organizational revenue, either in mean values or relative values. The FVI captures the recession 
more clearly than other metrics, as the bar graph in Figure 14 shows a shift of dropping FVI and 
recovering FVI over this time frame. It is possible that the sample was too small for these shifts to 
attain statistical significance, but the graphs of traditional financial indicators do not capture the 
recession. In fact, based on the traditional indicators, these organizations appear to have continued 
to grow through 2008 at roughly the same rates as they did before the Great Recession. A national 
study conducted by the Urban Institute (Boris, de Leon, Roeger, & Nikolova, 2010) found that 
nonprofits in Texas fared far better than nonprofits in other states through the Recession. Texas 
organizations reported fewer cuts in staffing, benefits, programs, and salaries than the national 
average.  
 
Findings for Research Question 1 
Having reviewed these general findings, I turn now to my first research question. 
Research Question 1:  How did the Great Recession of 2007-2009 affect a purposive sample of 
nonprofit organizations in the state of Texas?  
Hypothesis A: Older organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the 
reputational bias of age. 
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Hypothesis B: Larger organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the larger 
sizes of their budgets. 
Hypothesis C: Controlling for findings from age and budget size, human services organizations 
showed lower FVI values than their peers in other NTEE categories, both during and after the 
Great Recession, mirroring national trends. 
One of the major challenges in considering these hypotheses is the lack of evidence to show a 
financial downturn in this sample of 29 organizations. Without evidence of a crisis, it is difficult to 
confirm or disprove hypotheses related to crisis management. 
Hypothesis A: Older organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the 
reputational bias of age. 
To test this hypothesis, I split my sample of 29 organizations in half based on the year in which the 
organization received its public charity designation from the IRS. Organizations in the ‘older’ 
category had public charity designation dates ranging from July of 1947 to July of 1981, while the 
‘younger’ category encompassed organizations with public charity designation dates ranging from 
November of 1983 to February of 2000.A perusal of the years of incorporation of the 29 
organizations in this sample did not reveal any substantial gaps in age in the middle of the sample. In 
other words, the gaps between public charity designation dates were relatively smooth and did not 
suggest a clear division point in the sample. In the absence of an apparent gap and given the small 
size of the sample, I chose to divide the sample into two samples of roughly equal size. 
  
   
94 
 
Figure 23: Inflation-Adjusted Revenue Growth Vs. Organizational Age of Consistent Filers, 
2000-2012 
 
In this data set, the younger organizations had larger revenues, and appeared to show greater 
increases in actual dollars of revenue over the entire period under consideration. While the total 
dollar values may be larger for the younger half of the organizations in the data set, the shape of the 
lines is not meaningfully different around the time of the Great Recession. The graph above (Figure 
23) appears to show younger organizations performing better during the years of the recession than 
in 2006, while the inflation-adjusted performance of the older organizations appears to remain quite 
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Figure 24: Comparison of Means between Older and Younger Organizations, 29 Consistent 
Filers 
  
N Mean Std. Deviation S.E. Mean 
2008 FVI Older 15 .01 .01 .00 
 
Younger 14 .01 .01 .00 
2010 FVI Older 15 .01 .01 .00 
 
Younger 14 .16 .29 .08 
2012 FVI Older 15 .09 .03 .01 
 
Younger 14 .08 .05 .01 
2008 Revenue Older 15 4693186.62 6633560.56 1712777.97 
 
Younger 14 1805762.28 1154756.49 308621.65 
2010 Revenue Older 15 6318358.27 9328408.19 2408584.64 
 
Younger 14 2025393.06 1360578.64 363629.94 
2012 Revenue  Older 15 6512891.25 9909479.85 2558616.69 
 
Younger 14 2426899.13 1447911.06 386970.51 
2008 Assets Older 15 3324549.35 5629251.47 1453466.48 
 
Younger 14 2512300.51 1996195.36 533505.65 
2010 Assets Older 15 3790880.30 6763556.20 1746342.70 
 
Younger 14 2783960.26 2589882.23 692175.14 
2012 Assets Older 15 4920928.70 9499475.48 2452754.02 
 
Younger 14 3165159.48 3298793.07 881639.53 
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for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 




1.04 25.83 .310 .00 .00 .00 .01 




-1.90 13.03 .080 -.15 .08 -.31 .02 




.31 21.52 .762 .01 .02 -.03 .04 
2008 




1.66 14.91 .118 2887424.35 1740360.80 -824085.08 6598933.78 
2010 




1.76 14.64 .099 4292965.21 2435879.04 -910216.44 9496146.86 
2012 




1.58 14.64 .136 4085992.13 2587714.35 -1441441.97 9613426.22 




.52 17.68 .606 812248.84 1548287.15 -2444794.02 4069291.70 




.54 18.26 .598 1006920.04 1878515.17 -2935685.08 4949525.16 




.67 17.54 .509 1755769.22 2606394.17 -3730462.45 7242000.89 
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(Note: In the figure above and for subsequent t-test output figures, E.V.A. is an abbreviation for 
‘equal variances assumed’ and E.V.N.A. is an abbreviation for ‘Equal Variances Not Assumed.’) 
However, when a t-test was run comparing financial performance as well as FVI between these two 
groups, no statistically significant differences in means were found between the two groups. In some 
cases, such as that of the FVI in 2010, and revenue in all three years, these groups were shown to be 
different in variance, but the significance of their difference in means was below the p<.05 
threshold. Revenue levels differed between the older half and the younger half of the sample 
throughout the time period under examination as shown graphically, but not sufficiently to meet the 
test of statistical significance at p<.05 in an independent samples t-test against any of the financial 
metrics, nor against any components of the FVI.  
Hypothesis B: Larger organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the larger 
sizes of their budgets. 
The organizations in the sample were split into two groups based on annual revenue in 2000 to test 
this hypothesis, with the cutoff between large and small organizations falling at an annual revenue of 
$1.4 million.  
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Figure 26: Comparison of Means for Larger Vs. Smaller Organizations, 29 Consistent Filers 
 
Size N Mean Std. Deviation S.E. Mean 
2008 FVI Small 15 .01 .01 .00 
 
Large 14 .01 .01 .00 
2010 FVI Small 15 .11 .26 .07 
 
Large 14 .05 .14 .04 
2012 FVI Small 15 .08 .05 .01 
 
Large 14 .09 .04 .01 
 




for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 




-.88 26.09 .386 .00 .00 -.01 .00 




.66 22.13 .518 .05 .08 -.11 .21 




-.76 26.81 .457 -.01 .02 -.04 .02 
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FVI scores showed no basis to consider these groups to have different means in an independent 
samples t-test. Financial indicators such as revenue and assets were omitted from this test, as it was 
on the basis of these indicators that these two groups were separated. Based upon statistical 
significance, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. 
Hypothesis C: Controlling for findings from age and budget size, human services organizations 
showed lower FVI values than their peers in other NTEE categories, both during and after the 
Great Recession, mirroring national trends. 
To test this hypothesis, organizations with human service NTEE categorizations were grouped 
together, while organizations with NTEE categorizations outside the human service category were 
grouped together. An independent samples t-test compared the FVI values between these two 
groups.  
  
   
100 
 
Figure 28: Statistics Comparing Human Services Organizations to Organizations Under 
Other NTEE Categories, 29 Consistent Filers 
 
NTEE Category N Mean Std. Deviation S.E. Mean 
2008 Assets 
 
Hum. Svcs 7 2765515.76 2143660.82 810227.63 
Other 22 2985538.05 4742862.71 1011181.73 
2010 Assets 
 
Hum. Svcs 7 2787420.67 2287561.36 864616.92 
Other 22 3469395.61 5778085.04 1231891.87 
2012 Assets 
 
Hum. Svcs 7 3250345.29 3071788.51 1161026.92 
Other 22 4335170.28 8060147.02 1718429.12 
2008 Revenue 
 
Hum. Svcs 22 3928704.60 5585904.51 1190918.84 
Other 7 1320995.73 633207.53 239329.95 
2010 Revenue 
 
Hum. Svcs 22 5185282.19 7842165.94 1671955.40 
Other 7 1293524.09 803035.69 303518.96 
2012 Revenue 
Hum. Svcs 22 5339402.97 8331440.47 1776269.08 
Other 7 2029013.04 1084344.65 409843.75 
  
   
101 
 
Figure 29: Independent Samples t-test between Human Services Organizations and Other 
NTEE Categories, 29 Consistent Filers, p<.05 
  
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
2008 
Assets 




-.17 23.18 .867 -220022.28 1295745.85 -2899326.80 2459282.23 
2010 
Assets 




-.45 25.30 .654 -681974.94 1505031.56 -3779790.63 2415840.75 
2012 
Assets 




-.52 25.76 .605 -1084825.00 2073880.94 -5349677.34 3180027.35 
2008 
Revenue 




2.15 22.60 .043 2607708.87 1214728.99 92396.24 5123021.50 
2010 
Revenue 




2.29 22.32 .032 3891758.11 1699281.79 370609.10 7412907.11 
2012 
Revenue 




1.82 23.07 .082 3310389.93 1822938.22 -460041.94 7080821.80 
 
Again the data did not show a statistically significant trend to support this hypothesis. The fact that 
the sample size was so small may have affected this result. Still, for the purposes of this study, 
hypothesis C was not supported: no statistically significant difference was identified between the 
performance of human services organizations and their counterparts in other mission categories. 




The lack of evidence of a financial downturn within the sample makes testing all of the hypotheses 
under the first research question challenging. Within the state of Texas, the greater Austin area has 
been thriving. With a population growth rate roughly four times the growth rate of the United States 
and almost twice that of the state of Texas overall (Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, 2015), 
the Austin metro-service area was thriving during the period under examination from 2000 to 2012. 
With rates of bachelor’s and advanced degree attainment that are roughly half again the state average 
and large employers in fields with low exposure to recessions such as education, health care, and 
government (Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, 2015), it seems that these organizations may 
have been in the right place at the right time to weather the Great Recession with fewer financial 
consequences than their peers in other states, or even in other parts of the state of Texas. According 
to the State Budget Crisis Task Force’s Texas Report, oil and gas revenue cushioned the recession’s 
impact on the state, and also delayed its impact (Ravitch & Volcker, 2012). This report states that 
Texas entered the Great Recession in September 2008 and emerged roughly one year later. While the 
state surpassed its pre-recession employment rate in December 2011, the national economy has only 
recovered about half of the jobs that were lost in the recession by July of 2012 (Ravitch & Volcker, 
2012).  
This lack of statistically significant impact makes answering all of the research questions difficult. 
Addressing hypotheses that organizational age, size, or mission category might affect performance 
during the Great Recession is difficult with no clear evidence that these organizations were affected 
financially in a statistically significant way by the recession. Still, no statistically significant differences 
were found in the consistent sample of 29 organizations to support any of these hypotheses. 
However, considering the information portrayed in Figure 15 where the sample was trisected, small 
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organizations demonstrated larger relative revenue growth over the period prior to 2008, then were 
the only group to show a decline in revenue between 2008 and 2010, while the largest category of 
organizations showed an increase in annual revenue between 2008 and 2010.  
Hypothesis C concerned performance of organizations with missions in the health and human 
services space in contrast to the remainder of the sample. Of the organizations in the final sample of 
80, 42 were human services organizations. Of the 29 organizations with a full 990 on file for each of 
the years in question, 22 are human services organizations, four are public benefit organizations, and 
three have education-oriented missions. No statistically significant difference was found in the 
performance of these samples. 
Findings For Research Question 2 
Since this first data set of 29 organizations had been considered so extensively, I began my 
examinations of my second research question with this set of 29 organizations.   
Research Question 2: Did CEI scores in 2010 show any relationship with FVI scores in 2008, 
2010, or 2012? 
To begin with, I looked for correlations between total FVI scores, and the CEI subscales and total 
scores in this sample.  
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Figure 30: Correlation of Cumulative FVI Scores and CEI Scores, 29 Consistent Filers 
 


































































Finding no statistically significant correlations between the cumulative FVI and the CEI or its 
subscales, I ran the individual FVI terms against the subscales and the cumulative CEI.  
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Figure 31: Correlations Between CEI and its Subscales and the Disaggregated Terms of the 
FVI, 29 Consistent Filers 
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Two relationships in this correlation were statistically significant: one in a single time period, and 
one in two consecutive time periods. 
Figure 32: Correlation of Disaggregated FVI Terms and Disaggregated CEI Subscales, 
N=29 Consistent Filers, p<.05 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Pearson Correlation Significance (2-tailed) 
2010 FVI: Margin CEI: Leadership Culture -.382* .041 
2008 FVI: Concentration CEI: Community 
Collaboration 
.351 .062 
2010 FVI: Concentration CEI: Community 
Collaboration 
.393* .035 




The first relationship was between the Margin term of the FVI and Leadership Culture subscale. The 
Leadership Culture subscale considers organizational traits that start from the leadership team and 
permeate an organization’s culture. The Margin term of the FVI considers the amount of additional 
revenue an organization brings in on top of each dollar of expense. All CEI subscales are scored 
positively, with higher scores being stronger indications of a leadership culture that supports 
volunteers. The FVI Margin term is scored positively, but the overall FVI is scored negatively. In 
other words, a higher score on the Margin term is a suggestion of increased financial vulnerability. 
Therefore, this suggests that organizations with higher scores on the Leadership Culture subscale of 
the CEI garnered lower amount of net income from their revenue in 2010. In other words, their 
revenue was closer to their expenses than for those organizations with lower scores on the CEI’s 
Leadership Culture subscale. 
The second relationship was between the Community Collaboration term on the CEI and the 
Concentration term of the FVI. This relationship was statistically significant in both 2010 and 2012, 
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and showed a weak to moderate correlation lacking statistical significance in 2008. This was the only 
statistically significant relationship between CEI and FVI subcomponents that achieved statistical 
significance in consecutive time periods. This relationship suggests that organizations with higher 
levels of community collaboration as reported on the CEI are more likely to rely on a more 
concentrated set of revenue streams. This can mean a smaller number of funding sources overall, or 
a less balanced revenue flow from a set of streams. In other words, if one organization brings in 
90% of its revenue from one stream and has four streams making up the other 10%, this 
organization will have a more concentrated revenue stream than an organization that has 20% of its 
income flowing from each of five revenue streams. 
After conducting this analysis, I looked at the full data set to determine which organizations could 
be added to the analysis. Because I planned to examine organizational performance before the CEI 
administration (2008), in the same time period as the CEI administration (2010), and in the time 
period immediately following administration of the CEI (2012), only organizations with filings of 
Form 990 in each of these three years were considered. I then reviewed the 21 new organizations 
with consistent filings in these years and compared their performance to the 29 organizations with 
consistent filings across all seven time periods through an independent samples t-test.  
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Figure 33: Comparison of Means of 29 Consistent Filers (Represented with ‘7’) and 21 
Organizations to be Added (Represented with ‘3’) 
 
Years of Filing N Mean Std. Deviation S.E. Mean 
2008 FVI: 
Concentration 
7 29 .74 .19 .03 
3 21 .81 .26 .06 
2008 FVI: 
Administration 
7 29 .05 .07 .01 
3 21 .12 .12 .03 
2008 FVI: Margin 
7 29 .00 .12 .02 
3 21 .01 .27 .06 
2008 FVI: Equity 
7 29 1.19 1.44 .27 
3 21 .81 1.05 .23 
2008 FVI: Total 
7 29 .12 .06 .01 
3 21 .13 .13 .03 
2010 FVI: 
Concentration 
7 29 .77 .17 .03 
3 21 .86 .18 .04 
2010 FVI: 
Administration 
7 29 .14 .06 .01 
3 21 .22 .21 .05 
2010 FVI: Margin 
7 29 .01 .30 .05 
3 21 .13 .17 .04 
2010 FVI: Equity 
7 29 .97 .95 .18 
3 21 .97 1.54 .34 
2010 FVI: Total 
7 29 .11 .16 .03 
3 21 .07 .04 .01 
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Fig. 33, continued 
2012 FVI: 
Concentration 
7 29 .75 .19 .04 
3 21 .80 .23 .05 
2012 FVI: 
Administration 
7 29 .13 .08 .01 
3 21 .20 .19 .04 
2012 FVI: Margin 
7 29 .09 .21 .04 
3 21 .11 .18 .04 
2012 FVI: Equity 
7 29 .80 .73 .14 
3 21 1.12 1.57 .34 
2012 FVI: Total 
7 29 .08 .03 .01 




7 29 9.98 12.28 2.28 




7 29 -.81 .12 .02 
3 21 -.72 .24 .05 
Change in Assets, 
2008-2010 
7 29 -.95 21.73 4.04 
3 21 19.99 78.77 17.19 
Change in Assets, 
2010-2012 
7 29 -.72 .44 .08 
3 21 -.91 .34 .07 
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Figure 34: Independent Samples t-test Comparing 29 Consistent Filers to 21 Organizations 
to be Added to Sample 
  
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
2008 FVI: 
Concentration 
E.V.A. 1.57 .216 -1.11 48.00 .271 -.07 .06 -.20 .06 
E.V.N.A 
  
-1.06 34.90 .296 -.07 .07 -.20 .06 
2008 FVI: 
Administration 
E.V.A. 8.23 .006 -2.45 48.00 .018 -.06 .03 -.12 -.01 
E.V.N.A 
  
-2.27 30.41 .031 -.06 .03 -.12 -.01 
2008 FVI: 
Margin 
E.V.A. 2.27 .138 -.16 48.00 .877 -.01 .06 -.12 .10 
E.V.N.A 
  
-.14 25.41 .890 -.01 .06 -.14 .12 
2008 FVI: 
Equity 
E.V.A. .71 .403 1.03 48.00 .310 .38 .37 -.36 1.12 
E.V.N.A 
  
1.08 47.99 .286 .38 .35 -.33 1.09 
2008 FVI: 
Total 
E.V.A. 2.70 .107 -.27 48.00 .786 -.01 .03 -.06 .05 
E.V.N.A 
  
-.25 25.96 .808 -.01 .03 -.07 .05 
2010 FVI: 
Concentration 
E.V.A. .35 .556 -1.79 48.00 .081 -.09 .05 -.19 .01 
E.V.N.A 
  
-1.77 41.84 .084 -.09 .05 -.19 .01 
2010 FVI: 
Administration 
E.V.A. 3.72 .060 -1.88 48.00 .066 -.08 .04 -.16 .01 
E.V.N.A 
  
-1.64 22.51 .116 -.08 .05 -.18 .02 
2010 FVI: 
Margin 
E.V.A. .00 .990 -1.63 48.00 .110 -.12 .07 -.26 .03 
E.V.N.A 
  
-1.77 45.53 .083 -.12 .07 -.25 .02 
2010 FVI: 
Equity 
E.V.A. .21 .646 .01 48.00 .989 .01 .35 -.70 .71 
E.V.N.A 
  
.01 30.79 .989 .01 .38 -.77 .78 
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I saw only one statistically significant difference between the two samples: the level of administrative 
expense was meaningfully lower in the group of 29 consistent filers than in the 21 organizations to 
be added in 2008. This lowered the FVI Admin term for the 21 organizations to be added, which is 
considered to be an increase in financial vulnerability by Greenlee and Trussel (2000). While the FVI 
Administration term was lower for all three time periods under examination for CEI comparisons 
(2008, 2010, and 2012), the gap was only statistically significant at the p<.05 level in 2008. I decided 
that this one difference was not sufficient to outweigh the benefit of augmenting the sample size for 
another round of testing. Therefore, these 21 organizations were added to the sample.  
Analyzing 50 Organizations 
The mean FVI for this 50 organization sample decreases from 0.12 (financially vulnerable) to 0.10 
(border between financially vulnerable and no indication) to 0.08 (low in the no indication range) 
over the three samples from 2008 to 2012, suggesting that these organizations as a group are 
reducing their financial vulnerability over this time frame. A full list of these 50 organizations can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Next I examined how revenue, expenses, liabilities, and assets varied during this time frame for these 
50 organizations. 
  




Figure 35: Financial Indicators, 2008-2012, in Inflation-Adjusted Dollars, 50 Organizations 
  
The trend of improvement seen in the smaller sample over the later years of the time period appears 
consistent with the trend of improvement seen in this shorter time frame. Inflation-adjusted 
financial indicators appear to rise steadily through the time under examination.  
An independent samples t-test of these financial indicators for the 29 human services organizations 
in this sample as compared to the 21 organizations with missions outside of the human services 
category of the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) revealed no statistically significant 
differences at an alpha level of .05 between human service organizations and organizations from 
other NTEE categories.  
  




Figure 36: Coded FVI Scores, 50 Organizations, 2008-2012 
 
As with the smaller sample, the FVI scores show a recovery from the financial crisis as these 
organizations move away from the 2008 time period. The number of organizations considered not 
to be financially vulnerable drops in each time period, while the number considered financially 
vulnerable drops by half from 2008 to 2010 before a slight rebound up to 15 in 2012. This overall 
trend suggests increasing financial stability in the sample over the time between 2008 and 2012. 
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The 2010 spike in the FVI for the Human Rights Initiative of North Texas is an outlier on this 
graph as it was for the sample of 29 organizations above in Figure 20. The outlier spiking in 2008 is 
representing Reserve Aid, a Dallas-based organization supporting National Guard and Reservist 
veterans upon their return. Their expenses increased by a factor of ten from 2006 to 2008. For an 
organization that received its public charity designation in 2005, this is not shocking: as the 
organization became more established it grew dramatically. By 2010 Reserve Aid’s revenue was 
greater than its expenses, and its FVI returned to the ‘Not Financially Vulnerable’ range. 
The third outlier can be seen spiking up in 2012. This organization, Digital Workforce Academy, 
earns all of its revenue from services provided, and has a higher FVI due to its single revenue stream 
accounting for all of its revenue.  
Without these outlier organizations, the raw FVI scores for this sample look like this: 
Figure 38: Raw FVI Scores for 47 of 50 Organizations, 2008-2012 
 
The downward trend reflected in the sample’s means is evident in this graph. These organizations 
are moving down the graph away from financial vulnerability. Re-running the mean raw FVI of this 
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sample after removing these three organizations reduces the means to 0.11 in 2008, 0.09 in 2010, 
and 0.08 in 2012. 
Figure 39: Mean Raw FVI Scores for 47 Organizations Compared to 50 Organizations 
Before and After Outlier Removal, 2008-2012 
 
Removing the outliers reveals the downward trend of the overall sample more clearly. 
CEI and FVI from 2008-2012 
With this sample of 50 organizations, we now turn to the Community Engagement Index (CEI) 
findings. Do responses to the CEI relate to FVI or other financial metrics in the year it was 
administered (2010)? 
To answer this question I sought correlation between total CEI scores, as well as each subscale 
individually, and the financial indicators graphed above (inflation-adjusted revenue, expenses, 
liabilities, and assets) as well as the change in each of these indicators from 2008 to 2010, and the 
change from 2010 to 2012. 
The same lack of statistically significant results appeared when the full FVI was correlated with the 
CEI. Out of curiosity, I also explored relationships between CEI scores and changes in revenue and 
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assets during this time period. In addition to considering these raw values, I considered the changes 
in these values as well as in the FVI and its individual terms between 2008 and 2010, and between 
2010 and 2012. My thought was that while organizations might start at different values of these 
metrics, an economic shock might cause organizations with stronger community engagement 
practices to experience a different pattern of changes than their peers. I tested for these relationships 
through bivariate correlations between CEI total and subscale scores, and the variables mentioned 
above. Results from these correlative tests can be found in the figures below.  
  




Figure 40: Bivariate Correlations Between CEI and its Subscales, and Changes in 2008 FVI 













Pearson Correlation -0.02 0.26 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 






Pearson Correlation 0.05 0.16 0.14 -0.03 -0.22 




Pearson Correlation -0.09 0.26 0.19 -0.09 -0.33 




Pearson Correlation -0.04 0.22 0.1 -0.18 -0.21 




Pearson Correlation 0.01 0.23 0.09 -0.17 -0.23 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.95 0.11 0.54 0.24 0.10 
Total CEI 
 
Pearson Correlation -0.03 0.25 0.16 -0.13 -0.29 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.86 0.08 0.28 0.36 0.04 
 
The statistically significant relationships between the total FVI in 2008 and the CEI’s Marketing and 
Communication subscale, as well as the total CEI score, will be discussed after these statistics are 
presented.  




Figure 41: Bivariate Correlations Between CEI and its Subscales, and Changes in 2010 FVI 










Equity 2010 FVI 
CEI: Leadership 
Culture 
Pearson Correlation 0.1 0.12 -0.17 0.11 0.22 







Pearson Correlation 0.07 -0.04 -0.1 0.08 0.13 





Pearson Correlation 0.02 0.1 -0.11 0.01 0.12 





Pearson Correlation -0.02 0.04 -0.14 -0.05 0.11 





Pearson Correlation 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.74 0.7 0.63 0.43 0.86 
Total CEI 
 
Pearson Correlation 0.04 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.81 0.88 0.40 0.91 0.44 
 
No statistically significant relationships were found between the FVI or its subscales and the CEI or 
its subscales in 2010.  
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Correlation 0.21 -0.03 0.09 0.11 0.17 






Correlation 0.2 -0.09 0.03 0.04 0.19 





Correlation 0.06 0.09 0.12 -0.06 -0.04 




Correlation 0.11 -0.06 0.04 -0.22 -0.01 




Correlation 0.14 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.35 0.96 0.66 0.55 0.39 
Total CEI 
Pearson 
Correlation 0.14 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.07 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.32 0.94 0.78 0.53 0.63 
 
No statistically significant correlations were found between 2012 FVI scores, either in total or by 
subscale, and CEI scores.  
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Figure 43: Correlations between Changes in Revenue and Assets Between 2008-2010 and 




















Pearson Correlation 0.02 -0.11 -0.16 0.03 




Pearson Correlation -0.04 -0.21 -0.16 0.01 




Pearson Correlation 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.93 0.85 0.95 0.95 
CEI: Infrastructure 
 
Pearson Correlation -0.06 -0.16 -0.11 -0.04 




Pearson Correlation -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.44 0.60 0.55 0.57 
Total CEI 
 
Pearson Correlation -0.05 -0.11 -0.1 -0.03 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.73 0.45 0.49 0.82 
 
No statistically significant correlations were identified between CEI subscale or total scores and 
changes in revenue or asset levels between 2008 and 2010, or between 2010 and 2012.  
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Correlation 0.13 -0.04 -0.14 0.32 







0 -0.11 -0.19 0.14 






0.14 -0.05 -0.23 0.14 






0.03 -0.08 -0.2 0.18 






0.04 -0.17 -0.13 0.08 





0.07 -0.12 -0.22 0.16 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.64 0.4 0.12 0.28 
 
The correlation between the CEI Leadership Culture subscale and the change in equity terms is the 
only test with a statistically significant result. Given how many correlations were run to generate this 
figure, it is not surprising that one would be statistically significant. Still, this finding may be relevant 
to future research on this topic.  
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Correlation 0.21 -0.18 0.24 -0.02 






Correlation 0.24 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 





Correlation 0.07 -0.02 0.2 -0.1 





Correlation 0.23 -0.12 0.18 -0.27 





Correlation 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.05 




Correlation 0.19 -0.04 0.16 -0.11 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.18 0.80 0.28 0.45 
      
  





The results from these figures that reach or approach statistical significance are summarized in the 
following figure. 
Figure 46: Correlations Between CEI Subscales, FVI Subscales, and Changes in FVI 
Subscales, p<.05 
Correlated Variable 1 Correlated Variable 2 Pearson 
Correlation 
Significance 
CEI Marketing & Communication 2008 FVI -.33* .018 
Total CEI 2008 FVI -.29* .038 
CEI Leadership Culture Change in FVI Equity 2008-2010 .32* .024 
CEI Infrastructure  Change in FVI Equity 2010-2012 -.27 .058 
CEI Community Collaboration Change in FVI Concentration 2010-2012 .24 .091 
 
In 2008, total FVI and CEI scores showed a statistically significant negative correlation, suggesting 
that organizations with higher CEI scores were more likely to show lower FVI scores in that year. 
No statistically significant relationship was found between total FVI and total CEI scores in 2010 or 
2012.  
Disaggregating the subscales on both tools revealed two statistically significant findings. The first 
was a negative correlation between 2008 FVI scores and scores on the Marketing and 
Communication subscale of the CEI. Organizations with higher scores on the Marketing and 
Communication subscale of the CEI were more likely to show lower FVI scores. Since higher FVI 
scores indicate higher levels of vulnerability, this suggests that organizations with lower levels of 
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financial vulnerability in 2008 had higher levels of competence in marketing and communication, as 
measured by the CEI, in 2010. This test also revealed a positive relationship between the CEI’s 
Leadership Culture subscale and changes in the FVI’s equity component. Organizations with 
increases in the equity term of the FVI between 2008 and 2010 were more likely to have higher 
scores on the Leadership Culture subscale of the CEI. While the additional two findings were not 
significant at the p<.05 level, they are included in the following table for the purposes of informing 
future studies of CEI results. 
The two findings that do not attain statistical significance at the p<.05 level are a potential negative 
correlation between the Infrastructure subscale of the CEI and the change in the equity term of the 
FVI between 2010 and 2012, and a potential positive correlation between the Community 
Collaboration subscale of the CEI and the change in the concentration term of the FVI between 
2010 and 2012. This suggests that further exploration of these relationships may be warranted in 
future studies.  
All of these results must be considered in conjunction with the large number of correlation tests that 
were run on this sample. The meaning of the p<.05 standard is that on this basis we accept results 
that we would expect to see by chance in less than five percent of all cases. In this case, these results 
show three statistically significant results as a result of correlating six CEI variables against 27 
financial variables. This means that 162 bivariate correlations were run. With a standard of p<.05, 
we should expect about eight statistically significant results if the data is completely random. Since 
this study is exploratory, these results are being reported, but their statistical ‘significance’ is very 
weak. To strengthen these tests, the p-value cutoff should be divided by the number of tests run. 
Were I to take this step, the threshold these correlations would need to meet to attain statistical 
significance would become p<.00039, a standard none of these suggested correlations meets. 
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The theoretical and practical implications of these findings will be discussed at greater length in the 
following chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
This study was designed to explore the resilience of a set of nonprofit organizations in the state of 
Texas as these organizations underwent the Great Recession of 2007-2009. In compiling the 
necessary information to explore the research questions described at the close of the third chapter of 
this document, two discoveries were made. First, far fewer organizations from the sample had 
consistent financial information available from Form 990 than anticipated. Second, the organizations 
with full available financial information did not show a major shift in financial performance in the 
2007-2009 timeframe.  
Organizations were included into this sample based on their completion of the Community 
Engagement Index (CEI) in 2010, not on their financial scope, their legal requirement to file a full 
Form 990, or the consistency of their 990 records during the time period sampled. As a result, some 
attrition was expected since some organizations had religious missions and were thus able to exempt 
themselves from filing Form 990 (Internal Revenue Service, n.d.) and from the fact that some of the 
teams completing the CEI were representing small sub-segments of larger organizations, such as the 
ACE tutoring program. A Community for Education, known as ACE, is an early literacy program 
that trains tutors and incorporates them into public schools to serve students in early primary 
school. The program is housed within the Charles A. Dana Center, a research organization with 
several educational initiatives spanning from pre-kindergarten through higher education and 
including continuing education programs as well. The Dana Center, in turn, is one component of 
the University of Texas at Austin. ACE does not file its own tax return, nor does it have its own 
501(c)(3) status. Rather, it operates under the large umbrella of the University of Texas at Austin. 
The impact of the community engagement of the ACE program is a minute portion of the 
University of Texas at Austin. As a result, ACE was omitted from the sample to be examined due to 
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its diluted impact on the financial performance of an entity as large as the University of Texas at 
Austin. 
Prior to purchasing access to the DataWeb from the National Center of Charitable Statistics 
(NCCS), there was no easy way to determine which of the organizations from this sample would 
have financial information available for the period in question. Data released on Form 990 is 
considered to be highly reliable and accurate (Froelich, et al., 2000), and is expected to be available 
for all organizations with over $200,000 in annual revenue and over $500,000 in assets (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2014c). After I was granted access to the NCCS DataWeb through the generous 
support of the RGK Center at the University of Texas at Austin, I discovered that very few of the 
organizations in the sample were included in the DataWeb’s Statement of Income reports. These are 
the only digitized data files from NCCS that include sufficient information about the breakdown of 
expenses by program, management, and fundraising as is required to calculate the FVI of an 
organization in a given year. 
In addition to the issue of insufficient categorization of expenses in the Business Master Files of the 
DataWeb to calculate FVI, I discovered an additional concern. NCCS makes data available from 
‘snapshots’ of the full database at differing points in time. Rather than categorizing the information 
based on the year of the return being filed, these results are time-stamped with the month during 
which they were pulled from the total database. Since many organizations use different financial 
years, categorizing filings by year can be challenging. Many organizations use the calendar year for 
their financial reporting, and run their financial reports from the first of January to the 31st of 
December. Since educational institutions and programs that work with them usually follow the 
academic year, however, many schools and academic support organizations run their year from the 
first of July to the 30th of June. Other organizations may start and end their financial years on any 
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arbitrary date: this is a decision every organization makes independently (Internal Revenue Service, 
2015b). Moreover, once a financial year has been determined, nonprofits must complete and file 
their information by a given deadline, but there are extensions to these deadlines available. Given 
that investment return information may not be available until much later in the year, there is no clear 
date upon which NCCS can take a snapshot and gather the filing information from a given year 
without overlap from returns from different years.  
As an example, imagine two organizations. Organization A follows an academic calendar and 
completes its financial year on June 30th, 2010. With few investments, this organization is able to file 
a tax return by July 10th, 2010. In contrast, Organization B holds a sizeable endowment with a 
complex investment history. Organization B closes its financial year on December 31st, 2009, but 
may not receive full financial reports on its investments until September 2010 and thus files its tax 
return on the first of October, 2010. Imagine that, late in 2010, the board of Organization B 
concludes that the investment portfolio is not worth the expense and hassle, and reverts to simpler 
financial tools with more straightforward reporting that is available earlier in the year. As a result, 
Organization B is able to file its 2010 tax return on the first of February, 2011. If NCCS takes a 
snapshot every six months on the fifteenth of August and of February, these snapshots will 
completely miss the 2009 filing from Organization B. 
Given this limitation of the ‘snapshot’ approach to data summary, I decided to purchase a custom 
data pull from GuideStar in addition to the data available from NCCS. GuideStar tracks the year of 
filing on Form 990 itself, hopefully minimizing the snapshot issue described above. Unfortunately, 
even with the union of these two sources, the rate of intermittent filing of the 990 was forty percent. 
In other words, in a sample of 80 organizations, 32 had skipped at least one of the 990 filings after 
their first filing and before the close of the 2012 time period. Moreover, there were additional gaps 
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in the information. For example, 2004 was missing filings from 39 organizations, and no 
information about the segmentation of expenses between administration, program, and fundraising 
categories was available for 2006. I documented these issues and contacted GuideStar to verify that 
no data had been overlooked, and no additional data was found. This suggests that some portion of 
the issue may be in the digitization process utilized by GuideStar to capture this information. 
Unfortunately, the scanned copies of the 990 provided online by GuideStar only include the most 
recent three filings for unpaid accounts, and the most recent six for paid access. Even the paid 
access would not fill the largest gaps in data, which are in 2004 and 2006. Extensive web and library 
searches and explorations of the websites of these organizations individually, as well as a perusal of 
https://archive.org/details/IRS990 and the filings of Form 990 available through that source, 
revealed no data to fill these gaps in 990 filings. The following calculations are based on the 
aggregation of information from these sources.  
There is not enough data available to determine whether the missing 990s were due to major 
declines in the resources of the organizations which caused them to fall under the IRS-designated 
cutoffs (assets of less than $500,000 or revenue of less than $200,000), or whether those returns 
were omitted due to late filings or other challenges in the digitization process. Further, even for 
those organizations with strong and consistent performance both before and after the gaps in their 
990 filings, the various components of the FVI vary sufficiently as to render interpolation of FVI 
values suspect. Therefore, data outside of the consistent ranges of filing for these 32 intermittent 
organizations was excluded from analysis. This left a sample of 29 organizations with consistent 
filing records from 2000-2012, and 50 organizations with consistent filing records from 2008-2012. 
This exploratory study was intended to cast light on the performance of these organizations during 
the recession. In this sample, little impact from the recession was seen either in traditional financial 
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indicators or in FVI as defined by Greenlee and Trussel (2000). Organizations were included in this 
purposive sample due to their involvement with a funder or coalition with an interest in effective 
volunteer and community engagement. Without further detail it is difficult to attribute the stable 
performance of these organizations through the recession to any one factor. Still, three possible 
explanations arise. 
First, the sample itself is small. The changes due to the recession could well be visible with a larger 
sample. The organizations to be included in this sample were selected and the CEI was administered 
to them in 2010. While GuideStar’s website includes scans of Form 990 for many organizations for 
the last three filings, the purchase of access to the full databases of information were made in 2015. 
As a result, the scans were of little help in filling in gaps prior to the final period under 
consideration, 2012. It was clear that some of the organizations would not have full 990 filings 
available for the early samples in the time period due to the dates upon which they received their 
510(c)(3) designation from the IRS, but this challenge turned out to be less of an issue than was 
intermittent filing. Twenty-two of the organizations in question received their public charity status in 
2000 or later, but 32 of the organizations showed filing gaps in the data received from GuideStar 
and NCCS. 
Second, national and local data suggest that Texas fared better than most states during the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009, and that Austin fared better than most of Texas. From the Urban 
Institute’s analysis of nonprofit organizations receiving government funding, fewer Texas 
organizations were seeing fewer issues with layoffs, salary freezes or reductions, program reductions, 
or benefit reductions than most of the nation in 2009 (Boris, et al., 2010). While Texas as a whole 
was faring better than the national average, Austin was faring better than most of Texas on average. 
The Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce describes a city with several large industries that are 
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recession-resistant, including education, health care, and government (Greater Austin Chamber of 
Commerce, 2015). Further, Austin is considered to have the twenty-sixth best-educated populace in 
the nation (Bernardo, 2014), with the next best-educated city in Texas listed as Houston at number 
56. In the Great Recession, education was a critical determining factor in predicting how well 
families’ savings came through the crisis. Households with a head of house with a high school 
degree or less education lost an average of $33,000 in net worth between 1999 and 2009, with most 
of the loss focused between 2007 and 2009 (Bernardo, 2014). As a result, Austin’s highly educated 
workforce should have a stabilizing effect on the financial position of its population.  
Third, these organizations were included in this study because they completed the Community 
Engagement Index in 2010. This means that they were affiliated either with a coalition or a funder 
that was actively supporting effective volunteer management and community outreach practices. 
The fact that no meaningful negative effect from the Great Recession can be seen in this sample 
may be an indication that these organizations were already utilizing their community connections 
and volunteer resources to strengthen their organizations prior to taking the CEI. If it is true that 
organizations respond to the priorities of their funders (Carman, 2009), the fact that the OneStar 
Foundation, TRIAD, and the Literacy Coalition of Central Texas were interested in community 
engagement may have inspired these organizations to be more intentional about community 
engagement prior to completing the CEI. This hypothesis could be tested by building a paired 
control sample mirroring this group of nonprofits and comparing their financial performance to this 
sample’s financial performance over the period from 2000-2012. 
Despite these challenges, some interesting patterns emerged from this sample. First, adjusting for 
the large amount of inflation during this time period was a key factor in creating graphs that 
depicted the financial performance of these organizations accurately. At first glance, these 
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organizations appeared to be growing comfortably during the time in question. Once the inflation 
rate of 33% over the course of the period had been included in these calculations, their growth 
curves became far less consistent and more tumultuous. In addition to the turmoil created by 
unknown future rates of inflation, these organizations endured dramatic changes in real estate 
valuation during this time. While the housing crisis that gripped the rest of the nation may have been 
mitigated by Austin’s continued growth during this period, real estate is a large investment for many 
organizations. Fluctuations both up and down in real estate values can wreak havoc with an 
organization’s financial statements and with its property tax bills and rent as well.  
Second, once organizational revenue was controlled for organizational size, the trend line became far 
less tidy. While the trends were still upwards, the progress was much less smooth.  
Figure 47: Inflation-Adjusted Financial Indicators, 29 Consistent Filers, 2000-2012 
 
While inflation-adjusted revenue for the sample rose substantially from 2009 to 2010, the gap 
between these lines is the accumulation of net assets for the organizations in that year. From 2009 to 
2010, these lines are so close as to be indistinguishable on this graph, suggesting that revenue and 
expenses were far closer together than in 1999. While these organizations may have been able to stay 
in business, this decrease in financial cushion or ‘net income’ reflects higher financial stress on these 
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organizations. This lack of cushion is a sufficiently important indicator of financial sustainability that 
it is included as one of the factors in calculating the FVI: the ‘margin’ factor. 
FVI Components 
The FVI is calculated through an equation that includes four separate ratios. The margin factor is 
calculated by subtracting the organization’s annual expenses from its annual revenue, then dividing 
that value by the annual revenue. The output of this calculation indicates what percentage of the 
organization’s revenue will remain with the organization after all expenses are paid. This is similar to 
the calculation of the gross profit margin in the for-profit world. This term is negative in the FVI 
calculation, meaning that a higher value for the ‘margin’ term in the FVI calculation correlates with a 
lower FVI. This makes sense because it suggests that organizations able to retain some revenue 
beyond their expenses will have lower levels of financial vulnerability. In other words, if the 
organization makes some money beyond its expenses each year, it will be more financially 
sustainable than an organization with expenses that are equal to (or greater than) its annual revenue. 
The next component of the FVI is the ‘equity’ component. Similar to the equity ratio calculated by 
for-profit firms, this is an examination of an organization’s assets in comparison to its liabilities. This 
term is calculated by subtracting total assets from total liabilities, then normalized by dividing by 
annual revenue. While revenue and expenses are typically quite liquid, assets and liabilities may be 
less liquid. For example, a real estate asset may have substantial book value but is not easily 
liquidated at that book value in the event of an emergent financial crisis. Further, nonprofits often 
receive restricted funds that are donated for a specific purpose and cannot be utilized to support the 
organization’s administration function. Liabilities such as long-term mortgages may be difficult to 
reduce with little notice. Still, there may be some flexibility with some of these resources, especially 
over time. Tuckman and Chang explain that they include this ratio for four reasons. Assets may be 
used to collateralize loans, they may be sold off over time, some assets may be liquid over a longer 
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time span, and the organization may modify its services to utilize restricted funds more quickly 
(Tuckman & Chang, 1991). While assets and liabilities may not be as easy to modify in the short 
term, a stronger asset position relative to liabilities still reduces an organization’s FVI score, though 
by a smaller amount than the margin factor.  
Third, the FVI considers an organizations revenue stream concentration in the ‘concentration’ 
factor. This calculation is based on a Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index of an organization’s revenue 
streams, and provides a value between zero and one indicating how diversified the organization’s 
funding streams are. This term is calculated by dividing each of five revenue streams by total 
revenue, then squaring that value. The five revenue streams are as follows: program service fees, 
membership dues, sales of unrelated goods, investment income, and finally contributions, gifts and 
grants. Note that this fifth revenue category would include gifts from individuals, contracts from 
government sources, and grants from philanthropic institutions. As a result, the FVI does not allow 
for differentiation between public and private contributions. Organizations with lower values of 
revenue concentration receive lower scores on the FVI, because greater diversification of revenue 
streams is expected to increase financial resilience (Tuckman & Chang, 1991).  
The fourth term in the FVI is the ‘administration’ factor. Tuckman and Change suggest that in 
difficult financial times, nonprofits have the option of reducing their administrative expenses, and 
thus that organizations with a higher percentage of their expenses stemming from the administrative 
category will be able to avoid cuts to programs more successfully than peers with lower 
administrative expenses as a percentage of their total expenses (Tuckman & Chang, 1991).  
Funding Stream Blend: Public Versus Private 
When the initial analysis of the financial factors revealed no meaningful drop in revenue during the 
time of the Great Recession, I began to search for explanations. The first is that the recession hit 
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Texas later than it hit other states (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011) and was not as severe 
in central Texas as in most parts of the country, thanks to recession-resistant industries and 
consistent growth in the Austin metropolitan service area (Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, 
2015). Beyond this, I was curious about whether these organizations shifted their portfolio of 
funding streams. Did these organizations gain more funding from grants and contributions, or were 
public dollars from local, regional, state, and federal governments increasing their support of public 
service organizations? 
This information is more difficult to track due to the redesign of Form 990 in 2008. The new form 
was released in 2007, and organizations had the option of filing either the old or the new version of 
the form in 2008, and were expected to have switched to the new version by 2009 (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2014a). The new Form 990 includes a far more detailed breakdown of funding sources than 
the previous version, allowing for a glimpse into the way that funding streams shifted from 2008 (for 
those organizations choosing to file the new 990 in 2008) to 2010 to 2012. Since the previous 
version of the form did not include this information, there is not a baseline before the 2008 sample 
to which to compare funding stream levels. The funding streams considered in the FVI do not 
differentiate between public and private dollars: all such support is grouped together in the 
‘contracts, gifts and grants’ stream in the FVI. Because this data was not available for the entire time 
period under analysis, this data fell outside the scope of this study and was not purchased as part of 
the data request from GuideStar. 
Inactive Organization Purge 
Along with the redesign of Form 990, the time period under examination contains another major 
change from the IRS: a purge of inactive 501(c)(3) organizations which took effect in 2011. The 
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Department of Labor, 2006) included stipulations requiring all 
nonprofit organizations, even those with less than $25,000 in annual revenue, to file a tax return. 
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Organizations that went three years without filing a tax return had their tax-exempt public charity 
status revoked in 2011. This purge eliminated over 275,000 organizations, though roughly 10,000 
then re-activated their public charity status by filing their returns (Hrywna, 2012). To verify that this 
hadn’t been an issue for the organizations in the sample that did not file in 2012, I checked their 
status through the IRS Exempt Organizations Select Check (Internal Revenue Service, 2015a) and 
confirmed that none of the non-filers from 2012 in the sample of 80 being examined for this study 
had lost their public charity status permanently due to the 2011 purge. 
Findings from Research Question One 
The first question considered through the lens of this data was about how this sample of nonprofits 
in the state of Texas fared during The Great Recession of 2007-2009. I reprint the question below 
for the reader’s convenience. 
Research Question 1:  How did the Great Recession of 2007-2009 affect a purposive sample of 
nonprofit organizations in the state of Texas?  
Hypothesis A: Older organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the 
reputational bias of age. 
Hypothesis B: Larger organizations were less affected by the financial downturn due to the larger 
sizes of their budgets. 
Hypothesis C: Controlling for findings from age and budget size, human services organizations 
showed lower FVI values than their peers in other NTEE categories, both during and after the 
Great Recession, mirroring national trends during this time.  
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Figure 48: Financial Indicators, 29 Consistent Filers, Adjusted for Inflation, 2000-2012 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, this sample did not show a big drop during this time period. While Figure 40 
shows that revenue and expenses were closer together for the sample of 29 organizations between 
2008 and 2010 than in the rest of the years from 1999 to 2012, the upward trend in the sample’s 
revenue is more pronounced than before this time. There is a decline after this time, but even after 
adjusting for inflation, these organizations as a group brought in more revenue in 2011 than in 2008. 
Based on this sample, the largest drop in real revenue was between 2005 and 2006. The data 
provided by GuideStar from the 2008 to 2010 timeframe did not break down funding sources by 
their public versus private status. In other words, the data provided by GuideStar did delineate 
between the funding streams defined by Tuckman and Chang (1991), but did not delineate between 
funds from individuals, funds from foundations, and funds from government sources. As a result 
there is not an easy way to confirm whether the spike in revenue from 2008 to 2010 was from local, 
state, or federal government sources attempting to ease the effects of the recession. I was able to 
find some information about funding received from universities and local government programs for 
this purpose, but the organizations in this sample were not included in the data sources I was able to 
find. 
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To bolster these findings, I reached out to the large organizations in the sample with increases in 
revenue in 2009 to ask about their impression of the causes for this increase. Of this sample, two 
organizations were affiliates of Goodwill. I learned that Goodwill’s revenue stream was affected 
more dramatically by shifts in retail purchasing than by changes in government funding. “Nordstrom 
shoppers went to Target, Target shoppers went to Wal-Mart, and Wal-Mart shoppers came to us,” 
explained Jed Miracle, Senior Finance Director of Goodwill Industries of Central Texas (Miracle, 
2015). One organization completed a capital campaign and opened a new facility during that time 
period. Other finance professionals mentioned sequestration and various organizational events 
unrelated to the Great Recession as major drivers in the shifts in their income patterns during this 
time.  
In brief, the answer to Research Question One is that the Great Recession did not appear to have 
much of an effect on this purposive sample of 29 organizations. Revenue appeared to increase, but 
not in an unprecedented way: the rate of increase is roughly equivalent to that seen between 2002 
and 2003, and again between 2006 and 2007 (see Figure 33 for visual representation of these 
inflation-adjusted financial indicators). The increase appears to have lasted longer than during those 
times, and the margins may have been smaller, but the time frame of the recession does not stand 
out from the rest of time under examination in a startling way.  
An examination of this time period through the lens of relative revenue, to address the fact that the 
largest organizations may be overshadowing smaller organizations in summative calculations, shows 
no clear pattern during the recession timeframe. After removing a few outliers with unusually high 
relative revenues, the remaining 23 organizations show an array of different performances on this 
financial metric with no clear trend (see Figure 13, Relative Revenue Growth, 23 of 29 Consistent 
Filers, 2002-2012 for graphical representation of this point). The recession is similarly difficult to 
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pinpoint when considering how many organizations saw increases in revenue during each year. The 
big change is visible in Figure 14 in 2010: almost three times as many organizations saw revenue 
growth between 2009 and 2010 than saw decreases in revenue.  
To confirm, again, that increases were not being allocated disproportionately to larger organizations, 
the sample was divided into three groups based upon the organizations’ budget sizes in 2000. Figure 
15 shows that while the increase in revenue for the largest organizations (those with over $2 million 
in annual revenue in 2000) is most visible, the mid-sized organizations (those with between $800,000 
and $2 million in annual revenue in 2000) also saw an increase in revenue during this time. Revenue 
for organizations with less than $800,000 in annual revenue appears to be flat during this time, but 
increased between 2010 and 2012.  
One metric that showed some change during the time of the recession was the FVI. Figure 19 
shows that the number of organizations in the ‘financially vulnerable’ category increases steadily 
until 2008. The number of organizations in the ‘not financially vulnerable’ category then increases in 
2010 and 2012. This is a different perspective than that offered by the other metrics considered. By 
revealing an increase in financial vulnerability in this sample during the time of the Great Recession, 
these FVI scores are providing additional information about these organizations and their financial 
stability not conveyed by a consideration of financial metrics such as revenue or asset levels. 
Divisions of the sample by organizational age and budget did not reveal statistically significant 
differences in performance. The fact that the younger organizations in the sample showed higher 
levels of revenue than their older counterparts may be revealing interesting information, or may be 
an aberration caused by the small sample size, given that the two groups were not shown to be 
statistically significantly different by an independent samples t-test. 
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The small size of the sample made statistical significance especially difficult to attain for the 
comparison of human services organizations to organizations with other mission categories, since 20 
of the 29 organizations in this sample fell into the human services category.  
CEI Findings 
After considering the performance of these 29 organizations over the time period between 2000 and 
2012 from a strictly financial perspective, I included the Community Engagement Index (CEI) in my 
analysis. Since CEI scores were only collected from this group of organizations in 2010, longitudinal 
analysis of the CEI is not possible. However, I was curious about how CEI scores would vary along 
with financial indicators. Would there be a relationship between the dimensions of community 
engagement measured by the CEI and financial performance in the years around 2010? 
Because I had spent so much time with this sample of 29 organizations, I ran some tests with this 
group prior to augmenting my sample with those organizations with consistent 990 filings in 2008, 
2010, and 2012. When this analysis showed no significant results, I considered the terms of the FVI 
individually in relation to the subscales of the CEI. A statistically significant relationship between 
organizational margin and the Leadership Culture subscale was visible, as was a trend of correlation 
between the CEI’s Community Collaboration subscale and the FVI’s Concentration term that 
neared statistical significance in 2008 and attained significance in both 2010 and 2012. Before 
discussing this finding, I reiterate that the number of bivariate correlations run in this study was 
large, and while these findings were statistically significant at the p<.05 level, the expectation is that 
with so many tests being run (72), three or four would be significant at this rate by random chance 
on average. Given the exploratory nature of this study, however, I will review these findings as a 
precursor to further exploration of the potential relationship between the FVI and the CEI.  
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Figure 49: Correlation of Disaggregated FVI Terms and Disaggregated CEI Subscales, 
N=29 Consistent Filers, p<.05 
FVI Variable CEI Variable Pearson Correlation Significance (2-tailed) 
2010 FVI: Margin CEI: Leadership Culture -.382* .041 
2008 FVI: Concentration CEI: Community 
Collaboration 
.351 .062 
2010 FVI: Concentration CEI: Community 
Collaboration 
.393* .035 




The negative correlation between Leadership Culture CEI subscale scores with financial margin in 
2010 is intriguing. This suggests that organizations with pervasive support for volunteers saw 
narrower margins in 2010. Again, without information about the breakdown of the funding streams 
supporting these organizations during this time frame, there is no way to know if the increases in 
revenue were driven by recession recovery stimulus government funds, or from other sources. What 
the data do show is that expenses were increasing at least as quickly as revenue, given the overall 
reduction in margin visible in Figure 33 during this time. Government funding is known to be 
expensive to obtain and to carry burdensome reporting requirements, often causing the type of 
margin compression seen during these years in the sample (Brooks, 2000; Gronbjerg, 1991). One 
hypothesis about this pattern would be that these organizations with strong leadership teams and 
supportive cultures were able to bring in more government dollars during these years.  
The fact that the Concentration term of the FVI and the CEI’s Community Collaboration subscale 
show a pattern of correlation suggests that there may be a non-random driver for this relationship. 
The weak to moderate relationship shown in 2008 is included because of the statistical significance 
of the relationship in 2010 and 2012. The Concentration term of the FVI is an indicator of how 
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consolidated the organization’s funding streams are. The pattern revealed in the analysis of these 29 
organizations suggests a relationship between organizations with stronger community collaboration 
efforts and higher rates of revenue concentration. In other words, the data suggest that 
organizations with less funding diversity are more likely to collaborate with individuals and 
organizations across organizational boundaries. This relationship becomes slightly stronger as the 
years pass. One possible explanation would be that these organizations were able to utilize their 
strong collaborations to bring in government funding during the recession, and were then 
consolidating their funding base back to its pre-recession levels and positions after that funding 
expired. 
Considering the 50 Organization Data Set 
Having considered the relationship between the FVI and the CEI with the original 29 consistent-
filing organizations from Research Question One, I added the 21 organizations that had filed 
consistently in 2008, 2010, and 2012. Statistical analysis of the 50 organization set with these same 
tests failed to show any statistically significant results. I then considered changes in the terms of the 
FVI, thinking that while organizations might have started at different points on these terms of the 
FVI, the impact of any regional financial fluctuations might cause simultaneous movements among 
many of the organizations in the sample. 
  




Figure 50: Correlations Between CEI Subscales, FVI Subscales, and Changes in FVI 
Subscales, p<.05, 50 Organizations 
Correlated CEI Variable Correlated FVI Variable  Pearson 
Correlation 
Significance 
CEI Marketing and 
Communication 
2008 FVI -.33* .018 
Total CEI 2008 FVI -.29* .038 
CEI Leadership Culture Change in FVI Equity 2008-2010 .32* .024 
CEI Infrastructure  Change in FVI Equity 2010-2012 -.27 .058 
CEI Community Collaboration Change in FVI Concentration 2010-2012 .24 .091 
 
The relationship between the total FVI in 2008 and the Marketing and Communication subscale of 
the CEI appears to be the driver of the statistically significant relationship between total CEI scores 
and 2008 FVI scores, given that they are both negative correlations and the effect size of the 
Marketing and Communication is greater than that for the total score. This suggests that 
organizations with lower levels of financial vulnerability during the Great Recession may have exited 
the recession with stronger marketing and communication practices than their less financially stable 
peers. This may support a hypothesis that organizations in financial distress are less likely to devote 
adequate resources to marketing and communication efforts.  
This test revealed a statistically significant relationship between changes in the Equity term of the 
FVI between 2008 and 2010, and scores on the CEI Leadership Culture subscale. The Equity term 
of the FVI measures total equity divided by total revenue. Equity is the remaining value after 
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liabilities are subtracted from assets. By the FVI algorithm developed by Tuckman and Chang and 
confirmed by Greenlee and Trussel, a higher equity term is considered to increase an organization’s 
financial vulnerability (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Their argument is that 
because assets are less liquid than revenue, organizations must be careful to manage their cash flow 
and liquidity as well as their balance sheet. Additionally, these organizations may not be bringing in 
sufficient revenue to survive a drop in the value of their assets. Many less liquid assets, such as real 
estate and long-term investments, may fluctuate in value dramatically both in book and market 
value, and the organization will be exposed to all of these fluctuations. Further, increases in the value 
of real estate and investment assets may require the organization to provide cash to cover taxes on 
increases in value. As a result, the Equity term of the FVI is relevant to a consideration of an 
organization’s financial sustainability. Thus, the finding of a positive correlation between increases in 
FVI Equity followed by a higher score on the Leadership Culture subscale of the CEI suggests that 
an organization with a higher ratio of equity to revenue over the two-year period prior to the 
administration of the CEI might be shown to have a leadership team and culture that are more 
actively supportive of volunteers by the CEI’s measures. 
With CEI data in only one year, it is difficult to figure out which of these factors is driving the other. 
This could be suggesting that organizations with strong leadership support of volunteers are less 
reliant on revenue due to their support from volunteers. Conversely, it could be suggesting that as 
revenue drops, organizations become more careful in taking care of their volunteers. While these 
attitudinal shifts are not reflected in the data set upon which this study is based, the various factors 
for the FVI calculation are. While there is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
change in revenue for the top-scoring half and the bottom-scoring half of the sample on the CEI 
Leadership Culture subscale, there is a meaningful difference in asset growth. The lower-scoring half 
of the sample shows a mean increase in assets of 12.5%, while the higher-scoring half of the sample 
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shows a mean increase in assets of 72.3%. It is hard to argue that a dramatically higher rate of asset 
growth during this time period is a negative trait from an organization-wide perspective, but it does 
lead to an increase in this equity term of the FVI calculation.   
In addition to this statistically significant finding, two additional correlations approached statistical 
significance: a weak to moderate negative relationship between CEI Infrastructure subscale and 
changes in FVI Equity between 2010 and 2012, and a weak to moderate positive relationship 
between the CEI’s Community Collaboration subscale and changes in FVI Concentration between 
2010 and 2012.  
The first correlation that nearly attained statistical significance was the relationship between higher 
scores on the Infrastructure subscale of the CEI and reductions in the Equity term of the FVI 
between 2010 and 2012. The equity term was discussed above. The changes between the top and 
bottom halves of the distribution of the Infrastructure scale and the components of the Equity term 
of the FVI are very different from those seen between 2008 and 2010 when examining the 
Leadership Culture subscale of the CEI above. In this case, the higher-scoring organizations on the 
CEI subscale show much greater increases in revenue over the 2010 to 2012 time frame, thus 
reducing their overall Equity term scores. Recall that lower values of the Equity term are seen as 
positive indications of financial stability. Thus, the organizations with higher scores on the 
Infrastructure subscale are showing a suggestion of greater financial stability in the time period 
following the administration of the CEI.  
The final correlation that approached statistical significance was that between the CEI Community 
Collaboration and increases in the Concentration term of the FVI in the following time period. 
Lower scores on the Concentration term are expected to drive financial stability, so this shift 
suggests that higher scores on the Community Collaboration subscale in 2010 may correlate with 
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higher revenue concentration and thus higher financial vulnerability in 2012. However, given that 
this is the first full time period after the Great Recession of 2007-2009, this may suggest that 
organizations with stronger community collaboration practices were able to leverage more of the 
government funding that was made available to help the nation through the financial crisis, and this 
is the return to a previous level of revenue consolidation after that unusual event.  
While this study did not unearth a statistically significant relationship between overall CEI scores 
and financial indicators, the fact that these values are not related suggests that the CEI is bringing a 
new dimension to organizational analysis that is not addressed by strictly financial metrics such as 
those used by Charity Navigator (2014a) or the percentage of revenue allocated to programs, which 
is the most common metric by which nonprofit organizations are evaluated by individual donors 
(Hope Consulting, 2010). These organizations leverage thousands of volunteers: based upon 
responses to the CEI from the original sample of 125 organizations, these organizations alone 
engage more than 12,000 volunteers annually. While these organizations are not showing a 
statistically significant difference in financial performance based on CEI scores, these organizations 
were selected to complete this survey by coalitions and foundations that support them and also 
support effective volunteer engagement.  
Practical Implications of the FVI and CEI 
Despite the lack of statistically significant findings, this study has clarified several issues. The first is 
that donors cannot be expected to rely on information based on 990 findings if those findings are 
not easily available. Granted, recent 990s are relatively easy to download from GuideStar or to 
request from individual organizations, but in the face of a financial crisis a funder might want to 
consider the organization’s performance during previous financial downturns, or the organization’s 
past history of financial vulnerability. If this historical information is not easily available or has to be 
purchased from a source like GuideStar, donors may not bother to pay to do this research. If 
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nonprofit organizations want donors to be more proactive in comparing multiple organizations 
before giving, they should consider making their recent financial statements available on their 
websites, as does Any Baby Can (www.anybabycan.org /about/financial-documents). Given that the 
information conveyed by the FVI does not correlate with any of the traditional financial metrics that 
are often reviewed in the grant approval process, this information could be a helpful tool to donors 
and grantmakers of many sizes as they consider various funding recipients. 
Beyond the challenges of relying on filings of Form 990 for studies of predetermined groups of 
nonprofit organizations, this study has revealed that both the FVI and the CEI have valuable 
information to convey to internal and external stakeholders, above and beyond the traditional 
financial metrics from Form 990 or a typical annual report. Not only are the total scores on these 
indices informative, but their subscales contribute unique information as well. 
FVI Practical Implications 
FVI scores could be helpful to nonprofits, both in sum and in components. Beyond monitoring 
their FVI annually, the components of this index can be disaggregated and used as part of a 
decision-making process. Having a quantifiable metric whereby to discuss funding stream diversity 
can be a useful tool in discussions about whether pursuing a new funding opportunity would be 
worth the effort. Often, organizations are tempted to stay with funding streams wherein they have 
successful track records. As the Concentration term of the FVI makes clear, even the addition of a 
new stream bringing 10% of an organization’s revenue when they are currently dependent on a 
single type of funding can make a difference, reducing their revenue concentration by almost 20%. 
Quantifying the benefit of revenue diversification may make a financial officer’s job easier when 
trying to explain additional effort and possible expense involved in garnering support from a new 
provider.  
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The Equity term of the FVI demonstrates the importance of maintaining steady and increasing 
revenue streams even in the face of increases in assets. Board members or other interested parties 
not familiar with an organization’s finances may see a large gift of land or locked-up stock as an 
unmitigated benefit. This term helps to explain the necessity for liquidity to balance out assets for 
three reasons: gaps between book value and market value, lack of liquidity, and expenses associated 
with illiquid assets such as taxes. Art museums have become painfully aware that gifts of works of 
art come with costs such as maintaining a climate-controlled storage space, maintenance and 
restoration. To be able to maintain these pieces, let alone to create, staff, and maintain an 
appropriate exhibit space, requires liquid cash regardless of the value of the pieces donated.  
The Margin term of the FVI adds an additional component to the traditional comparison of revenue 
to expenses. It can be easy to think that as long as expenses are less than revenue, everything is fine. 
However, by dividing this value by revenue, this metric conveys how small the organization’s 
marginal earnings are. If these margins are thin, the organization may be one unexpected expense 
away from reducing programs or closing its doors.  
The Administration term of the FVI may be the most counterintuitive to most examiners of these 
components. Some viewers of this term may assume that lower levels of administrative expense 
would be better for an organization. The realization that administrative tasks are not fat to be cut 
from the budget but can be strengthening the organization in strong financial cycles in anticipation 
of reduction during leaner times is a perspective which may be new to many.  
Practical Implications of the CEI 
The information contributed by the CEI is focused on an organization’s relationship with its 
volunteers, but that focus transcends the boundaries of the organization. As Drs. Rehnborg and 
Poole discovered when creating this tool, effective volunteer engagement cannot be relegated to a 
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single individual, or even a single department, of a nonprofit. Rather, it must pervade the 
organization from its leadership team through all employees and out into the community through 
marketing and collaborative efforts.  
The Leadership Culture subscale focuses on necessary traits of the board, and addresses the 
organization-wide components of a volunteer-supportive organizational culture. This subscale also 
alludes to the breadth of volunteers an organization may welcome: from board members to students, 
from veterans to national service participants, potential volunteers are not homogeneous. This 
subscale includes several items clarifying that everyone in the organization contributes to the culture, 
and thus must be aware of the value of volunteers to build an organization with a true culture of 
community engagement. This subscale showed the only statistically significant relationship in the 
study. A correlation of changes in the Equity term of the FVI between 2008 and 2010 and the 
Leadership Culture subscale scores in 2010 showed that organizations with positive changes in 
Equity were likely also to have higher Leadership Culture scores. Further analysis of these 
organizations showed that these organizations showed a larger increase in asset value than their 
counterparts, suggesting that organizations with strong cultures supporting volunteers were able to 
increase their assets between 2008 and 2010 at a higher rate than their peers. 
While the Leadership Culture subscale focuses on internal issues, the Community Collaboration 
subscale addresses an organization’s ability to build and maintain bridges that cross the 
organization’s external boundaries. The items on this subscale relate to an organization’s ties to peer 
organizations, its engagement of outside voices in planning processes, and its proactivity in gathering 
feedback about its performance from internal and external perspectives. Organizations that score 
well on this subscale showed a suggestion of an increase in financial concentration in the time period 
following the administration of the CEI. This may suggest that organizations with stronger 
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connections to their surrounding communities were able to pull down the additional government 
support funding that was available to assist organizations and individuals in recovering from the 
Great Recession. Since the observed shift was between 2010 and 2012, it occurred after the 
recession and after most of the recovery funding had been distributed. Without further data about 
funding sources and their public and private ratios, it is not possible to verify or disprove this 
hypothesis. 
The Marketing & Communication subscale of the CEI addresses outbound communication from 
the organization to the surrounding community, and awareness of the appropriate methods and 
channels for such communication. Additionally, it measures the organization’s awareness and 
implementation of appropriate branding such as the utilization of an array of timely recruitment 
methods, approaches, and messaging. While these traits are important to recruiting volunteers and 
maintaining community awareness of an organization’s programs and processes, this subscale did 
not show any meaningful relationships with any of the financial statistics or FVI components 
tracked in this study. 
The Infrastructure subscale of the CEI details the necessary elements of an organization’s 
underpinning structure which must be sufficiently robust to support both paid staff and volunteers. 
Issues such as allocation of needed space, supplies, computer hardware and software can make a big 
difference in a volunteer’s experience with an organization. Beyond accommodating an 
organization’s regular volunteers, this subscale specifically asks whether the organization shares 
resources with another organization through a partnership. This subscale considers whether an 
organization is proactive or reactive with resource allocation: does the organization take a holistic 
view of the people supporting it, and support them in return regardless of whether they are paid 
staff, volunteers, or resources shared with another organization? Organizations with this level of 
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awareness will score well on this subscale. It is possible that these same organizations might see a 
decline in the Equity term of their FVI in the following time period: in this sample, there was some 
indication that organizations with higher Infrastructure scores saw reductions in their Equity term 
between 2010 and 2012. Unlike the shifts seen above with an increase in the Equity term being 
driven by increased assets, this reduction in the Equity term was seen to relate to an increase in 
overall revenue. In the calculation of the overall FVI, decreases in the Equity term also decrease the 
odds of financial vulnerability, so this shift not only indicates an increase in organizational revenue 
but also an increase in organizational financial stability. 
The final subscale of the CEI, Volunteer Management, is similar to a management assessment from 
a paid employee’s perspective. From onboarding processes to bidirectional feedback opportunities 
and support structures, this subscale focuses on whether the organization is taking its management 
responsibilities towards its volunteers seriously. This subscale showed signs of a possible 
relationship with increases in expenses between 2008 and 2010. This could be due to volunteers who 
had been highly loyal during better financial times leaving the organization to seek additional income 
or to reduce financial outlay by completing tasks for which they had previously had enough financial 
capacity to pay, such as child care or cleaning their homes. Were this the case, the organization 
might have had to bring on paid staff – either these volunteers or other people – to fulfill the roles 
that had been filled by volunteers in better financial times.  
One of the clever traits of the CEI is that its questions can be answered by individuals from any 
point inside – or outside – an organization. It can be completed by a volunteer who helps with a 
single event per year, a CFO who is paid or not, a board member, a staff member at a peer 
nonprofit, or even a potential funder. All of these perspectives would be valuable, and the similarity 
or differences in responses could be very informative. Nonprofit organizations could benefit from 
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collecting annual CEI responses from an array of stakeholders and monitoring it over time. These 
questions may not be asked on a regular basis in many nonprofits, but they could provide valuable 
feedback to an organization’s decision-makers. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
The lack of consistency in filing of Form 990 in this sample was unexpected. The thought that forty 
percent of this sample of organizations with historical revenue levels of over $200,000 per year and 
asset levels of over $500,000 per year, thus meeting the IRS’s requirements for filing a full 990, 
would skip one or more filings of the 990 was surprising. Because of this issue, the total size of this 
sample was far smaller than anticipated. To confirm that these results are valid for a broader 
population, this study should be replicated with a larger sample. Given that predicting financial 
crises is not easy, tracking CEI scores on an ongoing basis would be valuable both for research 
purposes and for internal management purposes within individual nonprofit organizations.  
The second major challenge for this study was the lack of evidence of a recession in this sample of 
organizations. Since financial crises are difficult to predict, annual CEI scores would be helpful. As 
this repository grows, it can be used for internal assessments within nonprofits completing the CEI, 
and can also provide a helpful historical record when financial conditions shift. 
These results would also be strengthened through further analysis of this sample in comparison to a 
similar sample of organizations that are not linked to the OneStar Foundation, the Literacy Coalition 
of Central Texas, or TRIAD. This information would be helpful as an indication of whether these 
organizations are performing differently from other nonprofit organizations in similar mission foci. 
Since these three coordinating organizations were sufficiently interested in effective community 
engagement practices as to take part in this study, it is possible that their previous work with the 
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nonprofits they support has already strengthened community engagement practices in these 
organizations in comparison to their peers. 
Additionally, the fact that these supporting foundations and coalitions were asking organizations to 
complete these studies cannot be overlooked as a potential source of bias. If the individuals 
completing these surveys felt that their funding or support levels from these coordinating 
organizations would be influenced by their responses to the CEI, it is possible that their responses 
could have been biased. To address this, a future study should be based upon a random sample of 
organizations in a given geography. Potential respondents should be assured that their responses will 
remain confidential and will only be shared in anonymized fashions, and preferably only in 
aggregate. Without the motivation of a coordinating organization behind a survey, it can be difficult 
to garner responses, especially to a survey with 52 community engagement questions (a count that 
does not include any demographic questions). Moreover, gaps in filings of Form 990 in 40% of the 
sample would require that the new sample be two and a half times larger than the number needed to 
attain statistical significance. Further, since response rates to online surveys are roughly 25% 
(Penwarden, 2014), the survey must be sent to at least ten organizations for each expected response 
from an organization with a consistent filing history, or organizations must be selected based upon 
their filing history. 
Additionally, a sense of the respondent organizations’ history with volunteers in terms of the 
number of volunteers engaged on a regular basis would be helpful. For this study, the only 
information available was from self-reported demographics placed into broad buckets as part of the 
CEI. To understand how volunteer engagement changes over time, more specific data regarding the 
specific number of volunteers involved each year would be helpful as a portion of an annual CEI. 
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There is little research on how patterns in volunteering change during a financial crisis: such 
longitudinal information would be helpful to establish baselines prior to a future financial crisis. 
The partnership between the authors of the CEI and the authors of the Core Capacity Assessment 
Tool (CCAT) has yielded the Service Enterprise Diagnostic, or SED, which integrates a broader 
view of organizational strengths beyond community engagement with academic rigor. One of the 
benefits of the SED is that this broader realm of analysis should address multi-collinearity concerns 
about the overlaps of the subscales of the CEI. This union of theoretical grounding from the CEI 
and the larger user base from the CCAT will hopefully yield a rich data set for future analysis. 
Conclusions 
This study revealed that this sample of Texas-based nonprofit organizations, when considered as a 
whole, was able to maintain its assets and revenue throughout the Great Recession of 2007-2009. 
While the results for the FVI and CEI did not reach statistical significance, the data show that both 
of these metrics capture information about nonprofit organizations that cannot be conveyed by the 
data usually reviewed by donors. Encouraging donors to review an organization’s level of 
community engagement as well as its financial vulnerability – or lack thereof – could assist in 
encouraging donors to invest in nonprofit organizations with sufficient community engagement and 
financial stability to utilize the donor’s dollars efficiently and effectively. If publication of FVI and 
CEI scores became more prevalent, donors of both money and time would be able to compare 
potential recipients of their largesse by relevant metrics that are not currently available easily to the 
general public. 
Inconsistent filing of Form 990 is far more common that I would have expected, and must be 
considered and accounted for when constructing a sample for tests relying on financial data to be 
drawn from the 990. One option to address this issue would be to verify the filing history of 
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organizations within the sample prior to launching a survey. While a history of consistent filings 
would not guarantee future consistent filings, it could suggest an organizational pattern. Most studies 
of the nonprofit sector as a whole draw most of their information from large nonprofit 
organizations, as did the creators of the FVI. Because their sample was so large, it was easy for them 
to disregard any organizations with inconsistent filing history. 
This is the first published exploration of raw FVI scores, and reveals their volatility. The information 
published by the previous architects of this metric (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991) revealed the rates of financial vulnerability in their samples by category, but conveyed no 
longitudinal data about how these scores shift over time. The rate of financial vulnerability in 
Greenlee and Trussel’s sample of more than six thousand organizations was under seven 
percent(Greenlee & Trussel, 2000), while the rate for the full sample of filings of Form 990 that I 
examined was over forty percent. Since Greenlee and Trussel examined very large organizations, 
including all nonprofits in the United States with annual revenue of $10 million or more, this may 
suggest that smaller nonprofit organizations experience higher rates of financial vulnerability than 
larger organizations. Neither of the historical studies included an aggregated longitudinal 
component. In the future it would be interesting to explore the volatility of FVI scores and consider 
whether these absolute cut-off values deliver enough information, or whether trending information 
about how FVI scores change longitudinally might also convey important messages about 
organizational sustainability. Since previous authors did not discuss the volatility of FVI scores, no 
historical information is available against which to compare the findings from this study.  
Though no statistically significant relationship was found between the FVI and the CEI, this study 
provides a unique summary of financial performance for a group of Texas organizations before and 
during the Great Recession, and depicts a nonprofit sector continuing to serve its community 
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throughout this time rather than faltering due to lack of available revenue. The potential correlations 
documented herein provide interesting questions to be answered by a future study predicated on a 
larger sample of organizations with community engagement data collected at multiple times. The 
Service Enterprise Diagnostic tool will hopefully provide this longitudinal information to allow this 
intriguing research to continue.  
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Appendix A: Organizations Included in Sample 
 
29 Consistent Filers: 
ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN INC 
ANY BABY CAN INC 
AUSTIN HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INC 
AVENIDA GUADALUPE ASSOCIATION 
BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF SOUTH TEXAS INC 
CARITAS OF AUSTIN 
CEN-TEX CERTIFIED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
CITIZENS DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
COMMUNITIES IN SCHOOLS OF SOUTH CENTRAL TEXAS INC 
COMMUNITIES IN SCHOOLS OF THE HEART OF TEXAS 
COMMUNITY & SENIOR SERVICES OF MIDLAND INC 
CONNECTIONS INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY SERVICES INC 
EL BUEN SAMARITANO EPISCOPAL MISSION 
FAMILIES IN CRISIS INCORPORATED 
FAMILY SERVICE ASSOCIATION 
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF CENTRAL EAST 
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF CENTRAL TEXAS 
GRAYSON COUNTY JUVENILE ALTERNATIVES INC 
GREATER SAN MARCOS YOUTH COUNCIL INC DTD 08-01-89 
LITERACY ADVANCE OF HOUSTON INC 
MY SECOND CHANCE INC 
PROJECT NORMALIZATION OPEN DOOR PRESCHOOL 
SA YOUTH 
THE BRIDGE 
THE CHILDRENS SHELTER 
THE PARENTING CENTER 
UNITED WAY OF ABILENE 
UNITED WAY OF SOUTHERN CAMERON COUNTY 
YOUTH AND FAMILY ALLIANCE 
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50 Organizations in 2008-2012 Testing with CEI: 
ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN INC 
ANY BABY CAN INC 
ASCEND CENTER FOR LEARNING 
AUSTIN HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INC 
AVENIDA GUADALUPE ASSOCIATION 
BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF SOUTH TEXAS INC 
BOOKSPRING 
BOY WITH A BALL MINISTRIES 
CARITAS OF AUSTIN 
CEN-TEX CERTIFIED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
CHRISTS HOME PLACE MINISTRIES INC 
CITIZENS DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
COALITION OF TEXANS WITH DISABILITIES INC 
COLLEGE FORWARD 
COMMUNITIES IN SCHOOLS OF SOUTH CENTRAL TEXAS INC 
COMMUNITIES IN SCHOOLS OF THE HEART OF TEXAS 
COMMUNITY & SENIOR SERVICES OF MIDLAND INC 
COMMUNITY HOPE PROJECTS INC 
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP FOR THE HOMELESS INC 
CONNECTIONS INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY SERVICES INC 
DIGITAL WORKFORCE ACADEMY INC 
EL BUEN SAMARITANO EPISCOPAL MISSION 
EL PASO DIABETES ASSOCIATION INC 
EXCHANGE CLUB CHILD ABUSE PREVEN- TION CENTER-AWARE CENTRAL TEXAS 
FAMILIES IN CRISIS INCORPORATED 
FAMILY SERVICE ASSOCIATION 
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF CENTRAL EAST 
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF CENTRAL TEXAS 
GRAYSON COUNTY JUVENILE ALTERNATIVES INC 
GREATER SAN MARCOS YOUTH COUNCIL INC DTD 08-01-89 
IEA INSPIRE ENCOURAGE ACHIEVE 
LITERACY ADVANCE OF HOUSTON INC 
LITERACY COALITION OF CENTRAL TEXAS 
MY SECOND CHANCE INC 
ONE CHURCH ONE CHILD OF NORTH-NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS AND 
SURROUNDING 
OPERATION HOMEFRONT INC 
PROJECT NORMALIZATION OPEN DOOR PRESCHOOL 
PROYECTO JUAN DIEGO INC 
R O C K RIDE ON CENTER FOR KIDS 
RESERVE AID INC 
ROUND ROCK AREA SERVING CENTER INCORPORATED 




SAN ANTONIO LIFETIME RECOVERY INC 
THE BRIDGE 
THE CHILDRENS SHELTER 
THE PARENTING CENTER 
UNITED WAY OF ABILENE 
UNITED WAY OF SOUTHERN CAMERON COUNTY 
UNITED WE SERVE 
YOUTH AND FAMILY ALLIANCE 
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